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SILENCING THE OPPOSITION 
 
[S]aid monies…being illegally expended [by the Hawaii Statehood Commission] are used to aid 
private purposes and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of 
statehood for Hawaii…[Such monies are] to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers 
of the territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood… 
- Alice Kamokila Campbell, plaintiff in Campbell 
v. Stainback, et al. filed on January 17th, 1948 
(Anniversary of the U.S.-backed overthrow of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom)1 
 
Which utterances are destined to disappear without any trace?  Which are destined, on the other 
hand, to enter into human memory through ritual recitation, pedagogy, amusement, festival, 
publicity? 
     - Michel Foucault2 
 
 
 On the morning of August 19, 2006, state Representative Barbara Marumoto, 
dressed as the Statue of Liberty, and state Senator Sam Slom, waving a large American 
flag, led a group of around fifty people to celebrate Admissions Day—a state holiday that 
commemorates Hawai‘i statehood.  This group’s state-sponsored commemoration, 
however, was blocked by Hawaiian grassroots activists, also estimated at around fifty, 
who had previously asked Marumoto and Slom to hold their celebration next door at the 
state capitol.  Carrying Hawaiian nationalist flags and signs that read “Kanaka Maoli 
Independence,” protestors argued that ‘Iolani Palace “is a sacred spot, which is the seat of 
our government” and also the site where the U.S. military-backed overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom had taken place 113 years earlier.3  The two groups clashed when the 
group celebrating statehood continued with their program and began to sing the “Star 
Spangled Banner”—without the accompaniment of the Kalani high school band, which 
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decided to leave the event and not get involved.  The Hawaiian group countered by using 
a public address system to interrupt the U.S. national anthem.  Verbal arguments and 
near-physical confrontations continued for over an hour until the group celebrating 
statehood—tired and frustrated—decided to leave.  The Hawaiian group formed a circle 
and prayed. 
 Far from the romantic images commonly associated with Hawai‘i, political battles 
and protests between groups—each armed with opposing versions of history—occur 
more frequently in Hawai‘i.  These disputes are often shaped by U.S. national narratives 
that underpin American civil liberties, which have contributed to numerous assaults on 
indigenous Native Hawaiian communities.  Such narratives translate into local, state, and 
federal court cases, policies, and actions, such as the numerous legal challenges to so-
called Hawaiian “entitlements,” the U.S. military’s post-9/11“land-grab” in Hawai‘i, 
major real estate and hotel developments on sacred sites and Native burials, and the 
legitimacy (or dismissal) of an over thirty year contemporary Hawaiian movement for 
self-determination, to name just a few.  These actions and policies are all intimately tied 
to U.S. national narratives that speak of equality and progress while obscuring the very 
colonial violence these stories enact.  Such contemporary conflicts are not only animated 
by different memories of the past, but whether past injustices—such as the 1893 
overthrow—remain locked in the past; or if this past wrong sustains the political 
conditions for new assaults to emerge, thus persisting and shaping, even haunting, our 
present moment.4  Indeed, the past and present are mutually constitutive of each other, 
where notions of history help to shape our views of present realities.  Our willingness to 
identify with certain histories over others is a complex choice, one with a multitude of 
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explanations, but this choice is generally influenced by one’s own sense of a natural order 
of things.   
 Most critics of Native Hawaiian protests of Admissions Day view such opposition 
as politically contrived and ahistorical.5  They argue that Hawaiians alive during the 
1940s and 1950s, like other communities, wholly embraced statehood and played crucial 
roles in its achievement.  For most in Hawai‘i, the history of statehood is a liberal 
movement preserved in popular memory, a simultaneous tale about a long struggle to 
oppose haole (white) racism and an expression of self-determination that was 
democratically and definitively settled.  Indeed, one of the primary reasons Hawai‘i 
statehood took nearly 60 years to accomplish, was its largely “Asiatic” population, or 
more specifically, an inflated fear that imperial Japan would “take-over” Hawai‘i.  
Southern congressmen were even said to have passed photographs of people from 
Hawai‘i (Asian and Hawaiian) in order to sway other congressmen to oppose Hawai‘i 
statehood.6  Many in Hawai‘i, indeed, supported a state-led movement to gain their civil 
rights as “first-class American citizens,” countering various inequalities created by white 
racism (both locally and nationally) and advancing a liberal and anti-racist ideal that U.S. 
citizenship and democracy should not be limited to haole only.  Often cited is the June 
1959 congressionally mandated plebiscite, which revealed that of the 155,000 registered 
voters, 17 to 1 were in favor of statehood (132,773 to 7,971).7   
 Yet, as Native Hawaiian demonstrations on Admissions Day illustrate, Hawai‘i 
statehood was only possible as a result of U.S. imperial force and power.  Statehood is 
argued to be the manifestation of a U.S. military-backed overthrow of an independent 
Hawaiian government in 1893 and its illegal annexation and occupation in 1898.  Many 
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further argue that the 1959 statehood plebiscite was itself fraudulent, as the ballot was 
written to limit the vote to statehood, and did not include the United Nations mandated 
options for “independence” or other “separate systems of self-government.”8  Indeed, 
United Nations Rapporteur Miguel Martinez in 1998 found Hawai‘i’s incorporation into 
the United States to be in violation of international law and recommended to the United 
Nations that Hawai‘i be placed back on the list of Non-Self-Governing-Territories.9  
Given the fact that 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of Hawai‘i statehood, the idea that the 
civil liberties achieved through statehood came at the expense of Native Hawaiians’ 
human rights to self-determination is cause for major contemporary conflict and anxiety.  
Histories between these groups have become so intensely opposed that on Admissions 
Day in 2008, near the time when the Hawai‘i 50th Anniversary Statehood Commission 
announced its yearlong plans to commemorate its “golden anniversary,” more than 
twenty members of a Hawaiian group from Maui were arrested for taking control of 
‘Iolani Palace seeking to reinstate an independent Hawaiian nation.10  These historically 
provoked political divisions beg the questions: was there, as Hawaiian activists claim, a 
longstanding history of opposition to statehood?  Or is such a history a “mere thing” built 
in and on a present politics?   
Situated in comparative ethnic studies, American studies, and cultural history, this 
dissertation examines the complex interplay between different Asian American groups, 
Native Hawaiians, and haole, within historical moments of interaction shaped by 
opposing versions of history.  Here, I defamiliarize the familiar narration of Hawai‘i 
statehood by tracing the production of this narrative, providing a genealogy of different 
state apparatuses and series of knowledges of history and race (primitivism and 
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orientalism) that worked together to narrate and materialize the historical domination that 
produced Hawai‘i statehood.11  By examining the cultural politics of Hawai‘i statehood at 
the intersections of “race” and “indigeneity,” this project theorizes the productive 
tensions created by placing Asian American and Native Hawaiian histories in 
conversation.  I argue that these groups’ oppressions are “overlapping without 
equivalence,”12 where these communities are each historically oppressed but their specific 
forms of oppression cannot be equated.  In this study, I show how statehood proponents 
challenged, and even modified, an orientalist notion that Asian Americans were foreign 
threats who were to be excluded permanently from the national polity as “ineligible for 
citizenship.”13  Yet, at the same time that this movement made racism against Asian 
Americans visible, statehood proponents made invisible (by naturalizing) another form of 
oppression, a primitivist (and American modernist) notion that viewed Native Hawaiians, 
like other indigenous peoples, as permanently “unfit for self-government.”14  Such an 
analysis signals a political need to become “multilingual” in these different histories and 
the temporal dissonance that allows these groups to relate differently to settler national 
narratives and projects for empire.15  
While Hawai‘i statehood is memorialized, as a civil rights victory that united 
Hawai‘i in order to achieve statehood, nearly all but forgotten is the existence of other 
Native Hawaiians and supporters who, citing the 1893 overthrow, voiced opposition to 
statehood.  Such lapses in present memory are systemic and deliberate, as the state 
commissions responsible for normalizing support for statehood, actually repressed and 
intimidated Hawaiian opposition.  These state apparatuses monopolized taxpayer monies 
to finance a massive opinion campaign targeting a local and national population to 
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support statehood.  This campaign’s control of public resources, its volume, visibility, 
and centrality, consequently blocked any opposing movement or narrative from forming.  
As quoted in the epigraph above, former Territorial senator Alice Kamokila Campbell 
sued the Hawaii Statehood Commission on January 17th, 1948—the anniversary of the 
1893 overthrow—seeking to stop this state apparatus from accessing taxpayer monies to 
campaign for statehood (chapter three).   
To be sure, statehood and the formation of these state apparatuses were created 
out of economic concerns, rather than altruistic ones.  The United States was in severe 
economic depression in the 1890s and 1930s, which led Congress to alter Hawai‘i sugar 
industry’s lucrative tariff relations in both moments.  Further “integrating” Hawai‘i into 
the United States—in other words, extending U.S. colonial control—was seen by settler 
planters as ways to regain profitable tariffs.  In order to regain tariffs through 
incorporation, however, the battle over public opinion would need to be won.  As such, 
the Hawaiian Bureau of Information (1892-1893), would not only work to attract tourists 
and haole settlers to Hawai‘i, but would also work to shape national public opinion 
around the 1893 overthrow and movement for annexation (chapter one).  This 
commission would serve as the blueprint for other commissions charged with further 
placing Hawai‘i under colonial control of the United States.  By the mid-1930s, the 
Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1947) led a similar movement to regain 
profitable tariffs by capturing consent for statehood (chapter two).   
By the end of the Second World War, however, statehood was desired, not to 
alleviate economic depression but rather, to capitalize on a growing tourism industry and 
post-world war boom.  As long as Hawai‘i remained a territory and not a state, large U.S. 
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banks and insurance companies were prohibited by their corporate indentures from 
issuing large loans or insurance policies.16  This lack of investment capital inhibited 
businesses from managing and profiting from record numbers of tourists visiting the 
islands.  In this context, the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959) was formed to 
lead a more aggressive campaign for statehood (chapter three).  The links between these 
commissions are not only institutional, but also familial.  For example, Lorrin P. 
Thurston, the son of Lorrin A. Thurston who helped lead the overthrow of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom and created the Hawaiian Bureau of Information, would eventually come to 
chair the Hawaii Statehood Commission.   
By the 1950s, statehood proponents realized that they needed to show how 
statehood served the needs and interests of Washington D.C.  Thus, the geopolitical scope 
of Hawai’i statehood has global implications, given Hawai‘i’s ideological value to U.S. 
Cold War projects for global hegemony.  As a consequence of these politics, the 
movement for statehood led by both federal and territorial leaders would create a general 
fear of publicly opposing the interests of these elites.  This consequently disposed well-
intentioned citizens—the good citizen-subject—to see their interests in the hegemonic 
ideology of the state and thus enact the colonial oppression of an influential and 
domineering class.   
 I wish to be clear, that I am not arguing that Native Hawaiians who supported 
statehood were “duped.”  Hawaiians did not all either embrace or reject statehood 
uniformly but rather, adopted a range of responses based on astute political assessments 
of changing conditions and possibilities occurring in Hawai‘i at the time.  Instead, this 
dissertation examines the racial and historical discourse on statehood that censored 
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Hawaiian opposition to reaffirm colonial power in the past and present.  This project 
asks, to what different historical forces did Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians 
respond, and what did the acquisition of statehood seem to promise?  How can U.S. civil 
rights discourse facilitate projects of settler colonialism and empire?  How do settler 
states narrate and represent the colonial violence necessary for its existence, and how is it 
made to seem normal and natural?  What role does settler colonialism play in normalizing 
the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i?  
 If nations are themselves narrations, as cultural critics have argued, then the 
dominant historical narrative defining the state of Hawai‘i is in the statehood 
movement.17  Hawai‘i’s quest for statehood tells a particularly American story, a narrative 
of western settlement and the linear evolution of the primitive into the modern, what 
Ralph Kuykendall, foremost Hawai‘i historian in the 1960s, articulated in the subtitle to 
his text as A History From Polynesian Kingdom to American State.18  Yet, Hawai‘i’s 
statehood movement also narrates an American tale that is closely related but also distinct 
from the settlement stories told on the U.S. continent.  Hawai‘i’s narrative tells a story 
not just of white settlement but of Asian settlement; it describes Hawai‘i as a place where 
Asians, who were largely seen as “perpetual foreigners” by the American public, helped 
to settle an exotic territory in the middle of the Pacific Ocean—a place where the 
seemingly oppositional cultures of the East and West were reconciled to create an 
“American melting pot” of the Pacific.19  The narrative of establishing U.S. capitalism 
and democracy in a non-western place was familiar, but Hawai‘i was both non-
contiguous and more importantly settled, as far as many Americans were concerned, by 
the wrong kinds of settlers.  By the end of the Second World War, Congress was forced 
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to contend with the question of whether or not to admit a qualified but largely non-white 
territory into the Union.  This dilemma was further complicated by the particular 
historical moment in which the question of statehood was debated in Congress, as 
Hawai‘i statehood intersected with both African American civil rights movements, Indian 
termination policy, as well as U.S. Cold War politics—since a militant labor movement 
in Hawai‘i had created suspicion that the islands were inundated with communists.   
In his intricate study of Hawai‘i statehood, Last Among Equals, Roger Bell shows 
how Southern senators blocked Hawai‘i’s bid for statehood as they wished to keep 
congressional control for the Democrats and also felt nervous that new liberal Asian 
senators might facilitate the passing of civil rights legislation.  In Completing the Union 
John S. Whitehead compares the movement for statehood in Hawai‘i and Alaska and 
their particular utility as military posts during the Cold War.20  It is at the intersection of 
civil rights and the Cold War that we can gain a more expansive view of Hawai‘i 
statehood.  In order to make Hawai‘i less foreign in the eyes of Congress and the 
American public, local proponents of statehood used Hawai‘i’s alterity to their favor.21  A 
diverse range of communities formed an historical bloc, including many Native 
Hawaiians that consented to a presumably higher calling of U.S. nationality in order to 
demonstrate their merit through alternative versions of American modernity.  Many 
argued that Hawai‘i’s citizenry—theorized as racially diverse but culturally American—
should be showcased above all other American achievements for the world to see what 
only American democracy could accomplish.  This was especially key since the Soviet 
Union and China began criticizing the United States in the 1940s as a white supremacist 
nation, even arguing that Hawai‘i statehood was an effect of capitalism’s failure and 
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continued need for colonies.22  This argument, statehood proponents asserted, could be 
challenged only if statehood were achieved.  Scholars such as Derrick A. Bell Jr., 
Thomas Borstelman, Penny M. Von Eschen, Nikhil Singh, Christina Klein, and Mary 
Dudziak have each shown differently how the idea of the United States as a racially 
diverse nation based on harmonious race relations was mobilized during the Cold War for 
the purposes of U.S. global hegemony.23  For instance, Derrick Bell argues that the 
celebrated Brown v. Board of Education case, which desegregated public schools, cannot 
be understood without considering its value to whites.  Bell argues that we should expand 
our consideration of civil rights projects and not simply concern ourselves with, “those 
concerned about the immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policy 
making positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and abroad that 
would follow abandonment of segregation.”  Bell thus shows that the Brown decision 
helped to provide “immediate credibility” in the Cold War to “win the hearts and minds 
of emerging third world people.”24   
By the 1940s and 50s, when decolonization throughout Asia, the Pacific, Africa 
and Latin America was transforming an international order, and criticism of Western 
colonialism was the dominant international sentiment, Cold War warriors were aware that 
Hawai‘i statehood had ideological value for gaining the allegiance of newly decolonized 
nations.  Hawai‘i’s majority Asian and Pacific Islander population could thus serve as the 
new face of a militarily powerful and economically dominant United States—one that 
would assist the maintenance of U.S. military bases and secure access to resources and 
markets throughout Asia and the Pacific.  As Christina Klein argues in Cold War 
Orientalism Hawai‘i statehood had the ability to rearticulate U.S. imperialism as the 
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spreading of democracy, which created a misleading distinction between European 
colonial powers and the United States.  Klein contends that Hawai‘i statehood made the 
United States “a little less white and Western in its national identity” and cites a 1959 
Newsweek article that declared “Hawaii will be the first state with roots not in Europe but 
in Asia” stating that no longer would America be known as the “land of the white man” 
and “tarred with the brush of ‘colonialism.’”25  
While Hawai‘i statehood helped to give American race relations a multicultural 
face before an international community, the local discourse of statehood in Hawai‘i 
furnished the Hawai‘i elite with a form of insulating, if not reconsolidating, their 
economic power and hegemony that had been under threat.  In chapter three, I show that 
by 1934, haole settler hegemony was in crisis.  In this year, as a part of New Deal 
agricultural policies created to respond to the Great Depression, Congress ignored 
Hawai‘i’s status as an “incorporated territory” and limited the quota of sugar that could 
be exported, tariff-free, to the U.S continent.  Hawai‘i’s Republican Party, who 
represented the interests of the Big Five—five interlocking corporations which dominated 
the Territorial politics and economy of the territory and who were intimately involved in 
the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom—began pushing for statehood in an attempt to 
maintain and reestablish hegemony.  For many of Hawai‘i’s non-white working class, 
however, statehood symbolized a rejection of haole hegemony, seeking access to 
opportunities limited by haole privilege and racism.  Hawai‘i’s political structure had 
been based on an amended Northwest Ordinance that declared that the U.S. president 
would appoint Hawai‘i’s Territorial governor while its citizenry would vote for a non-
voting delegate to Congress and its legislature.  Many of Hawai‘i’s appointed governors, 
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judges, and politicians were a part of the exclusive Big Five power structure and 
condoned an arrangement of power that was exploitative and often violent towards the 
numerous labor movements in the 1930s and 40s that called for better living and work 
conditions.26  Hawai‘i’s sugar planters purposefully kept their labor forces racially 
divided by using the discourse of scientific racism, to determine and justify segregated 
and hierarchical plantation housing and pay-positions.27  Labor historians Ronald Takaki, 
Gary Okihiro, Edward D. Beechert, Sanford Zalburg, and Moon-Kie Jung, write that 
paternalism and “divide and conquer” were systematic strategies used to “offset” any one 
nationality from accumulating power as well as to keep racial groups from effectively 
uniting to challenge the Big Five.28   
Moon-Kie Jung’s recent book Reworking Race, explains how the International 
Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union (ILWU), while credited with the successful 
organizing of Hawai‘i’s labor force solely around class interests, actually did so by 
“reworking race,” a project facilitated by the 1935 Wagner Act and earlier labor activists 
who established relations with the west coast after participating in the 1934 San 
Francisco dockworkers strike.29  Under the slogan “An injury to one, is an injury to all” 
the ILWU coordinated a massive strike in 1946 during which 21,000 workers shut down 
thirty-three of the thirty-four sugar plantations in Hawai‘i.  When pineapple workers went 
on strike the following year and dockworkers went on strike two years later, consequently 
crippling Hawai‘i’s entire island community for 157 days, the Big Five accused the 
ILWU leadership of being communist infiltrators with connections to the Soviet Union.   
While ILWU support of statehood started in the 1930s, the hysteria created by 
McCarthyism and its criminalization of labor, provided a political opportunity for the Big 
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Five to marginalize both labor and the general public through a newly written state 
constitution.  By April of 1950, at the same time that Hawai‘i’s State Constitutional 
Convention took place, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) was 
called to investigate communism in Hawai‘i.30  Hawai‘i’s ILWU labor leaders were 
eventually found in violation of the Smith Act (the Act which allowed HUAC to 
criminalize communists), and the general sentiment garnered from the sensationalism of 
the HUAC hearings helped to pass a conservative state constitution that limited the 
influence of the both the voting public and labor unions.  This state constitution would, in 
fact, maintain many of the Territorial structures of governance (specifically governor 
appointments), which had allowed the Big Five to monopolize political power.  Although 
the labor leaders of the ILWU and other radicals, collectively referred to as the “Hawaii 
7,” were fined and sentenced to prison, the verdict was met by a general strike of twenty 
thousand ILWU members who refused to load military cargo headed for the Korean War.  
Further appeals kept the convicted seven out of jail until they were exonerated in 1958.   
Despite attempts to maintain white settler hegemony, a new political force 
emerged that gave birth to a new arrangement of power in Hawai‘i.  The emergence of 
various labor movements of plantation and dockworkers, changing demographics and 
their impact on voting, and the disenfranchisement of rights through martial law during 
World War II would alter Hawai‘i’s political landscape.31  Asians in Hawai‘i, indeed, had 
historical reason to agitate.  As a result of the 1900 Organic Act, Hawai‘i adopted the 
naturalization laws of the United States that prohibited Asian immigrants already in 
Hawai‘i to naturalize or vote.  Labeled “ineligible for citizenship,” this generation would 
have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation.  In 
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1936, University of Hawai‘i sociologist and proponent of the “immigration assimilation 
model,” Romanzo Adams, predicted that, by 1944, two-thirds of Hawai‘i’s Asian 
population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the “non-
caucasian majority” and leading to a redistribution of power.32  Realizing that a 
previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, many Asian 
Americans helped form the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party’s control 
over the legislature.  Roger Bell explains that, “new forces, which ultimately achieved 
statehood, were identified with the burgeoning Democratic Party.  Supported largely by 
the descendents of Asian immigrants, who had long been denied equality in island life, 
the Democrats fervently believed that equality as a state in the Union would pave the way 
for genuine democracy and equality of opportunity at home.”33  By 1952, Congress 
passed the Walter-McCarren Act, making it possible for the first generation Japanese to 
naturalize and vote; by 1954 Japanese Americans were the largest voting bloc in the 
territory, and the Democratic Party, with the support of the ILWU, dislodged the 
Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai‘i 
as the “Democratic Revolution.”   
Indeed, during the Territorial period, there emerged a complex transition between 
a white racial dictatorship and a hegemonic “multicultural” state.34  Ronald Takaki notes 
that Asian American struggles against the haole oligarchy reflected a new consciousness, 
“a transformation from sojourners to settlers, from Japanese to Japanese Americans.”35  
Takaki’s seminal Strangers From a Different Shore uses the term “settler” to challenge 
common notions that Asians in the United States are “sojourners,” perpetual foreigners 
who never historically settled in the United States.  Takaki goes on to argue that Asians 
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in Hawai‘i, “[b]y their numerical preponderance… had greater opportunities [than on the 
U.S. continent] to weave themselves and their cultures into the very fabric of Hawaii and 
to seek to transform their adopted land into a society of rich diversity where they and 
their children would no longer be ‘strangers from a different shore.’”36  In fact, the 
opportunities afforded to Asian groups as a result of their “numerical preponderance” 
were key to shifting power away from a single racial dictatorship, dominated through 
coercion by haole racism, to a hegemonic “multicultural” democracy still organized by 
hierarchical notions of race.37  Such a shift, however, is not without other social and 
political consequences.  For instance, while Ronald Takaki celebrates a history within 
which the children of Asian immigrants were no longer made to feel like “strangers from 
a different shore,” Roger Bell notes that Native Hawaiians, after statehood, “had 
become…strangers, in their own land, submerged beneath the powerful white minority 
and a newly assertive Asian majority.”38  In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the 
counter-hegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against haole supremacy challenged, 
modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic U.S. colonial system. 
 Although 20th century history of Hawai‘i statehood has been largely narrated and 
thus understood as a struggle against white racism, contextualizing these dynamics within 
a history of U.S. occupation and settler colonialism further complicates our 
understanding of Hawai’i statehood.  Hawaiian histories by scholars such as Haunani-
Kay Trask, Noenoe K. Silva, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, J. Kehaulani 
Kauanui, Sally Engle Merry, Keanu Sai, Lilikala Kame‘eleihiwa, Amy Ku‘uleialoha 
Stillman and many others, have displaced a previous historiography that obscured Native 
Hawaiian resistance to U.S. occupation.39  As Noenoe K. Silva writes: “[o]ne of the most 
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pernicious myths of Hawaiian history is that the Kanaka Maoli [Hawaiians] passively 
accepted the erosion of their culture and the loss of their nation.”40  
 As the research and legal actions of scholar Keanu Sai have shown, the Hawaiian 
Kingdom may have been overthrown, but subjects of the nation had in fact never 
officially relinquished their national sovereignty.41  The political consequence of this 
reality is that it places past and present Hawai‘i under the formal category of 
“occupation,” rather than a “colonized” territory, a status with equally different legal 
implications.  This settler community’s interests converged with that of the United States, 
and in collusion with it, and amid Hawaiian national protests, overthrew and then 
illegally annexed Hawai‘i in 1898.  I contend that “occupation” and “settler colonialism” 
are not two irreconcilable polarizing frameworks but are actually both pertinent to an 
understanding of the uniqueness of Hawai‘i’s situation and the multiple tactics that the 
United States has utilized to dominate Hawai‘i.  Thus, Keanu Sai’s framework, which 
examines international law, sovereignty and occupation at the legal level, provides a clear 
understanding of the illegitimacy of the occupying United States, while a discussion of 
settler colonialism, at the level of power relations, can help to describe the form of power 
that was used to normalize such occupation.  Moreover, these forms of power were also 
used to establish a violent rationale through which Hawaiians are relegated to being 
permanently “unfit for self-government,” while settlers (Asian and haole), although 
contentious with one another, are afforded the masculine and intellectual capacity to turn 
“primitive” Hawaiian lands into “modern” and “democratic” societies.  In other words, 
Hawai‘i’s patterns of settlement and legal and sovereign legacies, and the colonial 
 17 
discourses of dominance that enabled them, share characteristics of both settler colony 
and nation under occupation. 
 As critical projects that examine the particular historical formations of settler 
colonialism and occupation in Hawai‘i develop, scholarship examining Asian Americans 
in Hawai‘i also have the potential to be transformed by engaging with the history of 
Native Hawaiians.  While Asian American history usually begins with western 
colonialism/imperialism’s displacement of peoples from Asia, or at the point of entry to 
the Americas or the Pacific, Asian American historiography seldom if ever considers the 
roles of Asian Americans in histories of settler colonialism and indigenous dispossession.  
Though the effects of land dispossession and genocide against Native Americans and 
Native Hawaiians are acknowledged, indigenous histories are often articulated in past 
tense, as memorialized moments that are rarely used to interpret relations of force in the 
present.  
 One of the first works in Asian American studies to situate Asian Americans and 
Native Hawaiians within a context of U.S. settler colonialism is the 2000 Hawai‘i issue of 
Amerasia Journal published by UCLA’s Asian American Studies Center.  Asian 
American studies scholars Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura guest edited this 
special volume and its subsequent reprint as an anthology titled Asian Settler Colonialism 
in Hawai‘i: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i.42 
Positioning Hawai‘i within its historical and contemporary colonial realities, Fujikane 
argues: “As in every settler state, there are differences and power relations that cut across 
settler populations, between white settlers and nonwhite settlers, among Asian settler 
groups, between working-class settlers and the settlers who make up the more privileged 
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classes…  Nevertheless, an analysis of settler colonialism positions indigenous peoples at 
the center, foregrounding not settler groups’ relationships with each other or with the 
U.S. settler state, but with the indigenous peoples whose ancestral lands settlers 
occupy.”43  Fujikane further argues that such intellectual work has political stakes, where 
only by supporting Hawaiians to achieve self-determination can “Asian settlers liberate 
themselves from their roles as agents in a colonial system of violence.”44  Indeed, other 
emerging and established scholars such as David Stannard, Eiko Kosasa, Karen Kosasa, 
Ida Yoshinaga, Julia Kaomea, Ku‘ualoha Ho‘omanawanui, Momiala Kamahele, Cristina 
Bacchilega, Lani Teves, Sora Han, Kristy Hisako Ringor, Bianca Isaki, Roderick 
Labrador, Jackie Lasky, Manu Vimalaserry, Diana Leong, among others, have begun 
probing such difficult and challenging issues and histories.45 
In the anthology’s key article, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: 
‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” Haunani-Kay Trask argues that Asians in Hawai‘i are “settlers of 
color” who have benefited from and contribute to the continued dispossession of Native 
Hawaiians.  Trask argues that American narratives of immigration and democracy are 
complicitous with colonialism’s justification and obfuscation of the ongoing story of 
Hawaiian dispossession. 
Hawai‘i, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of the 
uniqueness of America’s “nation of immigrants.”  The ideology weaves a story of 
success: poor Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino settlers supplied the labor for 
wealthy, white sugar planters during the long period of the Territory (1900-1959).  
Exploitative plantation conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work 
and the endlessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism.  Settler children, 
ever industrious and deserving obtain technical and liberal educations, thereby 
learning the political system through which they agitate for full voting rights as 
American citizens.  Politically, the vehicle for Asian ascendancy is statehood…  
For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration of 
foreign hegemony.46  
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Accordingly, some Asian ethnic groups in Hawai‘i have gained political and economic 
power through land deals after statehood.  In their influential book Land and Power in 
Hawai‘i: The Democratic Years George Cooper and Gavan Daws write that Asians in the 
Democratic Party, predominantly Japanese and Chinese, gain political power but have no 
land, while the Big Five corporations have large tracts of land but have lost a 
considerable amount of political power.47  These groups created numerous partnerships, 
many with individuals publicly imagined on opposite ends of the political spectrum, 
collaborating and profiting on the same land deals.  Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor, 
however, describes rural Hawaiian communities known as cultural kīpuka, who were 
“bypassed by major historical forces of economic, political, and social change,” thus 
allowing these communities to maintain traditional practices of land tenure and culture.  
Trask explains that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement emerged from these rural 
communities, as development increasingly encroached on Hawaiian ways of life and in 
the post-statehood period, forced many to begin organizing for a national land base 
distinct from the organizing of “local” communities against similar encroachments and 
trends.48 
Yet, scholarship that examines tensions between Asian Americans and Native 
Hawaiians within a framework of settler colonialism has been labeled “ahistorical.” 
Scholars such as Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor and Gary Okihiro contend that settler 
colonialism is a binary concept inadequate to interrogate Hawai‘i’s complex history of 
labor exploitation and colonization.  McGregor argued at the 2009 national Association 
for Asian American Studies conference in Honolulu that contemporary uses of settler 
colonialism are an extension of anti-Japanese racism during World War II.  She has 
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variously argued that the concept does not take into account Native Hawaiian racism 
against Asian Americans or the persistence of class differences in Hawai‘i.  In what is 
perhaps the most extensive critique of settler colonialism in print thus far, Dana Takagi 
has argued that tensions between Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians are products of 
an indigenous Hawaiian nationalism that emerged in the 1990s.49   
This dissertation challenges these arguments by showing that similar tensions 
between Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians were very much existent in the 
Territorial period leading to statehood in 1959.  Moreover, the term “settler” has long 
been in use to describe Asian Americans and I use it to also identify myself.  As 
mentioned earlier, Ronald Takaki has used the term “settler” as an analytical and 
historical term describing Asian American communities.  I also use the term this way, but 
with different political aims.  I do not use the term “settler” to make a claim on the 
United States against white exclusion, but instead to place Asian American history in 
direct conversation with a history of colonial dispossession enacted against Native 
peoples—a history that is deliberately buried and subjugated in settler nations.  In this 
way, the term “settler” contains a pedagogical capacity to challenge perceptions of 
reality, to widen one’s visual world in order to see the colonial oppression of settler 
nations with real political, economic, and legal consequences.  The term “settler,” can 
thus be used as both a political identity and as an interpretive analytic, one that can 
defamiliarize itself with, and divest itself of, predominant U.S. narratives and identities in 
Hawai‘i.  In Hawai‘i, such identities and narratives lead most non-Hawaiians to think of 
themselves as immigrants, citizens or locals—identities that assume Hawai‘i as a 
legitimate multicultural state under the United States.  Indeed, many are opposed to the 
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term “settler” because of its derogatory undertones, yet other political identities have 
been appropriated to enact a transformational politics.  For instance, the term “Black” 
was imagined as having negative connotations, but after the term became politicized and 
transformed, it became a source of pride and empowerment.  Settler colonialism is also 
criticized for reinscribing a Native and settler binary.  Yet such analytical categories help 
to better understand power relations, not as good Native versus bad settler, but as 
historical categories that help us examine the nature of different forms of power and 
oppression.  For instance, feminist politics make use of historically loaded, but complex 
analytical categories of “man” and “woman” in order to better expose heterosexist 
patriarchal domination.  As Cristina Bacchilega has argued on her own identification as a 
settler: “From my position, somewhat analogously to men supporting feminism, I seek to 
be a student and ally.  This need not entail taking Hawaiian cultural and scholarly 
production wholesale as ‘truth,’ but it does involve realizing how much is lost by either 
ignoring it or rescripting it before we malihini even take it seriously.”50 
Use of settler colonialism as an interpretive analytic does not dismiss scholarship 
interrogating other historically formed systems of power and oppression.  Largely 
informed by the scholarship on intersectionality and coalitional politics by scholar 
Andrea Smith, this dissertation makes use of her conceptual frame that white supremacy 
is comprised of distinct but interrelated logics: labor exploitation, genocide (settler 
colonialism), and war (orientalism).  Smith’s intervention provides a much-needed 
framework for relational thinking in comparativist scholarship.  Smith argues that current 
understandings of white supremacy are limited as they assume that different communities 
are impacted by white supremacy uniformly.  Part of this error, she argues, stems from 
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conventional failure to understand how white supremacy “is constituted by separate and 
distinct, but interrelated, logics.”51  The first logic she identifies is labor exploitation—
where certain racial groups become equated with being “slaveable.”  This pillar is useful 
in thinking about Hawai‘i’s long history of labor exploitation and militant unionism.  The 
second pillar is settler colonization or genocide, through which the indigenous must 
disappear so that others can lay a claim over their land.  This pillar is easily recognizable 
in Hawaiian history and will be elaborated on throughout this dissertation.  The last pillar 
is Orientalism or war, where there needs to be a permanent foreign threat that allows the 
United States to be in a permanent state of war.  This last pillar has numerous historical 
examples in Hawai‘i’s history, whether it is the Japanese prior to and during World War 
II, the threat of communists, or currently, in reference to so-called “terrorists.”  
Taking into account different logics of oppression allows us to understand that we 
can be simultaneously oppressed while also being oppressive when we do not take into 
account the kinds of oppression faced by other communities.  More significantly, it also 
places emphasis on strategies for resistance, particularly those that do not unintentionally 
keep systems of oppression in place for others.  There are numerous ways of thinking 
about how we can each participate in maintaining exploitative conditions vis-à-vis our 
own personal empowerment or collective ascendancy.  For instance, non-Native peoples 
are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands.  All 
marginalized communities are promised that they will economically and politically 
advance if they join U.S. wars to spread “democracy.”  As such, Smith’s model of 
relational thinking is productive not only in an analysis of Hawai‘i statehood but also in 
countering assertions that Asian settler colonialism is ahistorical.  Her conceptual frame 
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allows me to analyze historically created systems of power and also think reflectively 
about how one’s own community participates in nationally mediated structures of power 
and oppression.  “This way,” according to Smith, “our alliances would not be solely 
based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of 
others.”52 
 Qualifying these different forms of systemic oppressions is crucial to 
understanding the colonial inequalities produced through Hawai‘i statehood.  The 1893 
overthrow and 1935 movement for statehood, for instance, are examples of 
“accumulation by dispossession,” a form of capitalist exploitation used to further 
dispossess the Native population of their national lands and self-government, in order to 
seize their national property as a means to acquire access to capital.  In Capital, Marx 
takes Adam Smith to task for explaining the gap between the rich and the poor through a 
“nursery tale,” a kind of origin story, about two sorts of people, “one, the diligent, 
intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and 
more, in riotous living.”53  Marx goes on to criticize Smith’s idea of “primitive 
accumulation,” arguing that “[i]n actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, 
enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.”54  As David Harvey 
and Hannah Arendt have argued, however, the “original sin” of robbery that is described 
in “primitive accumulation” is not simply located in the past, but is more accurately to be 
understood as an incomplete and recurring process that is essential to the continuation of 
capitalism.55  Harvey renames this process, “accumulation by dispossession,” to describe 
a wide range of processes that are used during moments of economic crisis, caused by 
overaccumulation, to move the economy out of depression.   
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 In a similar examination of periods of state crisis, Michel Foucault’s Security, 
Territory and Population further examines the ways in which the state justifies acts of 
violent expropriation through what he terms the “theatricality of the state.”56  Foucault’s 
ideas on necessity, violence, and theatricality are used throughout the dissertation.  First, 
a crisis is identified, one that threatens the status-quo, followed by what government 
leaders consider the necessity of the state (raison d’etat), a necessity that justifies 
breaking the law.  Some sort of violence (coup d’etat) is used to maintain or reacquire the 
fundamental dynamics of force to keep the elites in positions of power.57  Theatricality, 
or the “theatrical practice in politics,” is then used to represent the act of violence, to 
shape public opinion in order to legitimize and reinforce state power.  Its purpose and 
consequence is to justify the violence used by political and economic leaders to maintain 
the relations of power of the elite.  In Hawai‘i’s case, we can easily see how the historical 
and political process of further incorporating Hawai‘i into the United States through the 
1893 overthrow and 1959 statehood relied extensively on state agencies—the Hawaiian 
Bureau of Information (1892-1893), the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1946), 
and the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959)—to narrate state violence and to 
strengthen the economy.  
 As the foregoing discussion illustrates, this dissertation is an interdisciplinary 
project that examines a range of cultural productions read through the theories and 
practices of cultural studies, and supported by archival research.  Instead of approaching 
a study of Hawai‘i statehood using methods that focus on powerful individuals and 
repressive institutions, as Roger Bell and John S. Whitehead have, I take a discursive 
approach to statehood.  I question the ways in which knowledge and power define and 
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limit, not only what is considered “sayable” in a given historical moment but also why 
certain narratives achieve wide circulation and publicity, while other narratives are 
contained and censored.58  I seek to illuminate how state agencies, in different historical 
moments, attempted to frame the rules of discourse for civil society through a range of 
state sanctioned opinion campaigns that reveal practices of governance and the 
theatricality of the state.  Here I examine cultural texts that normalize and narrate the 
United States in Hawai‘i, such as Hawai‘i exhibits at World’s Fairs, state seals, historical 
and scientific discourse on race relations, political cartoons, films, newspapers, and the 
papers and literature of the different territorial and federal agencies involved in the 
movement for statehood.  Taken together, these texts and cultural productions use 
gendered representations of “primitives,” “orientals,” and “whites” that help to create a 
space in which citizen-subjects imagine participating equally in a nation without 
understanding that nation to be an emerging empire and without knowledge as to how 
they are active participants in that ongoing formation.  
 At the same time, I juxtapose these narrations with an assortment of political 
actions and cultural productions, many from Native Hawaiians that denaturalize the 
United States in Hawai‘i.  Much of these activities involved direct and indirect criticism 
of occupation—commemorations of the 1893 overthrow, statehood testimony, a lawsuit 
against the Statehood Commission, stories of hauntings, nationally acclaimed but 
currently obscure history books, and visual art, among others.  These moments of 
pedagogy and resistance are “local” Hawai‘i examples of the kind of “unexpected” 
historical “anomalies” that, as Philip J. Deloria asserts, may not be anomalous but 
instead, representative.  By recovering and examining the frequency of these “secret 
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histories” (rare, occasional, frequent) we might be better equipped to challenge dominant 
characterizations and assumptions of Hawaiians as passive during the drive for statehood 
and write complex and transformative histories informed by or in relation to Native 
Hawaiian cultural politics.  As Deloria writes: “[t]hose secret histories of unexpectedness 
are, I believe, worth further pursuit, for they can change our sense of the past and lead us 
quietly, but directly, to the present moment.”59 
 Indeed, as settler studies scholars Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson have argued, 
“the occupation of land formerly owned by others always translates into the cultural 
politics of representation.”60  In fact, the cultural politics of U.S. settler colonialism are 
particularly complex because they intersect with the different histories of U.S. racial and 
imperial subjugation and their accompanying cultural representations.  The contemporary 
relevance of settler colonialism is also a difficult narrative to imagine and understand, 
much less contend with, as it is often obscured in the mind’s eye behind American 
national narratives that mythologize and naturalize the act of occupation.  For this reason, 
I also turn to critiques of visuality to assist my work.  Accordingly, ways of seeing are 
often guided intimately by ways of knowing, which are themselves shaped by a pedagogy 
of history, culture, and one’s position within the cultural politics of the everyday.61  
Mieke Bal has argued that the theoretical theme of visuality thus “lends itself particularly 
well to the kind of questioning that cultural analysis and history address to each other, not 
only because history has been so predominantly text-based, but more importantly, 
because ‘looking’ as an act has been central to a philosophy of science that put 
observation at the core of its procedures of evaluation.”62  The privileging of sight within 
western science was once held as one of the “noblest” of senses for objectively knowing 
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racial difference.  As Martin Jay writes, however, this difference was produced not in a 
given “objective reality open to an innocent eye” but rather, in an “epistemic field, 
constructed as much linguistically as visually” and often used in the service of 
surveillance and empire building.63   
 
Fig. 1, “School Begins,” Puck, 1899 
 
 
 In the political cartoon above, drawn in 1899 by Louis Dalrymple in the 
nationally popular magazine Puck, we are given a kind of representational map of 
different cultural representations and discursive logics that link settler colonialism to an 
emerging U.S. empire at the turn of the twentieth century.  The piece offers a rich and 
deliberate visual arrangement of differently infantilized, gendered, and racialized groups 
whose cultural representations mutually constitute a pyramidal view of the world, one 
that seeks to justify and naturalize both colonial expansion and white supremacy.  The 
tools of oppression, in this case a “manifest domestic”64 education (represented in the 
mostly white and feminized studious U.S. states, California, Texas, New Mexico, 
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although Alaska is interestingly racialized) and the ever-looming masculine military 
(represented through Uncle Sam’s “big stick”) are ever present to help nurture, in the 
citizenry’s imagination, the continuity of settler colonial expansion across the continental 
United States with the overseas colonies acquired in 1898 and 1899.  As Raymond 
Williams argues, works of art can be particularly useful in “complex societies” as 
evidence for grasping the “hegemonic in its active and formative but also its 
transformational processes.”65 
Cultural and Visual critic John Berger has argued that the medium of drawing 
impacts its viewer in ways that differ from paintings and sculptures.  He asserts that 
before a drawing, the spectator “identifies himself with the artist, using the images to gain 
the conscious experience of seeing as though through the artists own eyes.”66  Scott Long 
adds that political cartoons give political cartoonists a certain representational power, in 
ways that photographers or other artists are often limited.  He writes: “The cartoonist 
deals with abstractions, ideas and emotions that are beyond the comprehension of a 
lens…  Ask a photographer to take a picture of the Dollar Gap or the New Deal … or the 
Monroe Doctrine and he will be baffled.”67  Political cartoons at the turn of the 20th 
century were immensely popular, particular those that ran in the weekly magazines like 
Puck and its competitor Judge, both of which rivaled the influential dailies by the end of 
the 19th century.  “Their weekly cartoons were awaited eagerly,” writes Scott, and “were 
passed from hand to hand, and were the subject of animated comment in all political 
circles.”68  Sometimes referred to as the “ungentlemanly art,” political cartoons were 
viewed by some politicians as threats; on four separate occasions, American legislators 
even tried to restrict or ban all political cartoons.  Even the notorious William Marcy 
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Tweed, a corrupt politician and businessman in the 19th century, weighed in: “Stop them 
damn pictures, I don’t care so much what the papers write about me.  My constituents 
can’t read.  But, damn it, they can see pictures.”69  When cultural productions (such as the 
one above) are closely read, properly historicized, and their cultural forms are paid 
careful attention to, different works of art can be useful historical sources for examining 
the intricate power arrangements of a particular moment in U.S. history.  
Homi Bhabha describes the nation itself as a cultural narration where “the nation, 
as a form of cultural elaboration…, is an agency of ambivalent narration that holds 
culture at its most productive position, as a form for ‘subordination, fracturing, diffusing, 
reproducing, as much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding.’”70  I wish to pay careful 
attention to the cultural representations of indigenous peoples in order to examine their 
utility in narrating the act of colonization as “fair” and “natural” to most U.S. citizens.  
Andrea Smith shows how the discursively linked constructs of indigeneity and gender are 
integral components to justifying the conquest of both Native bodies and land: “[t]he 
project of colonial sexual violence establishes the ideology that Native bodies are 
inherently violable—and by extension, that Native lands are also inherently violable.”71  
By examining these narrative logics and contextualizing U.S. national narratives within a 
history of colonization, I investigate the production of a narration of the United States in 
Hawai‘i that normalizes Hawai‘i’s incorporation into the United States.  
 I begin this dissertation by looking at the discursive erasure of the internationally 
recognized Hawaiian Kingdom by an American discourse on primitivism, a particular 
discourse through which the takeover of Native American and Native Hawaiian land was 
made to seem natural and inevitable.  Chapter One thus examines the narrations featured 
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at the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition that rationalized and celebrated 
settler colonialism establishing future expectations of U.S. empire.  After helping to lead 
the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893, Lorrin A. Thurston attended the 
Chicago Exposition.  Thurston helped found the Hawaiian Bureau of Information and 
Annexation Club, and was now helping to organize the “Cyclorama of Kilauea,” a fifty-
foot high and 400 foot wide landscape painting of Kilauea volcano that was used by the 
bureau as an “imperial advertisement” for both annexation and tourism.  In this first 
chapter, I also look at the spatial and temporal layout of the exposition that ethnologists 
used as visual evidence to divide the world’s people into three temporal categories: 
primitives, orientals, and whites.  Here I delineate the different narrations of 
“primitivism” and “orientalism,” by examining the politics of the Japanese exhibit, which 
was displayed in a favored position in the White City.  I place these cultural narrations 
within what Walter LaFeber calls “depression diplomacy,” the introduction of a new 
overseas economic frontier as a means to alleviate labor discontent and industrial 
economic depression within the United States.72  
 I extend this examination in Chapter Two in a close look at the different power 
relations existent in settler colonialism.  Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen identify four 
dimensions of settler colonialism—namely, the metropole, white settler population, 
military, and indigenous population.  Hawai‘i’s history, however, requires the addition of 
an important fifth: a settler population that is neither white nor Native.  Thus, with an eye 
to further illuminating the specific form of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i, I examine more 
closely three historical and cultural registers that evidence the differential but 
interlocking forms of oppression in the machinations of settler colonialism.  To this end, I 
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examine more closely three examples or cases.  First, I turn to political cartoons from the 
turn of the twentieth century questioning how the different gendered personifications of 
the Philippines as “little brown brothers,” and Hawai‘i as “hula maiden,” were used to 
justify the different political trajectories of each territory towards independence and 
statehood, respectively.  In the second section, I turn to how settler colonialism and 
American frontier discourse in Hawai‘i were bolstered through academic discourse on 
race, culture, and ethnicity of whites, orientals, and primitives.  More specifically I 
examine the work of the Australian psychologist Stanley Porteus, and the University of 
Hawai‘i School of sociology (which has links to the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian 
Exposition).  I end this chapter by looking at the 1937 congressional investigation of 
statehood.  By this time, the hegemony of the Big Five is weakened and the opinion 
campaign of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission is unable to control testimony and as a 
result laborers and Hawaiians speak out openly against both the Big Five and Hawai‘i 
Statehood.  
In Chapter Three I trace two mutually constitutive but competing projects that 
occur during a moment of post-World War II economic expansion—the Japanese 
American project to defeat a notion that they were perpetual foreigners “ineligible for 
citizenship” and a particularly Native Hawaiian project to combat the idea that Hawaiians 
were “unfit for self-government.”  In this section, I analyze the central narrative and key 
sequences in terms of Cold War motivations that created support for a U.S. nationalist, 
anti-racist discourse that defended Japanese Americans.  In the same chapter, I juxtapose 
the terms by which Hawai‘i Territorial Senator Kamokila Campbell opposed statehood.  
Campbell was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to 
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Hawai‘i statehood and perhaps for this she has become an obscure figure in Hawai‘i’s 
history.  Taken together, the contrasting narratives in this chapter indicate that the anti-
racist politics of Japanese Americans had a kind of redemptive quality as well as an 
economic utility in conservative Cold War politics, while the anti-colonial politics of 
Hawaiians obviously struck deeply at the interests of the United States. 
Chapter Four offers a close read of the artwork of a Hawaiian artist who goes by 
the pseudonym Kēwaikaliko.73 In his artwork titled Benocide, after former Governor 
Benjamin Cayetano, he critiques the neoconservative legal challenges emerging out of 
the 2000 Rice v. Cayetano decision—which declared Hawaiian-only voting in the Office 
of Hawaiian Affairs race-based and thus unconstitutional.   Thus, this image also 
comments critically on the relations among Hawaiians, different Asian American groups, 
and whites, in a moment when a history of the overthrow in 1893 is forced into the public 
by a Hawaiian movement for self-determination that emerges in the 1970s.  Through 
selective narrative framing and the use of historically legible images, Kēwaikaliko creates 
a loaded illustration of a Hawaiian man being lynched by then governor Cayetano 
(Hawai‘i’s first governor of Filipino descent), a neoconservative white settler, and a pig 
or pua‘a. Through highlighting a notion of sight, this chapter will trace how Benocide 
appropriates the gaze and reverses it upon a settler colonial system through his visual art 
and the use of the historical and spatial configurations of a lynching. 
 Taken together, these chapters illustrate the complex ways that Hawai‘i statehood, 
narrated as a liberal anti-racist civil rights project, have facilitated and normalized 
projects of colonialism and empire.  Through a discursive approach to statehood, and a 
critical reconsideration of the ways that state agencies framed the rules of discourse using 
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representations of primitives, orientals, and whites to normalize the presence of the 
United States in Hawai‘i, we are better able to understand how Hawai‘i statehood became 
expected, how it came to be considered an inevitable outcome of history, and how ideas 
about history and race were arranged so as to invalidate and silence opposition to 
statehood.  These stories of American egalitarianism, besides silencing Hawaiian 
opposition, obscure how economic depression and desires for capital expansion largely 
underpinned elite desires for statehood—a kind of settler accumulation through Native 
dispossession.  Thus, contemporary Hawaiian demonstrations on Admissions Day 
challenge the state’s narration of itself, and in doing so, also illuminate the 
“counterhistories” of Hawai‘i.74  Like critical contemporary Hawaiian art, the unearthing 
and retelling of systemically and deliberately buried histories also visualize, how the 
state’s present power was taken historically by illegal force, and at the expense Native 
Hawaiian birth-rights to self-determination.  Collectively, they expose an ongoing history 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
A FUTURE WISH: THE HAWAIIAN BUREAU OF INFORMATION AND ITS 
ADVERTISEMENTS FOR ANNEXATION AT  
THE 1893 COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION  
 
The decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer sturdier growths must be 
accepted as an inevitable fact, in view of the teachings of ethnological history.  And as 
retrogression in the development of the Islands can not [sic] be admitted without serious 
detriment to American interests in the North Pacific, the problem of a replenishment of the vital 
forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense—not an Asiatic or a 
British sense. 
- James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State, 18811 
 
 
 Only four months after helping to lead the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, 
Lorrin A. Thurston was in Chicago at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition.  
Thurston, a third generation settler descending from some of the first American 
missionaries to Hawai‘i, was at the Columbian Exposition helping to manage his 
“Cyclorama of Kilauea”—a five story high and 400 foot wide landscape painting of 
Kilauea crater designed to encircle the viewer and give the impression of standing in the 
actual volcano.  Using the cyclorama as an imperial advertisement for both tourism and 
annexation—and doing so nearly five years before de jure U.S. control of Hawai‘i—
Thurston placed large American flags at the top of his cyclorama.2  Thurston hoped that 
the cyclorama might help to present another vision of the American frontier, one that 
would extend the imagined borders of the United States into the Pacific to Hawai‘i.  For 
annexationists, Hawai‘i needed to be seen not as the internationally recognized nation 
that it had been since 1843, but rather as an exotic island frontier zone, a primitive space 
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to be made anew with the joint help of white settlers in Hawai‘i and the newly 
industrialized United States.3  
 Lorrin A. Thurston’s activities in Chicago were part of a predetermined opinion 
campaign to shape public perception of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani and 
generate national and international support for the annexation of Hawai‘i to the United 
States.  Described by an historian as “the most ardent and proficient propagandist on 
behalf of the provisional government,” Thurston, in 1892, formed two groups: the 
Annexation Club and the Hawaiian Bureau of Information.  Whereas the Annexation 
Club conspired with U.S. Foreign Minister John L. Stevens to secretly plot and carry out 
the overthrow, the Hawaiian Bureau of Information would act as a kind of media arm of 
the campaign.  Officially responsible for promoting tourist travel and attracting a 
“desirable population” to colonize the islands, its more secretive function was to produce 
literature that justified white settler control over Hawai‘i and help to annex it to the 
United States.4  If hegemony is hard work, as is often said, then Thurston worked 
tirelessly, traveling across the country to provide facts and figures to journalists.5  He also 
maintained conversations with former U.S. Minister John L. Stevens who, from his 
residence in Maine, was also editorializing on the need for annexation.  In Chicago, 
Thurston’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea” displayed at the Chicago World’s Columbian 
Exposition, played a key role in their opinion campaign as it helped to cast Native 
Hawaiians as primitive while narrating the overthrow of an internationally recognized 
nation in their favor. 
 The cultural work required to normalize white settler control over a people 
imagined to be “primitive” resonated at the Columbian Exposition.  It is here that 
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Frederick Jackson Turner pronounced his famous frontier thesis, arguing that American 
exceptionalism and freedom originate from masculine white settlers’ experience with 
taming the wild frontier and its “primitive” inhabitants.6  These experiences were deemed 
responsible for creating rugged American individuals who were wary of authority and 
more capable than Europeans of maintaining a society built on democracy and freedom.  
Evidence of Turner’s rugged American masculinity was found in the 1890 Census, which 
declared that white settlers had completely settled the continental United States.  The 
significance of the settlement of the frontier was bolstered by the 1890 Massacre at 
Wounded Knee, a mass murder of around 300 Lakota by the U.S. 7th Cavalry, imagined 
by most Americans to be the final military defeat of Native American resistance.7  As 
Philip Deloria argues, these events informed much of the displays at the 1893 Columbian 
Exposition, wherein U.S. history was narrated “not as a frontiersman’s struggle with wild 
lands, but as one long Indian war, a violent contest in which Americans were shaped by 
constant struggle with a dangerous and challenging adversary.”8   
In the last decade of the 19th century, the presumed final pacification of Native 
Americans—with stakes in the crafting of American ideas of white manhood and 
nationhood—was also imagined to signal America’s readiness to transition from a 
continental colonial power to a hemispheric imperial power.  Future president Theodore 
Roosevelt, a political ally and friend of Hawai‘i propagandist, Lorrin A. Thurston, would 
declare in various volumes of The Winning of the West that the closing of the continental 
frontier only meant the opening of a new frontier overseas.9  While the narration of the 
Columbian Exposition constituted white American nationhood through the settlement of 
the frontier and conquest of Native Americans, the “Cyclorama of Kilauea” portrayed 
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Hawai‘i as a new American frontier zone to be settled and annexed by the United States.  
Native Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian women, substituted in place of Indians, were 
constructed as a new worthy “adversary” considered both “dangerous and challenging” to 
the presumed natural development of white settler control over Hawai‘i.  
 This chapter examines the links between the narrations of the overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom and the conquest of Native Americans at the 1893 Columbian 
Exposition.  Here, I illustrate how the Hawaiian Bureau of Information targeted 
exposition visitors with an opinion campaign to achieve Hawai‘i’s expected annexation 
by the United States.  First, I examine how the discourses of orientalism and primitivism 
that were employed by ethnologists at the Columbian Exposition, worked hand-in-hand 
to subject individuals to view the world, in particular, non-white (or other non-white) 
peoples, as potential threats to their well-being in ways that scientifically and morally 
rationalized colonial violence and future expectations of American empire.10  Secondly, 
through a close read of the Hawaiian Bureau of Information’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea,” I 
show how the gendered and racialized logics used in the cyclorama worked to collapse an 
internationally recognized Hawaiian Kingdom into a U.S. domestic discourse on Native 
Americans, specifically by categorizing Native Hawaiians as primitives deserving of U.S. 
colonization.11   
“Depression Diplomacy” 
 With more than 27 million people attending the Columbian Exposition, U.S. 
economic and political leaders hailed the exposition as a “celebration of America’s 
coming-of-age,” a “grand rite of passage” that pronounced the readiness of the United 
States—as a full-fledged modern industrialized nation—to take its place amongst the 
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leading nations of the world.12  The entire exposition was referred to popularly as the 
“White City,” and it commemorated the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s so-
called “discovery” of America and the fulfillment of this “divine” event through the 
imagined defeat of Native Americans and the successful settlement of their lands.  Such 
culminating achievements were issued as evidence of white American superiority.13 
 U.S. claims of white racial superiority, however, occurred at a time when its 
economic and social dominance appeared most threatened.  By 1893 the United States 
was in a major economic depression, with 500 banks closed and 15,000 companies out of 
business.14  By the middle of 1894 unemployment had reached a record 4 million.15  
During this time, greedy management practices, coupled with poor economic and work 
conditions, were causing class conflict such as the 1887 Haymarket Riot and the 1893 
Pullman strikes in Chicago, as well as some thirty lesser known (but still major) strikes 
that occurred throughout the country at the time of the Columbian Exposition.16  No 
longer exclusively reliant on agriculture, U.S. foreign policy sought larger foreign 
markets in which to sell the surplus of products created as a result of rapid 
industrialization.  Many white working-class Americans began to link industrial maturity 
with degenerating labor conditions and began to call for revolution.17  In 1894 Secretary 
of State Walter Gresham wrote: “I am not a pessimist, but I think I see danger in existing 
conditions in this country.  What is transpiring in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
and in regions west of there, may fairly be viewed as symptoms of revolution.”18  Thus, 
many business and government leaders believed that foreign markets, through aggressive 
imperialist policies, were necessary in guarding against revolt.  Walter LaFeber explains 
that the U.S. military support of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, which took 
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place in the same year of the Columbian Exposition, was a product of what he calls 
“depression diplomacy”—the desire to acquire or secure control of overseas markets as a 
means of alleviating industrial economic depression and domestic labor unrest in the 
United States.19  In other words, by 1893, the U.S. economic system was not sustainable 
without enacting a more aggressive policy of imperialism, one that would gain America 
access to markets in Asia. 
  This same economic depression in the United States also impacted Hawai‘i and 
motivated white settlers to overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom.  By 1893, Hawai‘i’s sugar 
industry was largely dependent on access to U.S. markets.  The Reciprocity Treaty 
between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, initially signed in 1876, gave 
Hawai‘i’s sugar industry a two-cent per pound bounty and thus a favored position over 
other foreign sugars that were competing in the U.S. market.  In return, the Hawaiian 
government was forbidden from leasing or disposing “any port, harbor, or other territory” 
to any other nation.  Joseph Nāwahī, an ardent Hawaiian nationalist and representative 
from Hilo and Puna, strongly voiced the opposition of many Native Hawaiians to the 
Reciprocity Treaty, calling it a “nation-snatching treaty” and the “first step of 
annexation.”20   
Because of the lagging U.S. economy in the 1890s, however, sugar growers in the 
United States successfully lobbied Congress to pass the 1890 McKinley Tariff.  This act 
would abolish the tariff relations established through the Reciprocity Treaty and diminish 
Hawai‘i’s sugar planters’ ability to compete in U.S. markets.  Hawai‘i’s sugar planters 
viewed the Reciprocity Treaty as completely necessary for the sugar industry in Hawai‘i 
to remain competitive.  Z.S. Spalding, a prominent sugar planter reminisced that, “before 
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the reciprocity treaty had passed… I do not think that there was a single plantation that 
had not gone into bankruptcy.”21  In fact, four years after the Reciprocity Treaty was 
established, sugar production doubled and by 1890, plantations produced ten times more 
sugar than they had in 1876.22  This dramatic rise in sugar production led to the 
accumulation of more capital, the establishment of banks, new technologies in irrigation 
and processing and especially, a demand for more land, resources, labor, and political 
influence.   
Having amassed economic power through the Reciprocity Treaty, white settler 
planters were willing to use whatever force necessary to maintain profitable tariff 
relations with the United States.  For instance, when the Reciprocity treaty was up for 
renewal in 1885, the United States offered to do so only in exchange for the use of Pearl 
Harbor as a Naval base.  When King Kalākaua (1874-1891) refused, white settlers 
organized rifle clubs and forced the infamous “Bayonet Constitution” upon him.  Written 
by Lorrin A. Thurston, the Bayonet Constitution would dramatically limit the influence 
of the monarch while disenfranchising a majority of Hawaiians from vote for the House 
of Nobles through income, property and literacy requirements.  It also restricted all 
Asians from both naturalization and voting.23   
Although the 1887 Bayonet Constitution was imagined as giving white settlers 
electoral advantages, it also sparked a highly organized and articulate movement whose 
target was the governmental structure established by the Thurston-created faction.  As 
Noenoe K. Silva has shown in Aloha Betrayed, Hawaiians began organizing into political 
parties:  the Hui Kālāi‘āina and Hui Aloha ‘Āina Party.24  By 1890, one year after an 
unsuccessful coup attempt to remove the Bayonet Constitution, Hawaiians, through the 
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Hui Kālāiʻāina joined forces with the Mechanics’ and Workingmen’s Political Protective 
Union to run candidates who were both friendly to labor and a new constitution.25  Many 
wealthy Chinese who were Hawaiian nationals but unable to vote, also began to employ 
hundreds of Hawaiians to enable them to meet the income requirements for voting.26  
This new historical bloc won the 1890 elections by a landslide.  Two years later, in an 
election held in October of 1892, this new political group would also win two vacant 
seats in the House of Nobles.27  Indeed, those marginalized from vote became effective at 
politically defeating the plantation elite even when the Bayonet Constitution was 
designed to marginalize them from political influence. 
 With white settler economic and political power was on the wane, sugar planters 
discussed annexation to the United States as a possible answer to regaining advantageous 
tariff relations lost with the passing of the 1890 McKinley Tariff.  Still, by the early 
1890s, some sugar planters needed convincing, as they were concerned that annexation 
might bring American laws that would extinguish the contract system that had also made 
the sugar industry lucrative.  Debates were framed between the benefits of maintaining an 
exploitable Asian labor force versus reestablishing profitable American trade relations 
through annexation.  Paul Isenberg, a prominent leader of the sugar industry, explained 
that he was strongly opposed to annexation because he felt safer having a surplus of 
labor.  Isenberg believed that having easy access to Asian laborers would make it easier 
to control their workforce, specifically stating that such conditions would make it so that 
the “Chinese and Japanese had to work or be hungry.”28   
The large number of “Oriental” laborers required by the sugar plantations also led 
to anxieties about the possibility of an imperialist plot by the Japanese to take control of 
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the islands.  By 1897, there were 25,000 Japanese out of a total population of 109,020 in 
Hawai‘i.29  Anxiety over the possibility of such a large Japanese population gaining 
control of Hawai‘i had some merit.  In Between Two Empires Eiichiro Azuma asserts that 
the exodus of laborers from Japan to Hawai‘i coincided with a “branch of Japanese 
imperialist thought” that viewed the western hemisphere as Japan’s own frontier to be 
settled.30  Meiji leaders, he explains, viewed Japanese emigration as a part of a Japanese 
style of manifest destiny, forged out of overseas settlements that were economically and 
politically tied to Japan.  Azuma argues that government leaders assigned, “a nationalist 
meaning to the act of emigration on the premise that the masses shared the same 
dedication to the state’s collective purpose.”31  As such, white sugar planters needed to 
contend not only with a burgeoning Hawaiian movement to protect their national 
sovereignty, but also a large Japanese population whose government had an interest in the 
Hawaiian Islands.32 
Aware of Japan’s imperialist views, white settler elites used the Bayonet 
Constitution to cast Asian plantation laborers in Hawai‘i as foreign threats, outlawing 
their naturalization and prohibiting them from voting.  But in fact, the relationship 
between Japanese plantation laborers in Hawai‘i and the Japanese government was often 
tenuous.  According to Azuma, “most emigrants of rural origin viewed their endeavors 
from the standpoint of personal interest without much regard to the purported duties of 
the imperial subject.”33   
At the same time, it was also “personal interest” that motivated Japanese 
plantation laborers to initiate a petition, on April 9th of 1893, less than three months after 
the overthrow, that did not oppose the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom but rather 
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demanded their electoral participation in the new settler government.  The petition argued 
that the Japanese were the “physical and intellectual” equals of any of the other 
foreigners.34  Likewise in 1894, the Chinese in Hawai‘i sent a petition, signed by 
hundreds of people, to the Provisional Government also seeking their right to vote.35  
Thus, if white settlers were going to maintain political and economic power for 
themselves—which was the principle reason for overthrowing the Hawaiian Kingdom—
then they would need some kind of assurance that annexation was even a possibility.   
Using the Columbian Exposition as a front to travel to the United States in 1892, 
Thurston traveled beyond Chicago to Washington D.C. to meet secretly with the Harrison 
administration, which expressed interest in annexing Hawai‘i.36  Through his Secretary of 
the Navy, B.F. Tracy, President Harrison stated, “if conditions in Hawaii compel you 
people to act as you have indicated, and you come to Washington with an annexation 
proposition, you will find an exceedingly sympathetic administration here.”37  The U.S. 
minister in Hawai‘i, John L. Stevens, was a protégé of Secretary of State James Blaine.  
Blaine believed that the president should not wait to annex Hawai‘i because he thought 
that Britain or Japan would annex the islands if the United States did not.38 
 In January of 1893, Queen Lili‘uokalani, who had taken over as constitutional 
monarch after the death of her brother King Kalākaua, responded to the numerous calls 
for a new constitution that would restore the voting rights of Hawaiians.  Thurston and 
the Annexation Club used her attempt to promulgate a new constitution as an opportunity 
to seize the Hawaiian Kingdom.  Stating that the actions of the Queen were “dangerous to 
American lives and property,” the planter elite read a pronouncement at the courthouse 
establishing the Provisional Government while eighty marines landed to help occupy the 
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Hawaiian Kingdom.  Thurston and four others then traveled to Washington DC.  Only 
two weeks after the overthrow, President Harrison tried, without success, to rush a treaty 
of annexation through Congress. 
 Unfortunately for the Thurston-faction, the shared interests between them and the 
U.S. government would be broken, as Grover Cleveland would defeat Harrison in the 
presidential elections.  As a friend of Lili‘uokalani, and under counsel from Secretary of 
State Walter Gresham, Cleveland opposed the annexation of Hawai‘i.  Geopolitical 
pressures elsewhere, indeed, contributed to Cleveland’s decision.  By 1893, American 
economic interests in Asia may have been nascent and the Cleveland administration 
focused on South America.39  And although he opposed Hawai‘i’s annexation per se, 
President Cleveland favored maintaining de facto imperial control of Hawai‘i.  Cleveland 
desired to maintain possession over Pearl Harbor and Assistant Secretary of State Alvey 
Adee added that Hawai‘i was just too multiracial and not capable of maintaining “a 
voting population sufficient to confer a rightful claim to state-hood.”40   
 Upon receiving the annexation treaty and questioning its rush, Cleveland sent a 
special investigator, Congressmen James Blount to “uncover the facts” about the 
“Hawaiian Revolution,” so-called by white settlers in Hawai‘i, who had likened the 
overthrow to the American Revolution.  Yet, Blount reported that Hawaiians were 
overwhelmingly opposed to annexation: “They are convinced they have been the victims 
of a great wrong committed by American officials.  They look to Washington for 
redress…. I am satisfied that if the votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign 
countries were excluded [annexation] would be defeated by more than five to one.”41  
Hawaiian testimony influenced Commissioner Blount and staved off annexation such that 
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the United States Congress had to resort to an unconstitutional joint resolution, in 1898, 
to annex the Hawaiian Islands.  
 Although the 1893 annexation attempt was defeated by the combined efforts of 
Hawaiian nationalists and the Cleveland administration, the settler-planter class was still 
able to maintain possession of the government of Hawai‘i.  President Cleveland did 
attempt to restore Lili‘uokalani but refused to use necessary force.  Consequently, the 
final decision to restore the Hawaiian Kingdom was left to Congress, which in 1894 
proceeded to recognize the Provisional Government as the Republic of Hawai‘i.  In the 
same year, Congress passed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, which returned white settler 
planters to the position of strategic importance they enjoyed during the Reciprocity 
Treaty era.   
 The planners of the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago found synergy 
between the story expressed in their fair and the events taking place in Hawai‘i.  In 
preparation for the opening day of the Exposition, the Chicago Tribune supported the 
idea of hoisting the same American flag above the exposition’s “Grand Entrance” that 
had been raised over the Hawaiian Government Building during the overthrow, opining 
that such a gesture would “advertise the cause of annexation and once more bring it home 
to the minds and hearts of all Americans.”42   
The similarities between white settler claims over Native American and Native 
Hawaiian lands were also not lost on Hawaiians or Native Americans.  For instance, in a 
public argument between W.R. Castle and a Hawaiian man named Kaho‘okono from 
Hilo, Kaho‘okono argued that “…with annexation, the natives would be driven to the 
woods like the Indians.”  Castle replied: “… that was what I was waiting for.  The good 
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Indians… were living on their own lands, with their own schools and churches.”  But the 
“bad Indians,” Castle argued, “would have scalped that man, and the Hawaiians would 
not be treated as they were unless they were like them.”43  These same connections were 
also made in Indian country about the situation in Hawai‘i.  In a letter to Queen 
Lili‘uokalani, the “Citizens of the Cherokee Nation” inquired: “How many volunteer 
Americans would it require to re-establish Your Majesty’s Government and displace the 
oligarchy that usurps your country?”44 
Whites, Orientals, and Primitives at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 “Bird’s-Eye View World’s Columbian Exposition,” Book of the Fair, 1893 
 
 
 With its domestic and global reach, and celebration of linear national narrations of 
discovery, settlement, and progress, the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition is 
instructive of the kinds of temporal and spatial logics that organized U.S. state formation 
and settler colonial power.  Like other nations that hosted previous World’s Fairs, the 
United States attempted to project its imperial prowess through displays of its colonial 
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feats and possessions.  There was a difference, however.  By 1893 the United States had 
not yet practiced a classical form of colonialism, one that involved governing overseas 
lands and peoples through administrative functions emanating from a metropole.  Instead, 
the form of colonialism associated with the United States involved practices of settler 
colonialism, through which the U.S. national land base was itself wholly dependent on 
settlers colonizing what they viewed as savage frontiers filled with savage peoples and 
seemingly primitive subsistence economies.  Such colonial practices aimed to remake the 
“wilderness” into their own so-called modern “civilizations.”   
 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 can be said to be the legal manifestation of the 
kind of settler colonial expropriation that led to the formation of the United States.  This 
ordinance helped to organize and make legal the violent expropriation of Native 
American lands by deeming Native peoples “unfit for self-government,” and thus 
renaming and claiming these lands as U.S. territories and states.  After achieving a large 
enough settler population (5,000 “free male inhabitants of age”) and replacing or 
containing the indigenous population (frequently, with assistance from the U.S. military), 
white settlers could make this land their own and proceed to organize and incorporate 
themselves into new territories.  After reaching a population of 60,000 and drafting a 
state constitution, these territories could petition Congress to recognize them as newly 
formed states on equal footing with the rest of the U.S. states.  The Northwest Ordinance 
declared in Act Three, however, that “The utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken without their consent; 
and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed.”45   
Yet, statehood for Ohio, the very first territory to be admitted through the Northwest 
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Ordinance, was the result of a ten-year war (from 1785 to 1795) between the United 
States and different Indians nations of the Midwest.  This ten-year war ended with the 
signing of the Treaty of Greenville, which forced tribal nations to cede most of the 
territory of the current state of Ohio and parts of Indiana.46  Indeed, as a legal doctrine, 
the Northwest Ordinance was the manifestation of an ideological narrative through which 
white settler violence against Indians and the expropriation of their lands and resources 
were deemed natural, inevitable, and perhaps most shockingly, legal.   
Robert Rydell writes in All the World’s a Fair that organizers of the Chicago 
World’s Columbian Exposition sought to illustrate through visual display the benefits of 
white civilization’s conquest of peoples deemed “primitive” to an international 
audience.47 The Midway Plaisance and the White City were the two foundational and 
largest sections.   Peoples from around the world were displayed as living ethnological 
exhibits at the Midway Plaisance—a two-mile strip that led to the White City.  The 
temporal and spatial arrangement of the Midway Plaisance leading to the White City was 
deliberately organized by the exposition’s Department of Ethnology to classify the people 
of the world along a smooth linear progression from dark anachronistic primitivism to 
enlightened white modernity, with the inscrutable oriental somewhere in the middle.  
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Fig. 1.2, “Miniature Guide Map,” Chicago Tribune, 1893 
 
 
Denton J. Snider argues that generally, groups were racially arranged at the 
Midway along a “sliding scale of humanity.”  Snider states that “savage races” such as 
Africans from Dahomey and Native Americans, were sequestered on one end of the 
Midway while ethnic whites, represented by two German and two Irish villages, were 
situated nearest to the White City.48  Between them were Orientalist representations of the 
Mohammedan world, West Asia, and East Asia.  These exhibits were organized by the 
Smithsonian anthropologist, Frederic Putnam, in a way that illustrated America’s ability 
to transform or modernize non-white cultures.49  By hailing whiteness as the apogee of all 
civilizations and cultures, this pyramidal view of the world helped to create a space to 
imagine the formation of an American empire and, especially, to normalize a seemingly 
natural order of the world where primitives, orientals, and whites were seen along a linear 
march from barbarism to civilization in ascending order.  
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Fig. 1.3, “Key to the Midway” 
 
 
 Many ethnologists at the exposition pushed strongly the idea of social evolution—
that the way to world peace is for the non-western world to adopt U.S. fashioned 
capitalism and democracy.50  Social evolution, expressed through competitive capitalism, 
justified western rule over non-western peoples on the basis of “natural” superiority.  
According to Susan Buck-Morss, one powerful cultural consequence of social evolution, 
is that, “Within this pseudo scientific discourse, the claim of social injustice became a 
logical impossibility.”51 
 Injustices committed against groups deemed primitive and savage were especially 
seen as logically impossible.  The anthropologist Otis T. Mason argued that there were 
three “modern types of savagery” in the world: the American (Native Americans), the 
Negroid, and the Malayo-Polynesian.52  Among these, the latter category (an ethnological 
and linguistic collapsing of Malaysians and Polynesians) saw inhabitants of Southeast 
Asia and Oceania as savage, and would undergird and justify U.S. colonial projects in 
Hawai‘i, Samoa, Guam, and a genocidal war in the Philippines.  As Michael Adas 
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cogently writes about frontier regions throughout the world, “terms like primitive and 
savage…came to signify sorry pasts and tragic futures that would ultimately end with 
their cultural, and perhaps biological extinction.”53  People cast as “primitive” were 
typically regarded as having made no progress towards civilization; their cultures 
portrayed as having contributed nothing to the overall goal of world peace, and even 
considered as being impediments to real progress.   
 If the Midway Plaisance occupied anachronistic space, the White City was viewed 
as a “future wish,” one that articulated both U.S. national identity and a future destiny 
possible only if the status quo could be maintained and expanded.  The White City, an 
ensemble of enormous Olympian structures (albeit made of temporary material), was the 
manifestation of an ostensibly superior form of governance.  Amid populist protests, the 
future destiny of the United States was said to be attainable only if the American 
population were obedient and practiced “good citizenship.”54  Arsonists who were most 
likely involved in the Pullman strikes, however, burned down the White City, blatantly 







 Fig. 1.4, The White City at Columbian Exposition Fig. 1.5, The White City after fire by arson                
 
  
  59 
 While expositions were often used to discipline the white working class, this 
“future wish” also mobilized a sinister expectation that Native peoples would disappear. 
In The Question of Palestine Edward Said writes that the colonial project of settlers seeks 
to “cancel and transcend an actual reality” by means of a “future wish—that the land be 
empty for development by a more deserving power.”55  As long as “primitives” could be 
proven as forever in the past, as a people whose history or futures were already written as 
obituaries, settlers could legitimate their occupation by asserting themselves as the 
modern inheritors of Native peoples’ lands.  But settler nations simultaneously rely, at a 
symbolic level, on the existence of a “primitive” people to assert its national difference 
from other nations and the perception of itself as a “modern” nation.56  Anthropology’s 
patronizing claims to guard against Native elimination thus simultaneously facilitated this 
expectation of Native disappearance. 
 
Fig. 1.6, Japanese Exhibit at Columbian Exposition 
 
 
  In order to place the blame of Native disappearance solely on the inability of 
primitives to live in civilized modernity, evidence had to exist that other non-white 
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groups had been made anew through the teachings of the west.  The Japanese at the 
Wooded Isle were held up as an example of such success, a kind of early version of a 
model minority discourse.57  “Orientals,” as opposed to “primitives,” were not peoples at 
the beginning of progress; rather, they were seen as symbols of the measure of progress 
along the spectrum between the spheres of the “traditional” and “modern” (with the 
modern referencing the West).58  The Japanese government, described as having made 
greater strides toward “the Western spirit of enterprise and civilization,” was given a 
space for display in the White City at the Wooded Isle, a part from the Midway.59  
Japanese officials stated that they were excited to participate at the exposition in order to 
further commercial ties with the United States and prove “that Japan is a country worthy 
of full fellowship in the family of nations.”60  
The Japanese were imagined as having the ability to open Asia to capitalism, and 
thus much needed markets that would help get the United States out of economic 
depression.  Americans consequently referred to the Japanese affectionately as the 
“Yankees of the East.”61  Azuma explains that the Meiji government understood that in 
order to be considered a “civilized” nation, Japan would have to “partake in the practice 
of colonization.”62  Indeed, the Meiji state’s colonization of the Ainu in Hokkaido in 1869 
was modeled after the conquest of Native Americans by the United States.  Accordingly, 
Japan would establish its own form of manifest destiny by colonizing Okinawa, Taiwan, 
south Sakhalin, Kwantung Province in northern China, and then annexing Korea in 1910.  
But while the United States hailed Japan as having a civilizing influence on a seemingly 
backward Asian continent, it insisted that Japan’s “supremacy” always be subordinate to 
that of the United States.  Robert Rydell writes, “as long as the Japanese showed 
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deference to the desires of the United States, there was every reason to believe that the 
Japanese people could be accommodated after a fashion in the future utopia.”63  By the 
time of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, however, American military and political 
leaders predicted that the emerging industrial and militarized nation of Japan was 
destined for future war with the United States.64 
 The temporal and spatial arrangement of “primitives” and “orientals” along the 
Midway Plaisance and White City allowed the United States to create a body of 
knowledge about these groups that would help to enact specific policies.  The knowledge 
being produced about “primitive” peoples helped to reify U.S. colonial policies that 
declared Native peoples “unfit for self-government,” helping to justify federal oversight 
of Native governance through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Such policies and cultural 
representations would help to normalize acts of conquest, to shift the threat of Indian 
violence in the nineteenth century to twentieth century nostalgia and metaphor.65  On the 
other hand, orientalism created both a formidable ally and enemy.  Japan would be used 
as an example of a people who had followed the Americans’ lead and established itself as 
a nation worthy of respect.  This respect, however, would simultaneously be perceived as 
a threat to notions of white superiority.  To be sure, fear of the Japanese was often based 
on an idea that they might, in fact, be a superior people capable of displacing whites.  
Such cultural representations were used to justify the passing of the 1907 Gentlemen’s 
Agreement.  This informal arrangement led to the United States agreeing that they would 
not block Japanese immigration, so long as Japan did not allow further emigration to the 
United States.  By deeming the Japanese “ineligible for citizenship,” further laws would 
be passed that would block naturalization, land ownership, and voting.  Such cultural 
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representations also provided justification for the United States to fortify Hawai‘i as a 
military outpost to defend against Japanese attack in the early twentieth century.     
The Cyclorama of Kilauea 
 
Fig. 1.8, Cyclorama of Kilauea at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition, 1893 
 
 
 The Hawaiian Bureau of Information’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea” functioned as an 
advertisement for tourism, settlement and annexation, all of which sought to reaffirm 
white settler economic and political rule in Hawai‘i.  Due to the small number of white 
settlers in Hawai‘i, especially when compared to the number of Hawaiians and Asians, 
white economic and political leaders saw tourism as an attractive economic alternative to 
sugar, one that would allow them to increase the white settler population through capital 
expansion and still be unaffected by American tariffs.  In 1891, the Daily Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the white settler elite that Lorrin A. Thurston 
would eventually buy and own, responded to the effects of the McKinley Tariff: 
 In spite of the blow which the sugar industry has received, there are those who 
think that we are about to enter upon a period of great expansion and consequent 
prosperity… The tourist travel to these Islands is capable of an almost indefinite 
expansion.  It might yield an income of several millions a year.  If it comes the 
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country will be opened up by a network of roads which will give to thousands of 
acres of arable land a ready access to market.  With the realization of these 
conditions the prosperity of the country will be assured and we can laugh at 
sugar tariffs.66 
 
Many believed that tourism would stabilize Hawai‘i’s economy and increase the 
immigration of white settlers in the hopes of eventually outnumbering the Native 
population and giving whites political power at the voting booths.  Numerous articles in 
the settler newspapers reported the desires of “hundreds and thousands” of whites who 
would consider moving to Hawai‘i only if it were a part of the United States.67  One such 
sentiment was expressed thus: “I would not expatriate myself, but if I could own a little 
land and have a home in such a climate and stay under the flag it would be a great 
temptation.”68  Outnumbering the Native population was also seen as fundamental to 
economic stability and expansion.  Thurston wrote in a letter to Secretary of State James 
Blaine in 1892 that there was an “overwhelming electoral majority in one class [the 
natives], and the ownership of practically all the property in another class [white 
settlers],” consequently creating conflict where settlers, “are constantly, more or less 
openly, threatening revolution and disturbance.”  Thurston explained that while it might 
not actually lead to revolution or bloodshed, the “constant possibility” of revolution 
prevented capital from coming into the country, halting further economic development.69  
Indeed, after facing defeat at the voting polls in 1890, Lorrin A. Thurston became heavily 
involved in promoting white settlement and tourism to Hawai‘i.    
Teaming up with Benjamin Dillingham, a well-known owner of the Oahu 
Railway & Land, Co., and William F. Sesser, a railroad-advertising agent from Michigan, 
Thurston used the Hawaiian Bureau of Information to distribute literature throughout the 
United States that portrayed Hawai‘i as a place where Hawaiian savagery and American 
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civilization met.  Over one thousand large photographs of the Kilauea volcano, ten 
thousand copies of a pamphlet titled Paradise of the Pacific and Inferno of the World, 
and 50,000 smaller pamphlets titled Vistas of Hawaii were distributed nationally.70  The 
development of printing technology near the end of the nineteenth century aided the 
Bureau’s campaign tremendously.  Lynn A. Davis explains that the opinion campaigns 
seeking to capture national consent for annexation utilized numerous photographs due to 
the new low costs of reproducing images of Hawai‘i.  Davis also points out that Thurston 
himself provided a “specific model” to promote Hawai‘i as a tourist destination.71 
Every person who entered the Cyclorama was given the pamphlet entitled Vistas 
of Hawai‘i.  In Legendary Hawai‘i and the Politics of Place, Cristina Bacchilega 
analyzes the larger pamphlet, “Its photos juxtapose images of powerful steamers to 
Native canoes, and beautifully landscaped ‘private’ yards to ‘glimpses of the great 
volcano, Kilauea.’  Thurston illustrates the binaries of his subtitle, Paradise of the Pacific 
and Inferno of the World, by displaying Native Hawaiians as part of the ‘infernal’ 
scenes—these representing the desolate volcano and that dark world before civilization 
brought trains and hotels to the islands.”72  In line with portraying Hawai‘i as a frontier 
zone, white settlement was considered necessary to bringing Hawai‘i out of its primal and 
anachronistic space.  Through proper white American settlement, the symbols of 
savagery and modernity on the farthest margins of the American frontier helped tourists 
feel a combination of threat from wild dark savagery yet safety in knowing that the land 
had been settled and modernized by American settlers.  But there was a threshold: if 
modernity went too far, and extinguished the exoticism associated with the “primitive,” 
Hawai‘i’s selling power would be lost.73  
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Fig. 1.8, “Volcano House Steamer,” Vistas of Hawaii 
 
The Cyclorama of Kilauea deployed many of the tropes that were used in the 
different sections of the Columbian Exposition.  For starters, as mentioned, it represented  
Hawai‘i as a new U.S. frontier zone.  Frederick Jackson Turner writes, “…the frontier is 
the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization.”74  The 
Cyclorama advanced this same idea by representing Hawai‘i, through a volcano, as a 
primordial origin of sorts: Kilauea volcano would be served up as a geological signifier 
of the absolute beginning stages of development, a place on earth at its most primitive 
state.  At the same time, this primitive stage of development was represented in what was 
considered to be one of the most modern forms of western technological entertainment in 
existence, the cyclorama.  Considered to be “all the rage in America,” cycloramas or 
panoramas, were linked to the mobile gaze and new styles of modern visual consumption.  
With their large panoramic screens, cycloramas were also the predecessor to motion 
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picture films.75  Thurston was certainly very keen to the selling power of visually 
combining the primitive and the modern. 
 While the volcano itself helped to create a sense of primitive danger, the 
evocation of Pele, described as the “Goddess of Fire,” was crucial to providing an 
explicitly racialized, gendered, and superstitious Native threat.  Pele’s statue stood above 
the entrance to Thurston’s Cyclorama and, at twenty-five feet, it was said to be the 
second largest statue at the Columbian Exposition.76  An 1893 booklet on the Midway 
described the statue of Pele this way: “Her hair is blown wildly back and there is a 
terrible frown upon her beautiful face, as she prepared to annihilate her enemies.”  Pele’s 
“enemies,” as narrated in the superficial Hawaiian stories told in the cyclorama and its 
advertisements, were always men.   
 
Fig. 1.9, View from inside the Cyclorama of  Fig. 1.10, Geologist walking inside the  
Kilauea.     crater. 
 
 
 This sense of Native threat was also inscribed upon the spectator in highly 
visceral and theatrical ways.  Frightened initially by the crater’s sheer mass and the 
sinister image of Pele, viewers were then enveloped in an exotic chant to Pele.  The chant 
was then followed by a short lecture on the science of the volcano.  In this way, Native 
“superstition” and the female threat of Goddess Pele were pacified by an objective 
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masculine science in the form of enlightened geologists who could measure, categorize, 
and rationally explain away superstitious Native mythology.  A write up of the exhibit 
speaks to this dynamic: “Language utterly fails to adequately describe the awful grandeur 
of the vast crater and the terrible fascination of the mighty forces constantly in action 
within its frowning walls, but a few volcanic facts will give some conception of what the 
volcano is and its method of action.”77  In the landscape painting of Kilauea crater inside 
the cyclorama, Chicago painter Walter W. Burridge depicts the figure of a geologist 
walking and studying within the crater.  Here, two competing sets of knowledge about 
one location were juxtaposed.  As a people who were seen as having a more advanced 
knowledge over the crater, settlers could position themselves as more deserving (than 
Native inhabitants) of that space.  The representation of Pele, combined with the science 
of geology, sought to cancel or trivialize Hawaiian cultural associations with place.   
Thurston and his geologists were entrenched in the discourse of the frontier and 
spoke of geology as a war between civilization and the destructive female power of Pele.  
Thomas Jaggar, an early geologist would eventually title his book, Volcanoes Declare 
War, telling of his and Thurston’s involvement in the 1935 U.S. Army’s dropping of six 
tons of bombs on a lava flow from Mauna Loa.78  Interestingly, the lines between a 
superstitious Native past and rational enlightened present would be blurred, however, 
when two of the bombers touched wings in mid-air and burst into flames, an incident that 
Hawaiians in the area had warned the Army about, stating that such bombings were 
desecrations against Pele.79  In fact, the ashes of one of the pilots killed in the bombing 
went missing on its return flight back to the U.S. continent.  The pilot’s ashes were never 
found.  Pacific Islander Studies scholar Vicente M. Diaz points out that such moments 
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where “men of reason” are thrown for a loop, have the gendered and epistemic effect of 
calling “into question that particular form of manliness built on reason.”80 
 In stark contrast to the one-dimensional portrayals of Pele in the Cyclorama, 
Native Hawaiian stories describe Pele, and the women associated with her, as offering a 
profoundly powerful and feminist narrative.  As Noenoe Silva writes of Pele, and the epic 
in which she appears:  
Pele is demanding, jealous, angry, unpredictable, and vengeful.  Further, the other 
women in the epic engage in meaningful and pleasurable activities: they fight of 
evils, outsmart rapists, chant and dance hula, surf, practice medicine and religion 
(one and the same at times), and have loves and profound relationships, especially 
with each other.  They are not cooking, cleaning house, or worrying about 
husbands.  They are not domesticated; rather, they are adventurous.81 
 
In contrast, Pele’s representation in the cyclorama entails the pacification and 
domestication of an irrational and belligerent Native woman.  This resonates fully with 
the narration of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani, one of the world’s most publicly 
visible and known women, who was also publicly vilified as a direct threat to white 
settler control over Hawai‘i.   Not surprisingly, Thurston described Lili‘uokalani as a 
“dangerous woman.”  As indicated earlier, it was Lili‘uokalani who sought to promulgate 
a new constitution to restore a system of checks and balances and full political vote to 
Native Hawaiians.  This attempt to open political office to vote was characterized as 
dangerous to “American lives and property,” which was taken to justify the landing of 
U.S. marines to occupy Hawai‘i.  The American press also ran numerous stories about 
Lili‘uokalani’s supposed savagery and hot temper.  One in particular told of 
Lili‘uokalani’s plan to have Thurston and others beheaded for committing treason.  
Lili‘uokalani responded by stating that beheading was a form of punishment never used 
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in the Hawaiian Islands and that she would rather have Thurston and company banished 
and their properties confiscated.82 
         
Fig. 1.11 Queen Lili‘uokalani  Fig. 1.12 Pele Statue up-close.  Fig. 1.13, “Lili to Grover,” Judge 
 
 
 Yet, the portrayals of Pele and Lili‘uokalani also show how the aims of 
colonialism and tourism relied on different representations of Hawaiian women.  Pele’s 
statue was designed by Ellen Rankin of Chicago whose goal was to portray Pele as a 
“Venus of the Pacific,” the most “beautiful woman that ever lived.”83  In order to lure 
tourists and settlers to Hawai‘i, Pele was sculpted with European features, a beauty 
aesthetic palatable to a white American audience.  Lili‘uokalani, on the other hand, was 
often represented in political cartoons as having “primitive” features, repeatedly 
described, by the missionary elite, as both savage and sexually deviant.84  Andrea Smith 
explains that because Native women are often seen as filled with sexual sin and dirty, 
“the rape of bodies that are considered inherently impure or dirty simply does not 
count.”85  Consequently, Smith argues, such an ideology makes it so that their 
colonization is also made to not count.86  
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 In fact, there is also much overlap between the gendered advertising for tourism 
and annexation.  Thurston writes in Vistas of Hawaii that it was the wresting of political 
control from Hawaiians that transformed Hawai‘i into a place that could be safely visited 
by tourists and correctly developed by whites.  Like most advertisements, the pamphlets 
and cyclorama produced by the Hawaiian Bureau of Information distracted the viewer 
from seeing a highly politicized situation offering, in its place, a space of fantasy defined 
by settler desire and colonial imagination.  As an imperial advertisement for annexation, 
the cyclorama sold Hawai‘i and Hawaiians as existing in an exotic and primitive past, 
which thus allowed a future wish for annexation and settlement by a people discursively 
constructed as more deserving of Hawai‘i and more capable of bringing it into the 
modern world.  The “Cyclorama of Kilauea” enjoyed a fairly long run in the World’s Fair 
circuits and eventually made its way to the San Francisco Midwinter Fair of 1894-95, a 
Boston Cyclorama theater, and eventually, the 1901 Buffalo Exposition.87  Long 
capturing the imagination of its viewers, the cyclorama was able to cast the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, and anything associated with Hawaiians, as existing in a vanishing past, while 
presenting a Hawai‘i under both American and white settler control as foretelling of a 
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A Future Wish for Statehood: Whiteness, Orientalism, and Primitivism in Hawai‘i 
 
             
 
Fig 1.14 Royal Coat of Arms of the Hawaiian Kingdom     Fig 1.15 Republic of Hawai‘i Seal 
 
 
 Lorrin A. Thurston often obsessively talked about the death of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom and the birth of a new settler government.  He argued that once Hawaiians 
understood that the monarchy was dead and “this idea penetrates the skulls of the great 
unwashed electorate,” Hawaiians themselves would become Annexationists.88  The State 
of Hawai‘i seal used today, adopted in 1895, visually offers us an understanding of this 
logic and a “future wish” as it relates to Hawai‘i.  Viggo Jacobsen designed the Hawai‘i 
seal in an art competition sponsored by the legislature of the Republic of Hawai‘i.  In a 
1979 issue of Aloha Magazine the author writes:  
The seal is a modified version of the royal coat of arms of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom… The rising sun replaces the royal crown and Maltese cross of the 
original coat of arms, and signifies the birth of a new state.  King Kamehameha the 
Great and Goddess of Liberty holding the Hawaiian flag replace two warriors on 
the royal coat of arms. Puloulou, or tabu ball and stick, in the second and third 
quarters was carried before the king and placed before the door of his home, 
signifying his authority and power.  Here, it is a symbol of the authority and power 
of government.  The phoenix, symbol of death and resurrection, symbolizes the 
change from the monarchy to a freer democratic form of government.89  
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In 1895, three years before Hawai‘i was fraudulently annexed through joint resolution by 
the United States, the star at the center of the shield represented the “the Star of Hawaii,” 
a “future wish” for statehood of which Viggo Jacobsen wrote, “we hope to see ultimately 
placed in the banner of the United States.”90  At the same time, however, most Hawaiian 
nationals had not given up their claims to Hawaiian independence.  As Noenoe K. Silva’s 
research has uncovered, a failed war was attempted in 1895 but in 1897, when talks of 
annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States resumed, the Hui Kalai‘aina and Hui 
Aloha ‘Aina Parties circulated petitions signed by over ninety percent of the Hawaiian 
population opposing American citizenship throughout the islands.91  The Hawaiian nation 
remained very much alive.  White settlers, however, sought to dismiss Hawaiian claims 
to nationhood by playing to a much more recognizable international threat to white order 
than that posed by Native Hawaiians.   
This threat—the Yellow Peril—is also one that Thurston would no doubt learn 
more about from his experiences at the Columbian Exposition.  In 1897, Thurston wrote 
that white settlers in Hawai‘i understood their political dilemma as a contest not between 
Native Hawaiians and white settlers, but rather between the white and the yellow race, 
stating: “It is no longer a question whether Hawaii should be controlled by the native 
Hawaiian, or by some foreign people; but the question is, ‘What foreign people shall 
control Hawaii?’”92  By 1897, tensions between Japan and the Republic of Hawai‘i were 
near breaking point.  The Republic had begun to force ships, filled with Japanese laborers 
to return to Japan in the belief that Japan was participating in a “peaceful invasion” of the 
islands.93  This led to talks of war between Japan and the United States.  Both the 
Republic of Hawai‘i and U.S. military leaders hoped to exploit these tensions, believing 
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this might force the United States to immediately annex the islands.  By the latter part of 
the 1890s, military leaders wanted to keep Hawai‘i away from Japan so that it could 
never use Hawai‘i as a staging point to attack the west coast. 94   
 In 1898, imperialists would again seek annexation.  The national press, however, 
reminded the public of the 1893 crime upon which annexation stood.  The New York 
Times ran an editorial titled, “Story of a Crime,” stating that before the “Hawaiian crime 
is actually consummated,” the American public should remember the whole story of the 
January 1893 overthrow.95  The San Francisco Call dubbed the annexation “shameful,” 
because “It made the United States a receiver of goods stolen while we held the owner to 
be robbed.”96  Unable to get the constitutionally required two-thirds vote from the Senate, 
Senator Morgan of Nevada, citing the annexation of Texas as a precedent, pushed the 
annexation through joint resolution, which only required half the vote of Congress.  The 
comparison was, and still is, flawed: Texas was not annexed as a territory but rather, 
admitted into the union as a “state.”  Moreover, unlike Texas, neither the white settler 
elite of Hawai‘i or Washington D.C. sought statehood for Hawai‘i.  The problem wasn’t 
simply that Hawai‘i’s majority population was non-white.  It was that the large numbers 
of Native peoples could still threaten the political control of the numerically small white 
settler elites should they gain full voting rights afforded by statehood. 
In 1927, Lorrin A. Thurston expressed the same general view of many of his peers 
relegating Hawai‘i statehood to an indeterminate “future wish” stating: “Do I object to 
statehood?  Most assuredly not, so long as it remains an ideal, not a reality.”97  A serious 
movement for statehood did not emerge until 1934, when another major economic 
depression abolished favorable tariff relations and again motivated Hawai‘i’s white 
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business and governing elite to further colonial control of Hawai‘i, this time through 
statehood.  The Hawaiian Bureau of Information, charged with leading an opinion 
campaign to achieve annexation and regain favorable tariff relations in the 1890s, would 
be nearly reproduced in 1935 in the form of the so-called Hawaii Equal Rights 
Commission.  This commission would lead to another opinion campaign to get Hawai‘i 
statehood for economic reasons.   
The links between 1893 and the 1930s, however, are not only limited to these 
commissions and economic depression.  Relations between Chicago and Hawai‘i, 
specifically the Columbian Exposition and the University of Hawai‘i, would also be 
furthered through the University of Chicago School of Sociology.  This department was 
built on the site where the Midway Plaisance once stood and in its early formulations, it 
used much of the logics of the Columbian Exposition for its intellectual foundations.  
This department would be responsible for training sociologists who would then travel to 
Hawai‘i and produce knowledge about race relations in the islands that would reaffirm 
notions of both primitivism and orientalism, thereby constituting Hawai‘i as a veritable 
“racial frontier.”   
Indeed, a critical retelling of the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition 
helps contextualize Hawai‘i statehood within the history of the formation of other U.S. 
states.  This political and cultural process was not inevitable; rather, it was a long and 
violent process underpinned by a white supremacist ideology that saw the expropriation 
of Native American lands and resources as a natural occurence.  This ideology would 
also be used to collapse the international sovereign rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom into 
a racist colonial discourse on Native Americans.  The Columbian Exposition, with its 
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various displays of peoples deemed primitive, oriental, and white, helped to naturalize 
white supremacist violence making it seem like nothing more than the spreading of 
democracy and progress.
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DRAWING THE LINES OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD:  




 The early decades of Hawai‘i’s Territorial period saw a rapid growth in both the 
sugar industry and U.S. military.  With sugar planters’ access to U.S. markets secure for 
the time being, those who helped in the overthrow and presumed annexation of Hawai’i 
to the United States further amassed large amounts of capital.  For instance, thirteen new 
plantations were created with $40 million available in new capital investment.1  Between 
1910 and 1913 land for sugar increased by 130,000 acres.2  Widely and collectively 
referred to as the Big Five—Castle & Cooke, Charles Brewer & Company, Alexander & 
Baldwin, Theophilus H. Davis & Company, and Heinrich Hackfeld & Company 
(renamed the American Factors during World War I)—these interlocking agencies would 
come to control 41 of the 47 sugar plantations and over 95 percent of the total sugar 
production in Hawai‘i by 1930.3  The Big Five, through a system of interlocking 
directorates, also controlled the industries that surrounded the plantations, namely 
banking, insurance, shipping, utilities and retailing.  Three of these five agencies came 
under the control of four families (Alexander, Baldwin, Castle, and Cooke) whose 
patriarchs first traveled to Hawai‘i as missionaries.  As the common saying about the 
missionaries in Hawai‘i goes: “They came to do good, and did well.” 
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 Big Five desires to maintain access to profitable U.S. sugar markets converged 
with U.S. military leaders’ interests in maintaining the Hawaiian Islands as a military 
outpost.  These mutual interests would keep their relations amicable.  Hawai‘i’s strategic 
location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean would also help to bolster U.S. economic and 
military power in Asia and the Pacific.  By the early part of the twentieth century, the 
United States had become cautious of Japan, particularly due to its military victory over 
the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).  Success in this war led the U.S. 
military to shore-up both the U.S. Army and Navy in Hawai‘i out of fear that Japan could 
invade the islands as a staging point to invade the U.S. West coast.4  Hawai‘i’s strategic 
location would also provide the U.S. military easy access to conduct operations in 
“Oriental waters.”5  With military installations in Hawai‘i, Samoa, Guam, and the 
Philippines, the United States was in a key position by the early part of the twentieth 
century to establish itself both economically and militarily as a hemispheric power 
throughout Asia and the Pacific.  
 By the 1930s, however, the arrangement between the U.S. military and the Big 
Five would come under extraordinary strain.  In 1931, Hawai‘i political leaders, and 
especially a rapidly growing tourism industry, received unwanted national and even 
international attention after Thalia Massie, a well-connected aristocrat and wife of a 
Naval officer, was brutally beaten and allegedly raped by whom she described as four or 
five “Hawaiian” men.6  Evidence would later confirm that her accusations were 
fabricated.7  In Honor Killing, David Stannard describes the atmosphere in Honolulu 
during the “Massie Affair” as an “ethnically divided powder keg.”  In 1932 the five 
accused men, a mix of Hawaiian, Japanese, and Chinese, were free on a mistrial as the 
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jury could not come to a decision, particularly due to questionable police investigations.  
Many Congressmen took notice of the ability for men of color in the colonies to be free 
after “harming” a white woman and attempted to place Hawai‘i under a Naval form of 
government.8  Equally disturbed by what he considered to be the Territorial 
Government’s incompetence at securing a guilty verdict for those “cutthroats,” Admiral 
Yates Stirling concluded to the press a racist expectation that lynching be used to restore 
order: “since the five accused men were as free as air, I half expected, in spite of 
discipline, to hear any day that one or more had been found swinging from trees by the 
neck up Nuuanu Valley or at the Pali.”9  Only a few days after Admiral Stirling’s 
comment, one of the accused, Horace Ida, was severely beaten and left for dead at the 
Pali—a stretch of road that cuts through a generally secluded Ko‘olau mountain.  Another 
of the accused, Joseph Kahahawai, unfortunately did not survive his attack.  Kahahawai 
would be kidnapped by Massie’s husband, her mother, and a family friend and then shot.  
The Massie gang would attempt to get rid of Kahahawai’s body by dumping it into a 
blowhole, a lava tube that would have dismembered his body, but the group was caught 
en route and apprehended.  The already tense relations among the military, Big Five, and 
now, especially the non-white majority, reached unprecedented levels after Kahahawai’s 
convicted murderers received a commuted sentence—from ten years hard labor to one 
hour spent in Governor Lawrence Judd’s office.  Walter Dillingham, the son of Benjamin 
Dillingham (who we met in Chapter One), commented on the dangerous precedent that 
Governor Judd’s decision posed in a majority non-white community: “While this may be 
condoned under conditions which prevail where whites are in the majority, it would be a 
hazardous thing to give any such recognition of lynch law in our community where it is 
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vital to stress the necessity of abiding by the laws of the country.”10   
Amid several rounds of federal investigations that cited Hawai‘i political leaders 
as neglectful and inefficient, Congressmen sought to establish a commission form of 
government over Hawai‘i.11 Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi, for example, 
assumed that the white settler leadership of the Territory was inept at maintaining racial 
order and control.  In 1933, Rankin introduced legislation that would have removed the 
white settler elite from control of the government and allowed the President to appoint 
nonresidents to key positions in the Territory.  Southern Congressman believed that a 
change in Territorial government would create the proper conditions, where a white 
person would never be sentenced to ten years hard labor for killing someone “black,” 
especially one who had harmed a white woman.12 
 As the circumstances of the Massie case reveal, racial hostilities by the 1930s 
were highly gendered and often involved a fear that white society was losing order and 
control in the islands.  Much of these anxieties were indeed catalyzed by the Great 
Depression.  Beginning with the U.S. stock market crash in 1929, over five thousand 
banks were forced to close and industrial production would fall by 50 percent, a situation 
that caused an estimated 15 million people to be unemployed.13  By December of 1936, 
nearly one-quarter of Hawai‘i’s labor force was out of work and the power and prestige 
held by the Big Five was under extraordinary stress.14  With a U.S. capitalist system in 
disarray, Congress would pass legislation that would again, much like it did the 1890s, 
impact the Big Five’s access to U.S. sugar markets.  As a part of New Deal Agricultural 
policies, the 1934 Jones-Costigan Sugar Act abolished the tariff relations providing the 
Big Five access to highly lucrative U.S. sugar markets.15  Unlike the 1890s, however, 
87 
   





federal policies to combat the Great Depression brought more worries for the Big Five.  
Congress would also pass the 1935 Wagner Act, which empowered Hawai‘i’s 
dockworkers to organize themselves into unions without employer intrusion or 
interference.  In an island society that depended primarily on importing and exporting 
goods through ports and harbors, dockworkers could now oppose the Big Five in 
unprecedented ways.  In turn, the Big Five searched for new political means to give it a 
larger voice in Congress, particularly to counter what it called “federal discrimination.”  
Statehood was imagined as providing them with this means.  
Hawai‘i’s occupation by the United States was thus comprised of a complex 
constellation of processes and interests.16  These processes consisted of a delicate 
arrangement of variously mediated struggles, which were orchestrated by U.S. designs 
for empire and global imperial politics, labor immigration and protest, economic 
depression and planter access to U.S. markets, racial tensions and alliances, and struggles 
for equality.  All of these forces contributed to an often obscured or ideologically 
justified arrangement of power: the (re)consolidation of settler accumulation through 
Native dispossession.   
In this chapter, I highlight settler colonialism as a major dimension of economic 
and social force in Hawai‘i, one instructive of the kind of organizing racial logics that 
made the Americanization of Hawai‘i and aims for statehood seem natural and inevitable.  
Thus I place settler colonialism in relation to other historical processes that generate 
profit through dispossession, namely labor exploitation and empire building.    
To illustrate the relations between these historical processes, I provide three different 
examples that call attention to particular formations of settler colonial power.  In section 
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one, I compare the representation of Hawai‘i and the Philippines in late 19th and early 20th 
century political cartoons, questioning how their gendered representations helped to 
naturalize different political trajectories—independence for the Philippines, and 
statehood for Hawai‘i.  In section two, I apply the concept of settler colonialism, paying 
careful attention to the differential positionalities of non-white settlers, including their 
complex relations to systemic structures of white racism through labor exploitation on the 
one hand, and participation in settler discourses complicit in the dispossession of Native 
Hawaiians on the other.  In this section, I also offer close readings of academic and 
scholarly texts produced in the early half of the 20th century that use “primitives” and 
“orientals” as objects of knowledge for political aims.  Examples include the work of 
Australian psychologist, Stanley D. Porteus, and that of the University of Chicago-trained 
sociologists who founded the Department of Sociology at the University of Hawai‘i, 
whose works justified “oriental” assimilation to the United States often through “frontier” 
narratives defined in opposition to “primitives.”  Such organizing logics would be key to 
the Hawai‘i statehood movement.  In the third and final section, I examine local 
editorials, political cartoons, and testimony pertaining to the 1937 congressional 
statehood hearings in Hawai‘i, which provided an opportunity for those regularly 
surveilled by the settler state to reverse the imperial gaze and instead testify before a 
more powerful U.S. congressional authority on the abuses and corruption of the Big Five.  
Where the first two sections provide examples of the production of differential colonial 
knowledge about different Asian groups and Hawaiians, the last section explores a 
moment where this dynamic is reversed, and the “objects of knowledge” are the Big Five 
themselves.  I begin first with a comparison of the different representations of colonial 
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power representing Native Hawaiians and Filipinos as American primitives destined for 
different political statuses—statehood and independence. 
“Little Brown Brothers” and “Hula Maidens” 
 
Numerous political cartoons at the turn of the twentieth century narrated 
Hawai‘i’s annexation to the United States as permanent, naturalizing this political 
arrangement by representing it as a marriage between Uncle Sam and a “hula maiden.”  
The annexation of the Philippines, on the other hand, was most often represented as a 
situation in which “little brown brothers” were being reared and educated by a benevolent 
Uncle Sam for eventual self-government.  The forms of imperial power over these two 
sites have very distinct dynamics and objectives, requiring different forms of gendered 
narratives and cultural representation.  For example, and as we shall see in greater detail 
later, the U.S. backed overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893 and the pacification of 
Philippine nationalists led by a controversial Emilio Aguinaldo made for very different 
forms of belittling these leaders.  The imagined racial and gendered inferiority of the 
political leaders of Hawai‘i and the Philippines—as primitive woman and boy 
respectively—helped to justify the need for a more “manly American race.”17 
When the United States ventured to occupy various island nations at the end of 
the nineteenth century, much of its experience of colonial governance involved settler 
colonialism and campaigns of genocide enacted against Native Americans.  On the other 
side of the Pacific Ocean, by the end of the 19th century, Filipinos were on the cusp of 
ousting the remnants of a failed Spanish empire.  Seeing an opportunity to gain further 
access to Asian markets, U.S. leaders made secret arrangements with Spain to assume 
colonial control over the archipelago.18  The result of this arrangement was the 
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Philippine-American war (1899-1905), in which upwards of 2 million Filipinos in the 
first four years were killed—mostly civilian non-combatants—so that the United States 
could purportedly teach Filipinos about democracy and self-government.19  Historian 
Patricio Abinales describes much of the genocidal campaigns that took place in 
Mindanao, the largest and southernmost most island consisting primarily of Muslim 
communities, as modeled after the American genocidal campaigns against Native 
Americans.20  When the Americans first arrived to the northern islands, General Elwell 
Otis erroneously declared that the war against the Tagalog “tribe” would last only a few 
weeks.  When the so-called “insurgency” continued to fight and in fact grew stronger, the 
United States deployed hundreds of thousands more American soldiers.  Their mission 
was to carry out what one American Governor would later describe as a “depopulation 
campaign.”21  Indeed, General “Howlin’ Jake” Smith is said to have ordered his soldiers 
to, “Kill and burn, kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the more you 
please me.”  He also commanded them to shoot “Everything over ten,” and turn the land 
into a “howling wilderness” where “even the birds could not live there.”22  Though the 
U.S. Army persisted, and reenacted what Patrick Wolfe calls a “homicidal frontier” in the 
Philippines, they could not reduce the Filipino population to levels that white settlers in 
other American territories might find tolerable.23  The difference in the Philippines too 
was that there was not a sizable white American settler population invested in settling 
these islands.   
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Fig. 2.1, “Speaking From Experience,” Judge 
 
 
In many political cartoons at the turn of the 20th century, Native Americans, 
Native Hawaiians, and Filipinos were drawn side by side, with menacing, but 
“moralizing” lessons attached to them.  In an 1899 cartoon in Judge an Indian chief uses 
“Professor Marconi’s wireless telegraphy” to warn a bandaged Filipino holding a spear, 
“Be good, or you will be dead.”24  Caricatured, and made light of through the cultural 
form of a cartoon, are a pile of Filipino bodies racialized as African, and a burnt village 
in the immediate background.  Further on the distant horizon, Hawai‘i, also depicted as a 
Black native, holds a spear and looks on.  The brand of American conquest, underpinned 
by a discourse of American primitivism, makes genocide seem like the fault of the Native 
for resisting.  While the cartoon certainly contains some serious commentary, the 
juxtaposition of western technology used by American primitives is “unexpected,” 
creating humor that is produced as a result of normative “expectations” for Native 
peoples.  Philip J. Deloria writes, “Primitivism, technological incompetence, physical 
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distance, and cultural difference…such images have remained familiar currency in 
contemporary dealings with Native people.”25  Such kinds of humor, he elaborates, draw 
from situations considered out of the ordinary that actually help to reinforce our 
expectations of other unmarked or absent categories.  These expectations of primitive 
incompetence ideologically underpin gross inequalities.  In other words, this cartoon has 
no white American soldier, yet the image of inept primitives helps to normalize white 
American conquest, conveying an insidious idea that the genocide of primitives was a 
natural and inevitable fact of modernity.  Such expectations of Native disappearance 
simultaneously elide responsibility for genocidal conquest.   
 
Fig. 2.2, “Civilization,” Judge 
 
 In the 1899 political cartoon on the front cover of Judge, titled “The Filipino’s 
First Bath,” U.S. President William McKinley scrubs the darkness and savagery off the 
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unwieldy Filipino child with the brush of “education” and the whitening waters of 
“civilization,” all the while exhorting (in the caption), “Oh, you dirty boy!”  Puerto Rico 
and Cuba are portrayed as model colonial citizens, more mature than the Philippines, 
presumably because they have willingly washed and whitened themselves and are now 
happily donning the stars and stripes.  The racist association of brown skin with dirt links 
Filipino racial types and national territories to uncleanliness and primitive disorder.  In 
this way they seem to beckon their “benevolent assimilation” from dirty “little brown 
brothers” into white adulthood except that this presumed ultimate status of masculinity 
could never be attained.  Indeed, the cartoon provides an example of the kind of 
ambivalence that surrounds colonial mimicry, where the image articulates the need to 
discipline and reform Filipinos to mimic whiteness, while the achievement of such aims 
still does not confer equality, since obvious physical differences between Filipinos and 
white Americans help to reinforce the so-called civilized power of the United States.  
Filipino independence would thus be based on a simultaneous recognition of their 
potential for attaining sovereignty, albeit one that is predicated on an assumption of their 
racial inferiority.  Put another way, Philippine independence was structured around a 
notion of Filipinos being worthy for self-government as fully matured men, while 
remaining racially inferior in a status that renders them forever “white but not quite.”26   
U.S. President William McKinley termed the practice of colonial governance used 
to occupy the Philippines “benevolent assimilation,” a complex project intended to be 
both temporary and permanent.  As historian Vicente Rafael explains: 
The allegory of benevolent assimilation thus foresaw the possibility if not the 
inevitability, of colonialism’s end.  But equally important, it also insisted on 
defining and delimiting the means to that end.  While colonial rule may be a 
transitional state of self-rule, the self that rules itself can only emerge by way of 
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an intimate relationship with a colonial master who sets the standards and 
practices of discipline to mold the conduct of the colonial subject.  In other words, 
the culmination of colonial rule, self-government, can be achieved only when the 
subject has learned to colonize itself.27  
 
U.S. colonial governmentality in the Philippines was intended ultimately to create a 
neocolonial system in which colonialism reproduced itself to the benefit of the United 
States.  Thus, U.S. occupation was able to continue itself under a supposedly independent 
political status.  Once the Americans were successful at “making native inhabitants desire 
what colonial authority desired for them” and once they established an economic, 
political, and military structure that forced Filipino leaders to abide by this ideology, only 
then did the U.S. plan to grant the Philippines their “independence.”28   
In 1934, the same year that Congress abolished Hawai‘i’s profitable tariff 
relations, which set the Big Five on a mission for statehood, Congress also passed 
legislation that would track the Philippines toward independence.  The motivating 
rationale for this, however, was less benevolent than it was economic.  Burdened by 
governmental responsibilities to Filipino nationals during the depression, Congress 
passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act to limit Filipino immigration to the United States to 
fifty persons a year while turning the Philippines into a Commonwealth destined for 
independence (with major stipulations) in ten years time.29  Progress towards 
independence was halted during the violent invasion and occupation of the Philippines by 
Japan from 1941 to 1944.  After “liberation,” however, the United States threatened to 
leave the Philippines without rebuilding the war-torn nation.  It also conditioned the 
release of (badly needed) financial assistance on the Philippine government’s agreement 
to include the so-called “Parity Amendment” in its constitution.  This amendment granted 
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extraterritorial rights to U.S. citizens and corporations, in effect giving them the same 
rights as, perhaps even more than, most Filipinos.  These rights led to the continued 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources and labor.  During the U.S. Cold War, 
when the United States began to escalate its military campaign in Vietnam, the 
Philippines signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (in 1951), the Manila Pact, and the Laurel-
Langley Agreement (both in 1954), all of which provided additional U.S. economic and 
military influence in the “independent” Philippines.  Indeed, Americans created a 
situation in which they could claim responsibility for all that had gone well for the 
Philippines, and force Filipinos to take responsibility for all that had not. 
 
Fig. 2.3, Hawaii and Uncle Sam Gun Shot Wedding, Puck 
 
As for Hawai‘i, U.S. occupation of the archipelago was facilitated and normalized 
by a process of settler colonialism, whereby Hawai‘i’s settler and military leaders 
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imagined their control over Hawai‘i as something permanent.  In the political cartoon 
above, Hawai‘i is depicted as a “hula maiden” in the process of being wedded, albeit 
reluctantly, to Uncle Sam.  Symbolically and politically, this “marriage” aided a settler 
colonial project whose purpose was not to teach the numerically outnumbered Native 
Hawaiian population to run their own government, but to dispossess Native Hawaiians of 
land, resources, and sovereignty, and insert in their place white settlers figured as more 
deserving and capable of leading a feminized Hawai‘i.  Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis 
Turbull argue that engendering Hawai‘i as dark, inept, but fertile and female was key to 
creating a sense of what Native Hawaiians lack, but relatedly, also key to creating not 
merely the necessity for white masculine settlers, but the occasion to galvanize that self-
identity of white settlers as fathers, husbands, and progenitors, of Hawai‘i’s future: 
Maps of Hawai‘i from Captain James Cook’s expeditions represent Hawai‘i with 
soft, curved, breast-like mountains and mysterious coves and bays.  Missionary 
accounts of “the natives” emphasize their darkness; naked, unashamed, 
promiscuous; lacking in writing, lacking in modesty, lacking in the knowledge of 
God.  Planters found a different lack—lack of industriousness, frugality, 
punctuality, property, devotion to accumulation.  Military planners found a lack of 
awareness of foreign enemies, an absence of appropriate defense technology, a 
properly masculine political hierarchy wanting.30 
 
Ferguson and Turnbull argue that “[b]oth versions of femininity—as lack and as 
availability—configure the representers as entitled to what they see.”31  The successful 
establishment of a white settler-led government after the 1893 overthrow was seen as 
evidence of a modern masculine state that worked in partnership with the United States in 
establishing a smooth continuum for U.S. control over Hawai‘i.  In fact, statehood was 
never promised to settler leaders at the time of alleged annexation, but the U.S. 
occupation of Hawai‘i was considered permanent, marking Hawai‘i as an “integral part 
97 
   





of the United States,” consequently making independence seem like a logical 
impossibility.   
Thus, unlike the Spanish catholicized Philippines, Hawai‘i was imagined to be 
thoroughly American by the time of annexation, where American Calvinist missionaries 
were imagined to have brought American modernity to the islands in 1820.  For instance, 
missionary descendant and Big Five executive W.R. Castle, wrote to Congress in 1899 
about these differences: “Those countries [referring to former Spanish colonies] are 
Spanish and absolutely un-American.  Hawaii has never been Spanish, and for seventy-
five years has been growing American, til [sic] it is as ready for the territorial government 
proposed as any of the territories of this country ever were!”32  The Calvinists in 
Hawai‘i—spiritual and cultural descendents of the same group that had violently 
displaced the Pequot Indians of the Massachusetts area in the 17th century—disseminated 
well into the 19th century a white supremacist worldview, which included the logic of 
settler colonialism.33  And while settler colonial practices throughout the nineteenth 
century did not negate the legal existence of Hawaiian Kingdom sovereignty and 
government, they did initiate a process that would eventually lead to conditions that by 
1893 made the overthrow possible.  Indeed, the arrival of the missionaries and their views 
of white supremacy launched a historical process that aimed to expropriate land and 
replace Natives with supposedly more racially superior, and thus more deserving settlers.  
Though Native Hawaiians initiated two wars to regain Hawaiian control of the 
government from those white settlers, they could not wage a protracted war as in the 
Philippines because of their relatively small population base.  According to David 
Stannard, Hawai‘i’s population at the point of contact in 1778 was around 800,000; other 
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estimates are upwards of one million.  By the 1890 Census the population had collapsed 
to around 39,000 on account of foreign diseases from both the West and East.34  By 1900 
Hawaiians comprised only one fourth of the total population.35  Some Hawaiians were 
aware of the commonality of their struggle to oppose an imperialist oppressor with 
Filipinos.  In 1899 for instance, Robert W. Wilcox, the Hawaiian nationalist who led 
armed revolts to restore the Hawaiian nation, wrote two letters to Emilio Aguinaldo, the 
leader of the Philippine war against the United States, to express solidarity with the 
Filipino fight for independence and to offer his services.36   
Unable to regain their national government through the bullet, Hawaiians, once 
again, gained political ground through the ballot.  Wilcox represented the Hui Kalai‘aina 
and traveled to Washington D.C. to challenge the fraudulent Newlands Resolution, which 
sought to annex Hawai‘i to the United States.37  With funding from a group of wealthy 
Chinese (and a Hawai‘i legislator named Lincoln Loy McCandless), Wilcox took up 
residence in Washington D.C.38  Wilcox spoke to the Committee on Territories and 
convinced its members to unanimously strike the property qualification for voting, and 
attempted to secure the vote for Asians, but was unsuccessful.39  In the first years of the 
Territorial period, and with encouragement from Queen Lili‘uokalani, Hawaiian men 
worked within the new American political system electing Robert W. Wilcox (of the 
Home Rule Party) as Hawai‘i’s first delegate to Congress.40  Though they had been 
forced under U.S. occupation, Hawaiians parlayed their voting numbers, around 60 
percent of the voting population, to turn a colonial system against itself and politically 
challenge white settler control.  With Hawaiians dominating the Territorial vote in the 
early part of the 20th century, many Hawaiians attempted to push for statehood in an 
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effort to achieve full voting rights and dislodge white settler influence. 
The continuation of white settler hegemony, as hegemony goes, required 
negotiated consent from Native Hawaiians, a consent that was essentially backed by 
federal appointments, (presumably) under threat of U.S. force.  While the Hawaiian 
Kingdom was long criticized for having an undemocratic constitutional monarchy by 
annexationists, the American Territorial system took the selection of political positions 
away from democratic vote and allowed Territorial governor Sanford B. Dole to appoint 
these positions, Dole was himself appointed by U.S. President William McKinley.  
Indeed, white settler hegemony in the beginning years of U.S. occupation was wholly 
reliant on keeping key political positions away from vote and establishing a Territorial 
structure based on appointments by the White House.  A key political position that was 
determined by vote was the congressional delegate to Washington D.C.  The Big Five, 
however, was successful at getting Prince Jonah Kuhio, nephew of Queen Lili‘uokalani, 
to run as a Republican for this elected position.  He subsequently defeated Robert W. 
Wilcox in 1903.  Kuhio had agreed to this plan, as long as government jobs went to 
Hawaiians.  Ty Kawika Tengan points out that by 1927, Hawaiians held 46 percent of 
executive-appointed government positions, 55 percent of clerical and other government 
jobs, and over half of the judgeships and elective offices.41   
While Native Hawaiians were successful at negotiating a U.S. colonial system 
that was forced upon them, the territorial period was still dominated by the Big Five and 
governed by a discourse of paternalism and white supremacy.  Tengan further argues that 
Hawaiians were constituted largely by the discourse of the “lazy kanaka,” an old and 
persisting racial thread of colonial discourse that had the effect of emasculating Hawaiian 
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men, especially in contrast to either the haole elite, or “hard-working” Chinese and 
Japanese men, many of whom, left the plantations to establish businesses in Honolulu.42   
Thus Hawaiian men, by the 1930s, were seen as lacking the “manly qualities” required 
for political and economic success, and certainly, for self-government.43  Inasmuch as 
politics, and especially the goal of “self-governance” were considered fraternal masculine 
spaces, the engendering of Hawai‘i as a primitive “hula maiden,” combined with the 
emasculation of Hawaiian men through a discourse of “lazy kanakas,” had the effect of 
establishing the archipelago as a feminized space.  Marking Hawai‘i as feminine could 
facilitate a policy that established Hawai‘i as an “integral part of the United States,” a 
Territory that lacked the masculine traits needed for proper self-government, something 
white American men were imagined as furnishing. 
Asian American Settler Colonialism 
 Settler colonialism is a historical process often contained to the past or selectively 
used to describe only white settlement.  Yet, Patrick Wolfe argues against such frames 
stating succinctly that, “invasion is a structure not an event.”44  Like other white 
supremacist formed structures, settler colonialism is a historically created system of 
power that aims to expropriate Native territories and eliminate Native modes of 
production in order to replace Native people with settlers who are discursively constituted 
as superior, and thus more deserving over these contested lands and resources.  Initially 
created through a notion that enlightened white settlers are superior to dark primitive 
Natives, in time, white settler colonialism as a structure would become modified through 
distinctly non-white and non-indigenous struggles for political and economic inclusion.  
These political projects for equality in the settler state would not consider or address 
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fundamental issues of occupation, especially of the specific situation of Native 
Hawaiians.  Such racial projects for inclusion and equality in the settler state thus modify, 
and even renew a hegemonic settler colonial system.  Here, I wish to highlight settler 
colonialism as a changing and evolving discursive practice, one that plays a key role in 
the initial stages of the statehood movement. 
 Historians Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen explain that settler colonialism in 
the twentieth century often consists of a four-sided structure in constant struggle and 
negotiation.  These four-sides consist of an “imperial metropole where sovereignty 
formally resides, a local administration charged with maintaining order and authority, an 
indigenous population significant in size and tenacity to make its presence felt, and an 
often demanding and well-connected settler community. [italics my own]”45  Indeed, 
these four dimensions of settler colonialism help to name some of the different 
constituents and institutions involved in the power play to achieve or defeat statehood—
imperial metropole (Washington D.C.), local administration (which I argue for Hawai‘i 
translates into a large military presence), indigenous population (Native Hawaiians), and 
settler community (the Big Five).  While Elkins and Pederson’s framing helps to identify 
an arrangement of settler colonialism in other geopolitical locations, in Hawai‘i there also 
exists a fifth dimension—what Hawaiian scholar Haunani-Kay Trask names “Asian 
settlers,” non-indigenous and non-white groups, exploited for their labor and possessing 
their own histories of subjugation by imperialism, yet still maintaining a sense of racial 
difference from Hawaiians and often benefiting from their dispossession.  
 While on the sugar plantations, Asian settlers were considered an exploitable 
labor source, viewed largely as commodities, whose value was shaped by scientific 
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racism and U.S. imperial discourse.  These laborers had long contended with western, 
and/or eastern, imperialism or occupation before setting foot in Hawai‘i.46  Large-scale 
Asian settlement began in the 1840s, when laborers from China first traveled to Hawai‘i 
to begin working on the first sugar plantations.  Individual settlers from Portugal would 
travel to Hawai‘i in the 18th century, but began immigrating in larger numbers by 1878.  
Laborers from Japan also began immigrating in large numbers by 1885, although there 
was in fact an earlier group that experienced such bad working conditions that the 
Japanese government decided against subjecting any more of its citizens to such 
oppression.  After annexation laborers from Okinawa (1900) and Korea (1903), and those 
sites colonized by the United States—Puerto Rico (1900) and the Philippines (1906)—
immigrated in large numbers.  To be sure, many would also leave Hawai‘i, either to 
return to their country of origin, or move on to the U.S. continent.  In either case, George 
H. Fairfield, manager of the Makee Sugar Company, stated the rationale for such 
recruitment policies: “Keep a variety of laborers, that is different nationalities, and thus 
prevent any concerted action in case of strikes, for there are few, if any, cases of Japs, 
Chinese, and Portuguese entering into a strike as a unit.”47   
 The use of these groups as objects of knowledge that would inform hierarchical 
ideas involving Asian settlers and Hawaiians is best illustrated in the work of the 
University of Hawai‘i psychologist Stanley D. Porteus.  Hailing from Australia, a place 
where settler colonial practices were often informed by ideas that the aboriginal 
population were to be treated like wildlife, Porteus interviewed plantation managers and 
conducted different tests in elementary schools to help white political leaders better 
control Hawai‘i’s non-white population.48  Indeed, much of the information in his and 
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Marjorie E. Babcock’s now infamous 1926 book, Temperament and Race, concerned the 
issue of controlling labor dissent by studying the racial “temperament” as well as the 
“educational capabilities” of each community (the book was made widely known in 1997 
through successful Hawaiian student protests at the University of Hawai‘i, who 
demanded the renaming of the social sciences building, which had been named after 
Porteus).49  According to Porteus and Babcock, the key difference in intelligence and 
socioeconomic status of different non-white groups lay in the presumed categorical 
difference between “primitive” and “oriental” races.  Reaching back to the work of the 
German craniologist, Emil Villiger, Porteus and Babcock linked intelligence to the 
different weight and size of these groups’ brains.  For example, they cited a 1912 study 
by Villiger that provided the following ranking, in ascending order, of racial types based 
on the average measurements:   
 Australian aboriginal     1185 grammes 
 Negro       1244 grammes 
 Malay       1266 grammes 
 Hawaiian      1303 grammes 
 Chinese      1332 grammes 
 Caucasian      1335 grammes 
 
Porteus and Babcock argued that the weight of their brains would also determine their 
performance in education.50  For wider comparative purposes, perhaps for good measure, 
Porteus and Babcock added, “the comparative retardation of the Australian aboriginal 
seems to be true of other more or less primitive races.”51   
Though Porteus and Babcock’s racist ideas were commonplace amongst the Big 
Five elite, as social scientific arguments they represented an out-of-favor position in a 
debate-taking place throughout much of the social sciences.  In anthropology, for 
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example, Franz Boas had by the 1920s convinced many that “culture” accounted for the 
difference between so-called “civilized” and “primitive” people, and that culture was 
determined by “historical events,” rather than biology.52  Porteus and Babcock responded 
to Boas by arguing that history has proven that education would in fact be wasted on the 
“idiot or imbecile,” since “primitive races” like Australian aborigines and Filipinos who 
had long contact with whites had progressed very little.53  A long history of “white” 
conquest and campaigns of genocide enacted against Australian aboriginal peoples and 
Filipinos were, predictably, not taken into consideration.   
In contrast to those labeled as “primitive races,” Porteus and Babcock argued that 
the “Oriental” groups in Hawai‘i were actually gaining in social status and had the 
potential to surpass whites.  This advancement in social status proved to them that 
“Orientals,” though “poorly endowed” when compared to whites, could nonetheless 
overcome the “handicaps” of color, custom and language and possibly thrive.54  In 
comparing Japanese with Native Hawaiians, for instance, Porteus found that Hawaiians 
were not driven to succeed because of their “temperamental adaptability,” which was 
owed to the education they received from the American missionaries.  The Japanese, on 
the other hand, lacked Hawaiians’ alleged ability to “harmonize” with whites.”55  Indeed, 
Porteus observed that the Japanese were quick to “turn the white man’s own weapons 
against him” by going out on strike describing them as “self-assertive and anxious for a 
larger place in the sun.”56  Such observations became the principal subject and claim of 
their book, that these “barefooted, horny-handed, ignorant labourers were not poorly 
endowed, but were rich in an inheritance of temperamental or psychosynergic traits that 
only needed the opportunity to make their weight felt in inter-racial and social 
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competition.”57  If inherited “temperament” and “psychosynergy” gave “Orientals” the 
potential to succeed, imperial history furnished the “opportunity,” but at an epic risk to 
white racial power.  Porteus and Babcock predicted that Japanese desires for ascendancy 
amounted to a threat to white society and could result in an “inevitable clash of 
temperaments” if the proper conditions were not prevented.58   
Indeed, while whites were considered intellectually superior to all other racial 
groups, nature and history did not automatically guarantee their primacy or exalted social 
position.  White economic and political superiority might have been inherited, but it was 
not an inevitable outcome in the face of competition.  Porteus and Babcock explain: “it is 
undoubtedly true that though the word is over-worked, the older civilizations do tend to 
become ‘effete.’”59  And so, while Porteus and Babcock argue that the historical 
settlement of Australia, Canada, and other “new lands” were different from—actually 
superior to—Hawai‘i by virtue of maintaining white control (which they dubbed a 
“vanguard of settlement”), the more salient issue lay in a threat posed by “Oriental” 
laborers who were now themselves clamoring for equality with whites.60  Unsurprisingly 
(from our vantage point today), Porteus and Babcock end their study with a warning to 
the white race: “If we hope for race survival, then we must proceed to develop to the full 
our human resources, the children that are already born.”61  
Porteus and Babcock furnished a body of knowledge that would highlight the 
vulnerability of white privilege and power in an effort to regulate the social and political 
development of non-whites (Asians and Hawaiians).  Accordingly, Hawai‘i’s sugar 
planters purposefully kept their labor force racially divided in terms of pay, housing, and 
jobs in order to maintain a paternalistic system of that fostered competition and division 
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amongst their work force.  Such “divide and conquer” tactics was hoped to stall any 
collective organizing that might lead to the dissolution of a white supremacist order.  In 
Reworking Race, Moon-Kie Jung elaborates that the racial hierarchy among three of the 
largest groups—the Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos—consisted of work and pay 
positions that descended in order of status and power.62  Filipinos were often relegated to 
unskilled labor positions, while a sizable number of Japanese and Portuguese were found 
in supervisory, skilled, and semi-skilled jobs.  The perceptions of cultural differences 
among these three groups, I would argue, were constituted by discursive formations of 
whiteness, orientalism, and primitivism.  These discourses furnished the stereotypes and 
the now commonplace perceptions of differences among various groups in Hawai‘i.  
Here the Portuguese were, in fact, often grouped somewhat tenuously as “white,” while 
the Japanese were racialized as “oriental” (a term that continues to be used locally in 
contemporary Hawai‘i), and Filipinos were viewed as “primitive.”  This pyramidal 
arrangement of power determined the capabilities, potentials, and value of the differently 
commodified labor groups on Hawai‘i’s sugar plantations, consequently fostering 
division and animosity.  Such discursive categories continue to shape how these groups 
are perceived today. 
 In Hawai‘i’s labor strikes, these divisions played out in relation to white 
supremacy and global imperial politics.  Moon-Kie Jung argues that the colonial rule of 
imperial Japan often made the Japanese in Hawai‘i understand themselves to be superior 
to “stateless” races.  In fact, the first large and organized strike of 1909 by the Japanese 
did not seek universal racial equality, but rather recognition that the Japanese should not 
be treated as an inferior race.  Thus strike leader Motoyuki Negoro argued, “We are first-
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rate nationals [itto kokumin].  Therefore we have the right to demand equal pay with 
stateless Puerto Ricans and the so-called white laborers of the Portuguese.”63  In the 1920 
strike, in which Japanese and Filipino laborers went out on strike simultaneously, but not 
in solidarity, the general depictions of the Japanese as an invasive “yellow peril” 
underpinned by deep suspicions of their loyalty to America, had the effect of further 
fracturing potential class solidarity between Japanese and Filipino workers.  Such 
accusations of Japanese disloyalty helped to shape, even discipline, the Japanese to prove 
their “Americanism,” often in opposition to other groups who might be seen as more 
foreign than the Japanese.  By the time of the Great Depression, Jung asserts, the need to 
prove Japanese loyalty to America, “drove a deeper wedge between Japanese and 
Filipino workers, as the Nisei’s reactive insistence on their Americanness led them to 
define themselves in contradistinction to the Filipino ‘alien race.’”64  For their part, 
Filipinos also felt compelled to show their own brand of loyalty.  Filipino labor leader 
Pablo Manlapit attempted to call off the 1920 strike after he was convinced that Japanese 
labor dissent was actually an imperialist ploy to take over Hawai‘i.  Manlapit explained 
that since the Philippines and Hawai‘i were both U.S. territories, he was indebted to 
American interests and therefore “opposed this shocking scheme of the Japanese who are 
attempting to occupy the Territory.”65 
In a similar vein to the work of Porteus and Babcock, sociologists and 
anthropologists at the University of Hawai‘i by the 1930s began to produce scholarship 
that would also advance the categories of “oriental” and “primitive” in ways that 
naturalized white supremacy.  The form of knowledge produced by the University of 
Hawai‘i School of Sociology, however, would have different expectations and political 
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stakes for East Asian groups deemed “Oriental.”  As opposed to Porteus and Babcock’s 
predictions that “Orientals” were destined for an “inevitable clash” with whites, 
University of Hawai‘i sociologists instead determined that “Orientals” were destined to 
assimilate into white society.  Thus, as part of its disciplinary value, sociology was 
viewed as having the ability to reconcile cultural difference, helping “Oriental” peoples 
to assimilate properly and gain membership in American modernity.  Anthropology, on 
the other hand, was then used to study and preserve “primitive” cultures, fixing these 
groups in the past, at the very beginning of an “imagined spectrum of progress” that 
would produced in opposition to a modern white America.66  The binary logics inherent 
in these categories would help to legitimate white settlers’ claims over Hawai‘i.  For 
instance, if “Orientals” were “foreigners” from afar, then white Americans could presume 
to be “natives” of here.  Similarly, “primitives” defined as cultures preserved 
permanently in the past, could allow white settlers to imagine themselves to be bearers of 
modernity and progress to Hawaiians.  For instance, future Congressional Delegate 
Elizabeth Farrington declared that Hawaiians had progressed only because of the 
“education they’ve gotten from us,” and that otherwise they would still be in the Stone 
Age.67   
University of Hawai‘i sociologists defined Hawai‘i as a veritable “racial frontier,” 
a lens through which the assimilation, or obliteration, of non-white cultures were seen as 
inevitable.  Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Hawai‘i’s sociologists were trained at 
the University of Chicago, which had intimate links to the propagation and dissemination 
of U.S. frontier discourses.  As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the 
University of Chicago was itself built on and around the fairgrounds of the 1893 Chicago 
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World’s Columbian Exposition and its anthropology and sociology departments were 
initially informed by and were actually built on the Midway Plaisance.68  The linear 
arrangement of the non-white world along the Midway has similar links to the “race 
relations cycle,” a theoretical model on the inevitable assimilation of immigrant 
communities in the United States developed by Robert E. Park at the University of 
Chicago.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the two-mile strip of the Midway 
categorized, exhibited, and arranged peoples of the world according to stages of 
development in very specific relationships to a utopic White City, which in turn 
represented an American civilizing project over a descending world order of whites, 
ethnic whites, orientals and primitives.  In this imperial demarcation the assimilation or 
obliteration of peoples deemed to be weaker than the west was taken to be an inevitable 
outcome of civilization.   
Noted for having trained many of the Hawai‘i sociologists, Professor Robert E. 
Park, saw assimilation as a linear process, a march of civilization which began in Europe 
through which non-white groups were either neutralized or incorporated into the always 
forward moving project of U.S. civilization.69  Park offered his famous “race relations 
cycle” to explain the inevitable forward march of American (white) cultural supremacy 
based on the social facts of “conflict and competition,” “accommodation,” “assimilation,” 
“amalgamation,” and even “miscegenation.”70  Park, thus distinguished between worldly 
“civilizations” and provincial “cultures.”  For Park, “cultures” possessed narrow and 
singular perspectives of the world.  “Civilizations,” on the other hand, contained 
perspectives that were global in scope and self-aware of the existence of other cultures’ 
worldviews.  The end result was that “cultures” died as they learned that their worldviews 
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were only one of many, while “civilizations” moved on, incorporating and encompassing 
weaker races.71  The notion that weaker races would simply assimilate into American 
society would be used in attempts to convince Congress that Hawai‘i should not be 
denied statehood on account of its large non-white population.  As we shall see later in 
this chapter, statehood proponents would rely heavily on the scholarship of sociologists at 
the University of Hawai‘i to argue for the admission of Hawai‘i as a state. 
 U.S. frontier logics projected that groups would either assimilate or be obliterated, 
and such notions played themselves out in the power relations between different Asian 
settler groups and Native Hawaiians.  In a pamphlet from the 1920 Sugar strike, for 
instance, Japanese laborers expressed a viewpoint that was not the least at odds with the 
U.S. imperial forms of racism which viewed pre-contact Hawai‘i as a giant wasteland 
devoid of civilization: “When we first came to Hawaii these islands were covered with 
ohia forests, guava fields and areas of wild grass.  Day and night did we work, cutting 
trees, burning grass, clearing lands and cultivating fields until we made the plantations 
what they are today.”72  In Hawai‘i, as on the American continent, pre-western contact is 
seen a “vacant land” only awaiting productive labor to transform it into civilization.  The 
presence or existence of its Native inhabitants and their own highly productive and 
complex agricultural systems, does not even merit mention.  
  Thus, Asian settlers may be considered inferior to the colonial metropole and 
white settler elite, but they nonetheless still maintained a sense of difference from and 
over the Native population.  Indeed, Asian settlers are “simultaneously both colonized 
and colonizer,” classified as “Oriental,” they are constituted as inferior to whites but 
superior to “primitives.”73  The erasure of Hawaiians is partly seen in the aforementioned 
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emasculation of Native Hawaiian men even in the eyes of Asian laborers.  Such troubled 
relations, however, should not lose sight of the guiding hand of white hegemonic power 
and racism.  If Hawaiians were imagined as fixed in the past, then social mobility was 
determined by moving in the opposite direction of “primitives.”  Thus assimilating and 
performing one’s Americanism, by aspiring to mimic white America, amounts to an anti-
Native discourse.  For instance, Chinese workers were first brought into Hawai‘i in the 
19th century to replace Hawaiian workers (who refused to work under such exploitative 
conditions), were encouraged by plantation managers to call Hawaiian men “wahine! 
wahine!” [Hawaiian for women].74  In a study conducted in the 1950s, Joseph C. Finney 
interviewed non-Hawaiians about their impressions of Native Hawaiians.  Finney found 
that “Caucasians and Orientals” alike frequently described Hawaiians as “primitive” or 
“lazy,” but also expressed remorse for the “inevitable” dying out of their culture.  One 
woman, identified as Japanese, explained: “You see the Hawaiians are known to be, are 
popularly known to be lazy, and they don’t have a tradition for literacy and they’re not 
the conscientious type, industrious type.”75  Even settlers who were not deemed 
“Oriental,” but rather straddled the liminal space between “primitive” and “oriental,” 
actively engaged in a politics of masculine identification with the United States in 
opposition to Native Hawaiians.76  For instance, Filipino laborers often used the term 
“Kanaka” (which refers to Native Hawaiians) as a slur to mean “’boy’ or servant.”77  
Given a desire to not be treated like others deemed “primitive,” Asian laborers actively 
engaged in a politics of identification with the United States.  In relation to Native 
Hawaiian struggles for restoring nationhood, this politics of identification can also be 
understood as a politics of colonial disavowal, or a politics dependent on disavowing 
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one’s complicity with U.S. occupation.78   
In such ways, civil rights projects challenge inequalities created by white 
exclusion and notions of white superiority, yet lose sight of another major form of white 
supremacist power, one that targets Native culture and their subsistence economies for 
erasure.  Arguing against the idea that Asians are “perpetual foreigners” constructed 
historically as “sojourners,” Ronald Takaki asserts in his seminal book, Strangers From a 
Different Shore, that many Asian Americans are in fact settlers who decided to remain in 
the United States permanently.79  Haunani-Kay Trask builds critically on this 
transformation of sojourners to settlers by pointing out its consequences for Hawaiians.  
Trask argues that “intrasettler competition” between haole and Asians obscures a system 
that is dependent on the dispossession of Native Hawaiians.  She writes: “In settler 
societies, the issue of civil rights is primarily an issue about how to protect settlers 
against each other and against the state.  Injustices done against Native people, such as 
genocide, land dispossession, language banning, family disintegration, and cultural 
exploitation, are not part of this intrasettler discussion and are therefore not within the 
parameters of civil rights.”80  The critical point is not that Asian settlers did not challenge 
forms of white supremacy themselves, but rather that any racial project, even by 
exploited laborers, that does not also contend with issues of occupation can become 
agents of such oppression.  Indeed, desires to be vindicated as “first-class citizens” 
through statehood were often driven by aspirations to prove one’s humanity, which was 
often denied by racist perceptions of different Asians and Hawaiians.  Statehood 
proponents thus needed to prove to Washington D.C. that Hawai‘i’s largely non-white 
population was capable of assimilating to American culture and ideals. 
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Disrupting the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission at the 1937 Congressional 
Statehood Hearings 
 
   
Fig. 2.4, Willie Vocalite at the 8th Annual Hawaiian Products Show 
 
 In 1937, the popular editorialist, George Wright, conveyed in the Hawaii Hochi (a 
Japanese American daily) that he expected the 1937 congressional statehood hearings to 
be what he called an “engineered affair.”81  He believed that the public hearings would be 
filled with “hand-picked” individuals who “take their orders from the dominant industrial 
groups.”82  Wright wrote: 
There will be a few hardy souls who are willing to come out in the open and 
oppose the idea of statehood on various grounds, some good and some pretty 
rotten.  But the majority will follow the example of Willie Vocalite at the recent 
products show and perform their part with robot-like precision just as they have 
been previously fixed to do it, saying the things that have been transcribed upon 
the wax records of their mechanical minds.83  
 
Willie Vocalite was the Hawaiian Electric Company’s featured exhibit for the 8th annual 
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Hawaiian Products Show.  A large silver robot hailed for its numerous human-like 
abilities, Willie “Stands-up—Sits down—Waves flag—Shoots gun—Smokes and 
Talks.”84  By calling those who voiced the interests of the sugar industry Willie Vocalites, 
Wright marked just how economically subjugated the general populace had become by 
the Big Five and commented on the kind of submission that was required of them.  
Indeed, by 1937, there was a general belief that the public had become either so 
entrenched in the statehood campaign of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, or had 
been effectively rendered mute or compliant under the threat of losing jobs that there 
seemed to be little to no opposing or independent viewpoints.   
Indeed, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission initiated the dissemination of 
statehood literature in the daily newspapers in order to shape public opinion in favor of 
statehood.  Beginning in 1934, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin had begun to publish numerous 
articles that supported statehood.  By 1935 the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission was 
formed and targeted editors of newspapers and magazines on the U.S. continent, 
commending certain articles, and “correcting” any article that did not support statehood.  
In this way, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and the Republican Party, under the 
leadership of Native Hawaiian congressional delegate, Samuel Wilder King, made it 
difficult for anyone to oppose statehood.  As mentioned earlier, statehood was seen as 
necessary to regain rewarding tariffs for the sugar industry.  The Hawaii Equal Rights 
Commission was quite explicit about the economic motivations for statehood and, since 
the sugar industry, government, and the media declared publicly the virtues and necessity 
of statehood, any person who opposed statehood was marked as a detractor, one at odds 
with Hawai‘i’s powerful elites.  
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 In this climate of fear, and because testimony was heard openly, many people 
believed that the 1937 Joint Congressional Statehood Hearings would be a replay of the 
1935 hearings, at which virtually no one spoke out against the repressive tactics of the 
Big Five.  As a matter of fact, in 1937, the Big Five and the Republican Party paid the 
expenses of the congressional visitors.85  After the sixteen-day hearing was over, 
however, many would feel differently about the engineered set-up of the 1937 
Congressional hearings.  George Wright, for instance, retracted his earlier statements in 
the Hawaii Hochi and wrote that instead of a, “triumphant symposium on the 
incontrovertible right of Hawaii to become the 49th state there was a veritable dog-fight of 
snarling objectors who came prepared to show the gentlemen from the mainland exactly 
why Hawaii was unfit for statehood.”86  George Wright himself, and other writers in the 
alternative papers, played a significant role in facilitating such dissent. 
 In the years and months leading up to the 1937 hearings, an emerging labor 
movement had shaken the Big Five’s hegemony.  Dockworkers were successful at getting 
the federal government to investigate Big Five violations of the Wagner Act of 1935.  
The Wagner Act, which had also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 
ensure that employers abided by the Act, now provided longshoremen in the islands with 
the ability to force the Big Five to recognize their unions.  Moon-Kie Jung identifies two 
factors—metropolitan state intervention and de-isolation—that took place in the 1930s 
that helped to plant the seeds for radical labor movements in the latter part of the 1940s to 
come into fruition.  Metropolitan state intervention, Jung argues, was created with the 
passing of the Wagner Act and the establishment of the NLRB.  De-isolation, in the 
meantime, had been established when Hawaiian men, like Harry Lehua Kamoku and Levi 
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Kealoha, kept ties with the West Coat maritime workers they met while helping in the 
1934 San Francisco Strike and returned to the islands to help organize Hawai‘i’s 
longshoremen.87  Such ties between Hawai‘i’s longshoremen and those in the west coast 
would also bring the celebrated labor organizer, Jack Hall, to the islands.88 
 Whereas previously the Big Five had simply fired and blacklisted active union 
members, in 1935, it formed the Industrial Association of Hawaii (IAH) to formally 
oppose the creation of unions.  In March of 1937, with the urging of labor leaders in Hilo, 
the NLRB agreed to investigate the work conditions of longshoremen.  For eighteen days 
the NLRB heard testimony in Hawai‘i, and eventually charged members of the Big Five 
for unfair labor practices.  The NLRB trial examiner also found that Castle & Cooke had 
specifically violated the Wagner Act and ordered the company to reinstate eleven union 
members who were unfairly released in a 1936 strike.  Thus, by the October 1937 
statehood hearings, many believed that the Big Five’s power structure was weakened and 
vulnerable to attack.   
 In the weeks leading up to the statehood hearings, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and 
Honolulu Advertiser ran articles that posed statehood as a natural and necessary step in 
the inevitable march towards progress, demanding that Congress treat Hawai‘i as an 
integral part of the United States and not as a foreign country.89  Alternative papers such 
as the Hawaii Hochi and Voice of Labor, however, were critical of the overlap between 
big business and government, and asked sharp and probing questions about what the 
Hawaii Equal Rights Commission’s organized visit would allow the congressmen to see 
and hear.90  For his part, George Wright highlighted Wyoming Senator Joseph C. 
O’Mahoney’s declaration of his intent, while in Hawai‘i, to investigate statehood in 
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relation to “the sugar industry, interlocking control, economic hegemony, political 
domination by privileged interests, the company store racket, espionage and the blacklist, 
labor intimidation and the peonage of workers under a medieval system of feudalistic 
exploitation.”91  Wright capitalized on Senator O’Mahoney’s article in an editorial titled, 
“He Doesn’t Know Half of It!,” insisting that because of Senator O’Mahoney’s 
“fortunate advertisement,” and his general knowledge of the political scene in Hawai‘i, 
there was every possibility that the workers of Hawai‘i might be able to “give him the 
lowdown on the ‘system’ and introduce him to many new angles that he has never 
suspected before.”92  In stark contrast to prevailing discourse, the alternative newspapers 
described those in opposition to the Big Five as not “bad citizens” but heroes who were 
capable of independent thinking and speaking truth to power in the face of exorbitant 
odds.  
                            
Fig. 2.5, “Getting Ready for Company,   Fig. 2.6, “Too Many Entangling 
Hawaii Hochi      Alliances,” Hawaii Hochi 
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 In addition to running editorials, the Hawaii Hochi also ran numerous political 
cartoons that further drew the lines, quite literally, of class conflict.  Many of the political 
cartoons that led up to the congressional hearings paid careful attention to the issues of 
repression and silence, often comparing the Big Five and the Territorial government to 
the repressive fascism of Nazi Germany.  The National Labor Relations Board was also 
making such comparisons as it continued to learn more from workers’ testimonies.  
Indeed, the NLRB went so far as to describe Hawai‘i as a “picture of fascism,” inasmuch 
as big business dominated the Territorial government and created a general climate of 
fear that stifled public speech against the interests of the Big Five and government.93  
Often times, the political cartoons caricatured the themes of secrecy and transparency, 
thus exposing Big Five efforts to conceal dirty practices from the view of the visiting 
Congressmen.  To be sure, the political cartoons portray the settler elite as in a position of 
visual weakness.  In these political cartoons, there is a reversal of the power of the Big 
Five, particularly as it is subject to the authoritative gaze of Washington D.C.  While the 
non-white working class were often used as objects of knowledge, observed and studied 
by academics such as Porteus or the University of Hawai‘i sociologists who sought to 
produce knowledge about them that would maintain white hegemony, with the 
congressional committee in Hawai‘i, the ability to testify to a higher white authority 
furnished Hawai‘i’s non-white population a powerful opportunity to reverse the gaze and 
create knowledge about the Big Five and their repression.  The result of this momentary 
reversal—and what might happen if O‘Mahoney and the other Congressmen could see 
the corruption, the cover ups, and the political repression—was that it gave the general 
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public an understanding of Hawai‘i’s new political possibilities, like what had been 
taking place in the labor movement, beyond Big Five hegemony.  Indeed, U.S. 
Congressional oversight on the question of statehood helped cast critical light on the Big 
Five and settler state power such as to offer the general public, and the working class in 
particular, a large voice to expose that exploitative power.  In other words, the settler elite 
were now under visual surveillance by Congress, and the testimony and observations by 
the working class could have long lasting implications for the Big Five. 
 As was expected, on the first day of public hearings, Senator O’Mahoney began 
by stating that, “in the last two days while in Hawaii it has become apparent to me, and to 
some of the other members of the committee, that there is a sentiment in the islands 
which may not find free expression.”94  The question of “free expression” was an issue 
that came up in much of the testimony and was a major concern of the congressmen.  
Senator Tom Connally of Texas, for example, was informed that someone in the audience 
was intimidating witnesses by showing either “approval or disapproval” of their 
testimony.95  Indeed, there was a justifiable fear and risk in speaking openly against the 
interests of the Big Five.  Garnett M. Burum, a house manager of the Seamen’s Institute 
and secretary-treasurer for the Hawaiian Island Federation of Labor, testified that while 
he could not provide examples of Big Five repression at the 1937 statehood hearings, he 
was himself recently fired from his job for providing testimony before the National Labor 
Relations Board and also falsely arrested for “conspiring to have a union man beaten 
up.”96  Such testimony would influence Representative Jack Nichols of Oklahoma, who 
interrupted the hearings, to read into the record this excerpt from an editorial in the 
October 7th issue of the Voice of Labor: 
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The Senators and Congressmen…will be entertained at the Royal Hawaiian, at the 
Waialae Club, at the homes of the “big shots.”  They will go on carefully 
conducted tours to sugar plantations and to pineapple canneries and to model 
villages.  They will hear speeches and they will see the military and naval 
establishments.  
  
But they will be carefully shepherded away from fields where women or children 
are working, they will never see the slums of Palama or River Street, they will not 
see the darkened rooms where aged Chinese live and raise bean sprouts in pans of 
water in order that they may live.  They will hear of the wonderful work Palama 
Settlement is doing, but they will not hear how many children are infected with 
syphilis, how many are illiterate, how many can not speak English, how many 
have to work to contribute to the support of their families while still of school 
age… We don’t believe they will know of these things when they leave.  But we 
hope they do.97 
 
Representative Nichols reported taking this as a challenge, for the committee, to be wary 
of what the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission organized visit would and would not allow 
them to see, and to be ready, “to hear about any condition that is existent in the Territory 
of Hawaii.”98  Accusations that the Big Five were going to “pull one over” on the visiting 
congressmen, in fact, made them anxious.  The constant repetition, if not obsession, of 
this challenge seems to have struck at the congressmen’s egos, thus maneuvering two 
competing white masculinities (Big Five versus Congressmen) against each other.  
Chairman of the hearings, William King of Utah, however, thought that his fellow 
congressmen were “making too much of [it].”99    
As was expected, Hawai‘i’s largely “Oriental” population, specifically the 
Japanese, was a major concern for the visiting Congressmen and for those testifying 
against statehood.  While many opposed Hawai‘i statehood based on arguments that the 
Big Five were using it as a means to maintain control over politics and the economy, the 
question of Japanese American loyalty and bloc-voting was brought-up, particularly in 
light of imperial Japan’s invasion of China only a few months earlier.  In fact, the very 
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first testimony offered at the hearings was given by an engineer in the Navy, who 
opposed statehood based on a belief that, “Under statehood we would have a Japanese 
Governor in three or four sessions,” and that such an outcome would in turn arouse 
whites to organize “the Ku Klux Klan… for the white man to get justice.”100  Indeed, 
many opposed statehood in the belief that Japanese Americans would remain loyal to 
Japan because of their dual citizenship.  In this way, an Orientalist discourse helped to 
constitute the Japanese in Hawai‘i as perpetual foreigners, as ever looming threats to the 
safety of the United States in Hawai‘i.  This widespread fear legitimized and naturalized 
the subsequent military build-up in Hawai‘i.  By 1937, anti-Japanese American racism 
was at an all-time high, leading Secretary of State Cordell Hull to increase U.S. military 
personnel in Hawai‘i.  Thomas T. Sakakihara, a Territorial House Representative and one 
of four Japanese American legislators, testified that as an American citizen by birth, he 
and many Japanese Americans “bitterly resented” that they were “often pointed out as 
Japanese” with its inference that “we are alien Japanese.”101   Sakakihara, like many 
others, asserted that the real obstacle to Hawai‘i statehood was not Japanese Americans 
but white racism: 
We have the ability, capacity, resources, and power to assume the duty as a State.  
The greatest obstacles however which is blocking the efforts of the Territory in 
attaining statehood are those who possess a feeling of superiority complex over 
citizens of foreign extraction born in Hawaii.  They are composed largely of those 
Caucasian races who have migrated to Hawaii from mainland or some foreign 
country of Caucasian extraction.  They entertain deep, unfounded suspicion as to 
the loyalty of American citizens of Oriental extraction to the government of their 
birth which is absolutely ridiculous and unsupported by evidence.102  
 
The issue of Japanese loyalty remained a major issue both for and against statehood in 
the coming decades, particularly as a result of the 1941 Japanese government’s military 
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attack on Pearl Harbor.  During the 1930s, however, many statehood proponents sought 
to downplay the number of Japanese Americans in Hawai‘i. 
 One such person was University of Hawai‘i sociologist, Romanzo Adams.  
Adams played a key role in downplaying the numbers of Japanese in Hawai‘i by 
forecasting that the population of whites and Native Hawaiians would increase, while the 
“Oriental” population (including Filipinos) was destined to decrease.  Adams 
acknowledged that he had been asked the president of the University of Hawai‘i, D.L. 
Crawford, to gather specific statistics on the number of Japanese who were born in 
Hawai‘i.103  Indeed, historian of science Christine Manganaro, explains that the 
University of Hawai‘i School of Sociology was the academic arm of the statehood 
movement, offering statistics and data that would make the multiracial population of 
Hawai‘i more comprehensible for, and acceptable to the American public and 
Congress.104  Congressional delegate Samuel King, whose Hawaiian mother was a 
childhood friend of Queen Lili‘uokalani and whose white father was involved in the 
overthrow and annexation of Hawai‘i to the United States, testified that “looking into the 
future of Hawaii” non-American elements would inevitably be absorbed by feelings of 
“national loyalty” or die of “natural causes.”105  The driving rationale behind King’s 
statements was the projected demographics offered by Romanzo Adams, and the logics 
of Park’s “race relations cycle,” which argued that as time passed Hawai‘i’s population 
would inevitably assimilate to American culture and move farther away from their 
“respective original ancestries.”106  Adams was in fact a frequent source of authority for 
government officials and statehood proponents throughout the hearings. 
Findings that the numbers of Native Hawaiians were increasing drew a series of 
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anxiety-ridden questions from the Congressmen about the theme of Hawaiian “racial 
mixture.”  Representative John Rankin of Mississippi, who was widely known in Hawai‘i 
for sponsoring the bill that would have established a military form of government, 
continually asked questions about intermarriage and what he called “racial atavism.”107  
Rankin specifically asked whether Hawaiians who had married whites would be more 
“toward the Caucasian or toward the Hawaiian?”108  Though Adams repeatedly answered 
that this was a question for a biologist, Rankin eventually forced him to concede that the 
mixed blood Hawaiian could go either way, but that “They don’t like to emphasize their 
mixed blood.  Students in my classes have told me that they always classify themselves 
as Hawaiians, although they know they have had a little bit of European or Asiatic 
blood.”109  Delegate Samuel King picked up on this issue.  King contended that while 
Adams extolled the increase of Native Hawaiians, everyone born in the islands, 
regardless of race, was considered Hawaiian.  King declared that: “All of us of local birth 
consider ourselves as Hawaiians; and every man who has a drop of Hawaiian blood in his 
veins or who has lived here for any length of time subscribes to that…  In fact, 
descendants of missionary stock consider themselves as thoroughly Hawaiian as those of 
Hawaiian blood.”110  King attempted to render “race” a non-issue by stating that birth in 
the islands automatically made someone Hawaiian.   
 King’s views notwithstanding, John Ho‘opale’s testimony would show how 
expressions of indigeneity and opposition to settler colonialism remained relevant to 
other Hawaiians: “Now, my people, the original Hawaiians—not these naturalized 
Hawaiians, or foster Hawaiians—I am speaking about the aboriginal Hawaiians, who 
want to live on this land without interference from outsiders.”111  While not critical of the 
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United States in Hawai‘i, Ho‘opale was concerned that statehood might lead to Native 
Hawaiians being outnumbered in their own homeland.  Ho‘opale argued that more 
Hawaiians would testify in opposition to statehood, but many were impoverished and 
employed by the Big Five, making them “afraid” to lose their “bread and butter.”112  As 
mentioned earlier, Hawaiians held a large proportion of government jobs and were thus 
constrained from speaking publicly against statehood.  As such, Ho‘opale was concerned, 
since he saw statehood as a question of “the death and life of our country.”113  A former 
House Representative in the legislature, Ho‘opale knew intimately the repercussions 
involved in opposing statehood; indeed, Ho‘opale was never again reelected because of 
his public stance against statehood.114  John Ho‘opale would, again in 1950, oppose 
statehood asking that Congress “restore the independence of our beloved land.”115   
Being numerically outnumbered in one’s ancestral land was, of course, a primary 
concern for many Native Hawaiians.  In 1922, Native Hawaiians comprised 50 percent of 
the voting population, but by 1936, this percentage decreased to 30 percent.116  Since the 
overthrow of their government in 1893, Hawaiians were unable to control immigration to 
Hawai‘i.  In 1932, Abigail Kawananakoa, would-be heir to the Hawaiian monarchy, 
expressed the view, common among many Hawaiians, that they were being made 
strangers in their own homeland: 
We [Hawaiians] must live here, we cannot go to China, we cannot go to the 
Philippines, we cannot go to Japan… I have nothing but admiration for the 
Chinese and the Japanese and the Filipinos, but this is our home, and everybody is 
crowding us out of our home…It is a desperate situation.117 
 
The forms of colonial power with which Native Hawaiians were contending in their 
ancestral homeland thus targeted them for replacement.  Roger Bell has argued that 
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another more immediate reason for opposition was that Hawaiians on the neighbor 
islands viewed statehood as but a precursor to reapportionment, which would then give 
the island of O‘ahu a majority of seats in both the House and Senate.  Bell writes, “Many 
Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian residents of the outer islands viewed reapportionment as but 
a further formal step toward the triumph of American values and interests, symbolized so 
acutely by the rapid growth of Honolulu City and the modernization of Oahu.”118   
  Despite the best efforts of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and the Big Five 
to get the congressmen to support statehood, the final congressional report that was 
released in 1938 did not recommend immediate statehood for Hawai‘i.  The 
congressional committee stated that, “there is not complete unity on the question of 
statehood among the people of Hawaii,” and recommended a Territory wide plebiscite to 
ascertain the views of Hawai‘i’s general public.119  Moreover, the committee 
recommended further study and consideration, especially of the growing Japanese 
population in Hawai‘i, which had quadrupled in the preceding eight years, and which the 
committee identified as a cause of “considerable local discussion” due to the “present 
disturbed condition of international affairs.”120  At this time, tension between China and 
Japan had escalated into war, and the same was happening in Europe.  In 1935 Germany 
ceased to recognize the Treaty of Versailles, and by 1938, had annexed Austria and most 
of Czechoslovakia, with aims to invade Poland the following year.  Such events would 
culminate in the Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  The inevitable clash 
between Japan and the United States finally took place.  
126 
   






Fig. 2.7, “Hey! We Got The Wrong Congressmen!,” Hawaii Hochi 
 
 
 While only 17 of the 68 witnesses opposed statehood, such numbers need to be 
understood within the general climate of fear that existed in publicly opposing the 
interests of the Big Five.  George Wright, in fact, called the 1937 hearings a historical 
moment within which the “submerged nine-tenths of the population became vocal.”121  
Wright criticized the mainstream media for favoring the advocates of statehood as a way 
to also discredit the opposition.  But he also explained that “the crowds that attended the 
hearings knew what was going on and the news spread like wildfire, bringing others to 
join in the spectacle.”   Indeed, the political cartoons coming out of the Hawaii Hochi 
celebrated the vocal opposition against the Big Five.  One in particular, titled, “Hey! We 
Got the Wrong Congressmen!” showed a defeated pumpkin head, perhaps King, crying at 
a desk before which statehood proponents, figured as circus animals—“trained seals” 
read statements titled, “Why I Favor Statehood;” the “monkey press” taking sugar cubes 
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out of the “$ugar Bowl” each performing as they have been trained.   
While unsuccessful at pulling off the “Statehood Hocus Pocus” in 1937, the 
Hawaii Equal Rights Commission succeeded with a 1940 plebiscite, a measure that in 
hindsight was responsible for putting the statehood movement back on track.  It 
accomplished this, however, with effective and purposeful imprecision.  According to 
Roger Bell the 1940 plebiscite was “deliberately imprecise,” and had been purposely 
worded in such a way as to avoid the very real possibility that a majority of voters would 
reject immediate statehood.122  The plebiscite’s original wording, crafted by Joseph 
Farrington, read, “Are you in favor of immediate statehood for Hawaii?”  In the 
penultimate draft of the ballot, the wording was changed slightly, to employ a two-step 
process to ensure numbers: step one would have asked the preliminary question, “Are 
you in favor of statehood for Hawaii?”  Those answering affirmatively would then 
answer: “Are you in favor of statehood for Hawaii NOW?”  The final draft of the 
plebiscite question, however, was changed to simply read: “Do you favor statehood for 
Hawaii?”  The plebiscite yielded a 67 percent vote in the affirmative, although the 
question only received 60 percent support on the island of O‘ahu, where the statehood 
campaign had been most active.  Roger Bell has concluded that, “Because of the 
ambiguity of the plebiscite question, members of the Equal Rights Commission were 
obliged to concede that it had settled very little.”  Statehood remained, as John Snell 
(Executive Secretary for the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission) acknowledged, “a hotly 
debated issue in the territory.”123  
 By the mid-1930s the movement for statehood was clearly seen as an attempt to 
reconsolidate white racial power and privilege.  Big Five prestige and influence was 
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always emboldened by its relations with the federal government, which for its part 
desired control over Hawai‘i as a means to maintain a large military force in the middle 
of the Pacific.  As a result of the Great Depression, however, Congress extinguished the 
profitable tariffs and empowered dockworkers to unionize in ways that would extinguish 
the mutual interests of the Big Five.  Such acts by Congress signaled to the Big Five the 
need to gain full congressional representation in Washington D.C. through statehood, in 
order to counter what they called “federal discrimination.”  But gaining admission into 
the United States would be a difficult project to attain given Hawai‘i’s largely non-white 
population.  Indeed, prior to and leading up to the initial movement for statehood in 1934, 
perceptions of Hawai‘i’s Asian and Hawaiian population had been largely shaped by the 
discursive categories of orientalism and primitivism, respectively informed by frontier 
logics of assimilation and obliteration developed and advanced by academics such as 
Stanley Porteus and the sociologists at the University of Hawai‘i.  Such gendered 
categories would position these communities differently in relation to white society.  For 
instance, where orientalism constituted Asian groups as foreign threats, who would either 
assimilate or clash with the United States, Hawaiians were portrayed as perpetual 
primitives, as forever in the past whose control over Hawai‘i had come and gone.  Such 
discursive constructions would facilitate different kinds of politics, where Asian groups 
sought to counter the idea that they were foreigners by proving their Americanism and 
struggling to achieve statehood.  Many Hawaiians, on the other hand, saw statehood as 
another step in the decimation of their culture and values.  Indeed, some Hawaiians 
would oppose statehood, fearing its ability to marginalize and displace them within their 
own homeland.   
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It would be martial law, enacted by the December 7, 1941 Japanese military 
attack on Pearl Harbor that galvanized popular resentment against territorial status.  
While the economic elite profited off of martial law and, in fact, even sought to prolong 
it, the treatment of Hawai‘i’s civilian government and population (primarily Japanese 
Americans) was so careless and abusive that the Supreme Court found it, in 1946, in 
violation of the U.S. constitution.124  While the existence of a large and potentially 
influential Japanese American population in Hawai‘i gave reason to the congressional 
committee in 1937 to recommend against statehood for Hawai‘i, by the end of World 
War II, Japanese American loyalty in the military would become beneficial if not vital to 
a movement for statehood.  Such devastating casualties and injuries sustained by 
Japanese Americans in the war would soften white perceptions of the Japanese as 
perpetual foreigners.  In fact, highlighting the achievements of Japanese Americans 
would play an ideological role in reconciling two formidable empires—the United States 
and Japan.
  130 






                                                
 
1 Noel J. Kent, Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 




3 Moon-Kie Jung, Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii’s Interracial Labor 
Movement, 16. 
 
4 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-




6 David Stannard, Honor Killing: How the Infamous “Massie Affair” Transformed 




8 John Rosa, “Local Story: The Massie Case Narrative and the Cultural Production of 
Local Identity in Hawai‘i,” Amerasia Journal 26:2 (2000) 102. 
 
9 David E. Stannard, Honor Killing, 224. 
 
10 Ibid., 387. 
 
11 “Sex in Hawaii,” Times Magazine, Monday, 18 April 1932. 
 
12 Roger Bell, 59. 
 
13 Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century: A People’s History, (New York: Perennial, 
1980) 111. 
 
14 Sumner J. La Croix, “The Economic History of Hawai‘i: A Short Introduction,” 
Department of Economics, University of Hawai‘i, East-West Center, January 9, 2002. 
 
15 The Jones-Costigan Act reduced the quota of sugar Hawai‘i planters were allowed to 
send to the United States and limited Hawai‘i sugar planters to refining only 3 percent of 
their raw sugar locally.  Unincorporated territories such as Cuba was allowed to refine 22 
percent of their crop, and the Philippines and Puerto Rico were able to refine nearly 10 
percent.  See Roger Bell, Last Among Equals, 60; 
 
16 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather, Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest, (New York: Routledge Press, 1995) 16. 
  131 





                                                                                                                                            
 
17 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in 
the United States, 1880-1917,  189. 
 
18 Luzviminda Francisco, “The First Vietnam War: The Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902,” (London: Association for Radical East Asian Studies, 1973, abridged version from 
THE BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS). 
 
19 Dylan Rodriguez, Suspended Apocalypse, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, forthcoming) 131.  
 
20 Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the 
Philippine Nation-State, (Manila: Atenedo De Manila University Press, 2000)17-24. 
 
21 Luzviminda Francisco, “The First Vietnam War: The Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902,” (London: Association for Radical East Asian Studies, 1973; abridged version 
from THE BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS) 6; 13. 
 
22 Luzviminda Francisco, “The First Vietnam War: The Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902,” 15. 
 
23 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The 
Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, (New York: Cassell, 1999). 
 
24 The Forbidden Book: The Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons, ed. Abe 
Ignacio, Enrique de la Cruz, Jorge Emmanuel, Helen Toribio, (San Francisco: T’boli 
Publishing and Distributino, 2004) 96. 
 
25 Philip J. Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places, 4. 
 
26 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Routledge Press, 1994) 122-123. 
 
27 Vicente Raphael, White Love: and Other Events in Filipino History,  (Durham: Duke, 
2000) 22. 
 
28 Ibid., 22. 
 
29 Also in 1934 is the Indian Reorganization Act, which allowed Native American nations 
to return to local self-government, essentially establishing a neo-imperial structure for 
Indians. 
 
30 Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, Oh, Say, Can You See?: The Semiotics of the 




  132 





                                                                                                                                            
32 W.R. Castle to Honorable Hugh R. Belknap, House of Representatives, February 15, 
1899, National Archives.  
 
33 Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1975) 
 
34 David Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western 
Contact. 
 
35 Roger Bell, 36. 
 
36 Ernest Andrade, Jr., Unconquerable Rebel: Robert W. Wilcox and Hawaiian Politics, 
1880-1903, (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1996) 219. 
 
37 Ke Aloha Aina, Friday 16 June 1900: 5. [translated by Noenoe Silva] in ‘oiwi: a native 
hawaiian journal, (Honolulu: Kuleana ‘Oiwi Press, 2002) 134. 
 
38 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, 363. 
 
39 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, 365. 
 
40 “Statehood for Hawaii,” Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Hawaii, 
January 5, 1938, 75ht Congress, 3rd Session, Senate, 33; Ke Aloha Aina, Friday 9 June 
1900: 2 [translated by Noenoe Silva] in ‘oiwi: a native hawaiian journal, (Honolulu: 
Kuleana ‘Oiwi Press, 2002) 127-129; Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, An Island Kingdom 
Passes, 377. 
 
41 Ty Kawika Tengan, Native Men Remade: Gender and Nation in Contemporary 
Hawai‘i, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) 45. 
 
42 Ibid., 45. 
 
43 Ibid., 45. 
 
44 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The 
Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, (London: Cassell, 1999) 163. 
 
45 Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, “Introduction,” Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, (New York: Routlegde, 
2005) 4. 
 
46 See Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans an Interpretive History, (New York: Twain 
Publishers, 1991); Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore; Pau Hana: 
Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920. 
 
47 Ronald Takaki, Pau Hana, 24 
  133 





                                                                                                                                            
 
48 For more of his construction of Australian aboriginals as “primitives” see Stanley D. 
Porteus, Primitive Intelligence and Environment, (New York: The MacMillian Company, 
1937). 
 
49 Stanley D. Porteus and Marjorie Babcock, Temperament and Race, (Boston: Gotham 
Press, 1926) 
 
50 Ibid., 146. 
 
51 Ibid., 146. 
 
52 Ibid., 306-307. 
 
53 Ibid., 306-307. 
 
54 Ibid., 307. 
 
55 Ibid., 29; 49. 
 
56 Ibid., 49. 
 
57 Ibid., 308. 
 
58 Ibid., 49. 
 
59 Ibid., 308. 
 
60 Ibid., 308. 
 
61 Ibid., 351. 
 
62 Moon-Kie Jung, Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii’s Interracial Labor 
Movement, (New York: Columbian University Press, 2006) 62. 
 
63 Ibid., 100 
 
64 Ibid., 154. 
 
65 Masayo Umezawa Duus, The Japanese Conspiracy: The Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920, 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999) p.84; Melina Tria Kerkvliet, 
Unbending cane: Pablo Manlapit A Filipino Labor Leader in Hawai‘i, (Honolulu: Office 
of Multicultural Student Services, 2002) 27. 
 
66 Ibid., 87-88. 
 
  134 





                                                                                                                                            
67 Roger Bell, 115. 
 
68 Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals:Migration Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America, 
(New York: University of Oxford Press, 2001), 31. 
 
69 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, “Anything but Racism: How 
Sociologists Limit the Significance of Racism,” in Handbook of the Sociology of Racial 
and Ethnic Relations, ed. Hernan Vera and Joe R. Feagin, p.84; Robert E. Park, “Our 
Racial Frontier on the Pacific,” Survey Graphic 56 (May 1926). 
 
70 Henry Yu, p.35; Denise Ferrieira Da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007) 154-155; 157. 
 
71 Henry Yu, 87. 
  
72 Ronald Takaki, Strangers From a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, 154. 
 
73 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Hellen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key 
Concepts, (New York: Routledge, 2000) 211-212. 
 
74 Ronald Takaki, Pau Hana, 25. 
 
75 Joseph C. Finney, “Attitudes of Others Toward Hawaiians,” 79. 
 
76 E. San Juan Jr. writes: “The colonized ‘ward’ from ‘las islas Filipinas’ occupies a 
space between the indigenous Indian and the ‘inscrutable Oriental.’” in After 
Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines-United States Confrontations, (Boston: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 3. 
 
77 Virgilio Menor Felipe, Hawai‘i: A Pilipino Dream, (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 
2002) 198. 
 
78 Dean Saranillio, “Colonial Amnesia: Rethinking Filipino ‘American’ Settler 
Empowerment in the U.S. Colony of Hawai‘i,” in Positively No Filipinos Allowed: 
Building Discourse and Communities, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006). 
 
79 Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore, 169-171. 
 
80 Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in 
Hawai‘i, rev. ed. (1993). Reprint: (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 25. 
 





  135 





                                                                                                                                            
 
84 “8th Hawaiian Products Show,” Honolulu Advertiser, 28 September 1937. 
 
85 Voice of Labor, 7 October 1937. 
 
86 George Wright, “The Lid Comes Off,” Hawaii Hochi, 27 October 1937. 
 
87 Moon-Kie Jung, Reworking Race, 108-110. 
 
88 Ibid., 111. 
 
89 “Hawaii Outgrows The ‘Political’ Suit Given Her by Uncle Sam” “Hawaii Asks to be 
Treated as Part of the United States and Not as a Foreign Country,” Pacific Collection, 
University of Hawai‘i Library. 
 
90 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 August 1937. 
 
91 “He Doesn’t Know Half of It!,” Hawaii Hochi, 10 October 1937. 
 
92 George Wright, Hawaii Hochi, 19 October 1937 
 
93 As quoted in Tom Coffman, The Island Edge of America: A Political History of 
Hawai‘i, (Honolulu: Univesity of Hawai‘i Press, 2003) 38. 
 
94 Ibid., 11. 
 
95 Ibid., 79. 
 
96 Ibid., 95-97. 
 
97 United States Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: hearings 
before the United States Joint Committee on Hawaii, Seventy Fifth Congress, second 





99 United States Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: hearings 
before the United States Joint Committee on Hawaii, 60. 
 
100 Ibid., 12; 13. 
 
101 Ibid., 242. 
 
102 Ibid., p.242. 
 
  136 





                                                                                                                                            
103 Statehood for Hawaii, p.426. 
 
104 Christine Manganaro, “Assimilating Hawai‘i: The Role of University of Hawai‘i 
Social Scientists in Arguments for Statehood,” Panel titled: Reading, Writing, and 
Working Statehood Hawai‘i, presented at the Association for Asian American Studies 
Conference 2009. 
 
105 Ibid., p.579. 
 
106 Ibid., p.579. 
 
107 Statehood for Hawaii, 431. 
 
108 Ibid., 431. 
 
109 Ibid., 431. 
 
110 Ibid., 579. 
 
111 Ibid., 173. 
 
112 Ibid., p.174 
 




115 As cited in John M. Van Dyke, Who Owns the Crown Lands of Hawai‘i?, (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008) p.256. 
 
116 “Statehood for Hawaii,” Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Hawaii, 
Transmitting Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 18, A Report of an 
Investigation and Study of the Subject of Statehood and Other Subjects Rleating to the 
Welfare of the Territory of Hawaii, January 5, 1938, (United States: Government Printing 
Office, 1938), 33. 
 
117 David Stannard, Honor Killing, p.78. 
 
118 Roger Bell, 65. 
 
119 “Statehood for Hawaii,” Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Hawaii, 
Transmitting Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 18, A Report of an 
Investigation and Study of the Subject of Statehood and Other Subjects Rleating to the 
Welfare of the Territory of Hawaii, January 5, 1938, (United States: Government Printing 
Office, 1938) 94. 
 
  137 





                                                                                                                                            
120 Ibid., 33. 
 
121 George Wright, Hawaii Hochi, 27 October 1937. 
 
122 By 1940 hostility against the Territorial government had remained high.  In August of 
1938 tensions between labor and the Big Five erupted into state violence, in the “Hilo 
Massacre,” in which fifty people, including many union members and even a child, had 
been gunned down by the police under orders from Sheriff Henry K. Martin. The 
Territorial government did not take responsibility for the violence, and even beat a 
lawsuit filed by Kai Urutani against the police officers.  The Territorial government did 
not enjoy widespread popular support.  Roger Bell, 73. 
 
123 Roger Bell, 73-74. 
 
124 J. Garner Anthony, Hawaii Under Army Rule, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1955); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 312 (1946). 
 
  
    138
CHAPTER THREE 
 
JAPANESE FOREIGNERS AND HAWAIIAN PRIMITIVES: 
 GO FOR BROKE!, KAMOKILA CAMPBELL, AND THE HAWAII STATEHOOD 
COMMISSION 
 
So much has been said and published favoring Statehood for Hawaii that it is only fair that the 
opposition be heard.  Unfortunately, equal treatment under law is denied the opponents of 
Statehood. 
- Alice Kamokila Campbell, 19531 
 
 
 The American use of the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
signaled the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II in 1945.  Such displays of U.S. 
military and technological might, the kind capable of obliterating entire cities of people in 
a matter of seconds, would also alert the world to the new leadership position of the 
United States in the new global order of things.  Emerging from the war with their 
industries untouched, especially in comparison to war-torn Europe and Japan, the United 
States was in a position to lead the world both militarily and economically.  Following 
the lead of the United States, the victorious nations of World War II would together 
establish the United Nations to solve future international conflict through processes of 
“peace”—armed with rules, regulations, and international courts for arbitration.   
Between 1945 and 1946, when the United Nations addressed the issue of self-
determination, Hawai‘i along with Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands, would be placed on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing-
Territories under Chapter XI.  As such the United Nations declared that the occupying 
countries had a “sacred trust obligation” to foster self-determination and self-governance 
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over the interests of the administering power and required these nations to do an annual 
report on the progress being made towards these aims.  Legal scholar Maivân Clech Lâm 
points out that Italy, Germany, and Japan, the losing nations of World War II, were made 
to give-up their colonial possessions.  These possessions were listed under Chapter XII, 
and unlike those non-self-governing territories listed under Chapter XI, these occupied 
territories were tracked for independence and their occupying powers were forbidden 
from interfering with this process.2  If, “war is merely a continuation of politics by other 
means,” as the saying goes, the reverse has also been argued as true, where: “Politics is 
the continuation of war by other means.”3  American leaders after World War II deployed 
both formulations to maintain the spoils of war and continue their control of non-self-
governing-territories under U.S. occupation.  
In a letter written by Acting Secretary of the U.S. State Department James E. 
Webb to Hawai‘i congressional delegate Joseph R. Farrington on 24 May 1949, Webb 
responds to Farrington’s questions regarding the relationship between the movement for 
statehood and the responsibilities of the United States to the U.N. Charter.  Farrington 
asked whether the congressional “Enabling Act,” legislation that would have allowed 
Hawai‘i to form a state constitution and achieve statehood, as in violation of the Charter.  
Webb wrote that Hawai‘i had “repeatedly demonstrated their desire for statehood” and 
from the standpoint of foreign policy and the international obligations of the United 
States under Chapter XI of the Charter, the Department of State believed that “such 
action by the Congress would be in conformity with the traditional policy of the United 
States toward those peoples who have not yet become fully self-governing...”  Webb 
further explained that in the view of the State Department, Hawai‘i statehood would 
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actually “serve to support American foreign policy and strengthen the position of the 
United States in international affairs.”4  
 The traditional practice through which the United States incorporated new 
territories, was written in the Northwest Ordinance.  Underlying and informing this 
policy was a linear settler narrative of transforming primitive wild frontiers into 
Territories, whereby after a period of American tutelage, these Territories could 
eventually be deemed worthy by Congress to enter as a full-fledged modern State of the 
Union.  This view that statehood was an inevitable endpoint for the Territory of Hawai‘i, 
as opposed to some other form of autonomy from the United States, was the guiding logic 
of the statehood movement.  This movement used taxpayer money to produce and 
disseminate massive amounts of literature that framed and limited discussions of 
Hawai‘i’s future political possibilities to a simple choice between statehood and status-
quo (territorial status).  Statehood proponents actively shaped public opinion by only 
highlighting the benefits of statehood.  Evidence of such deliberate containment can be 
seen in the federally mandated plebiscite that took place in June of 1959.5  Mililani Trask, 
former Pacific Expert to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
argues that the June 1959 statehood plebiscite violated America’s international trust 
obligations to the people of Hawai‘i.  She explains that in 1953, the United Nations 
General Assembly had passed Resolution 742, which identified offering the options of 
“independence,” “separate systems of self-government,” and “Free Association” as the 
criteria to determine whether or not a non-self-governing people had “attained a full 
measure of self-government.”6  Despite the fact that 132,773 voted for statehood while 
only 7,971 voted against it, the federal ballot used in 1959 did not afford the people of 
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Hawai‘i the United Nations-mandated options of “independence” or other “separate 
systems of self-government,” and thus violated U.N. Resolution 742.  The fact that the 
United States had such international obligations to offer other forms of governance 
besides statehood was not general public knowledge.  
 Indeed, the international human rights violations that were committed in the 
process of achieving statehood are still little known, and widespread knowledge is a 
casualty of how the statehood narrative has become memorialized as a civil rights 
victory.  What is typically commemorated in the statehood narrative is the successful 
unification of Hawai‘i’s people to counter the racism of Washington D.C. and prove that 
Hawai‘i was worthy of American statehood.  What this civil rights narrative obscures, 
however, was the existence of Native Hawaiians and supporters who opposed statehood 
viewing it as an extension of the 1893 overthrow, arguing instead for some form of 
independence or commonwealth status.  Such lapses in present memory, I argue, are in 
fact largely the products of the state agencies responsible for shaping and normalizing 
public support for statehood—the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1946) and the 
Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959).  These agencies articulated and 
institutionalized the rules of discourse for civil society through processes of selective 
narrative framing in ways that censored and repressed Native Hawaiian opposition. 
 This chapter traces two mutually constitutive, but different and competing 
political projects: the Japanese American anti-racist project of combating their legal and 
cultural marginalization as perpetual foreign threats “ineligible for citizenship,” and a 
distinctly Native Hawaiian struggle to combat their colonial designation as permanently 
“unfit for self-government.”  Indeed, these two groups’ oppressions cannot be equated so 
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it is critical to understand how complex national narratives and relations of power 
governing a settler state, and an emerging U.S. empire, targeted these dissimilar 
communities differently.  In the postwar, narrations of Japanese American loyalty and 
masculine sacrifice in World War II were popularized as a means to win both statehood 
for Hawai‘i but also reconcile two formidable empires—the United States and Japan.  As 
such, an important and powerful agent in the production of this civil rights narration was 
the heroic, yet tragic story of Japanese American military service during World War II.  
Where previously the Japanese in Hawai‘i were considered obstacles to attaining 
statehood, after the war, the Statehood Commission would highly publicize Japanese 
American veterans as model American citizens, the good citizen-subject, who had proven 
their loyalty to the United States in war and thus Hawai‘i’s worthiness for integration 
through statehood.   
Consequently, the articulation of Hawaiian self-determination through anything 
other than statehood did not serve the ideological and economic interests of Hawai‘i’s 
elite or Washington D.C.  Hawaiian historical memory of the overthrow and political 
claims to independence or commonwealth status, thus effectively became subjugated; in 
their systematic erasure, they became dismissed as irrational, naïve, and even criminal.7  
Hence, instead of thinking about Asian American and Native Hawaiian groups’ rights 
and projects as either in solidarity or always in opposition, perhaps as Patricia Williams 
suggests, “[w]hat is needed, therefore, is not the abandonment of rights language for all 
purposes, but an attempt to become multilingual in the semantics of each other’s rights-
valuation.”8  This chapter is an attempt to place these different histories and logics of 
oppressions into conversation.   
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Shaping Public Opinion: The Citizen’s Statehood Committee and the Hawaii 
Statehood Commission 
 
 With a very brief recession between 1946 and 1947, the United States economy 
would otherwise surge for the next twenty years.  Large military spending during and 
after World War II helped to get the United States out of the economic depression of the 
1930s.  America’s Gross National Product (GDP) more than doubled in the 1950s and 
would double again by the 1960s.  Such increased national prosperity, combined with 
government subsidization of the development of commercial airlines, would greatly 
increase tourist travel to the Hawaiian Islands.   
Prior to World War II the settler elite worked to gain statehood as a means to 
alleviate economic depression and regain profitable tariffs for the sugar industry.  After 
the war, however, there emerged a historical bloc that advanced statehood as a means to 
capitalize on the post-war boom and the growing tourism industry.  Malcolm 
MacNaughton, former president of Castle & Cooke and the Chamber of Commerce of 
Honolulu, would point out that giant lending institutions and insurance companies were 
looking to invest in Hawai‘i but were precluded by their corporate indentures as long as 
Hawai‘i remained a U.S. territory.  In an interview given in 1986, MacNaughton 
reflected: “We couldn’t get this money.  And air travel was increasing.  Tourism was 
coming… We needed this money.  Statehood would get it for us.”9   
 After the first congressional hearings on statehood since World War II were held 
in January of 1946, proponents seized on the wide publicity garnered by the hearings to 
launch a national publicity campaign for statehood.  After consulting with Congressional 
leaders in Washington D.C., Governor Ingram Stainback established the Citizens’ 
Statehood Committee.  The Committee’s official title, Citizens’ Statehood Committee, 
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was in fact a misnomer insofar as it was established and managed by top territorial 
governmental officials with oversight by the Pacific Branch of the Secretary of the 
Interior and Hawai‘i’s business elite, and not everyday citizens.  Indeed, as Stuart Hall 
has pointed out, state projects seeking to shape ideology are most effective when the 
“lines of force and opinion” seem produced “freely and spontaneously as the popular 
consent of the governed.”10  In other words, the Territory’s attempts to shape public 
opinion would be more successful if they created the impression that everyday people 
and community groups, rather than government agents or economic interests, initiated the 
movement for statehood.  This tactic of making a state-led movement seem grassroots 
became the cornerstone of the statehood opinion campaign.   
In keeping in line with the perception that statehood was initiated by everyday 
citizens, attempts at winning public opinion through the media needed to be seen not as 
government paid advertisements for statehood, but rather as seemingly natural topics of 
conversation that occurred spontaneously and frequently in major media outlets.  In a 
discussion on “Public Relations,” Joseph Farrington, son of former Governor Wallace R. 
Farrington, and future U.S. Congressional Delegate who led the statehood movement 
throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, wrote: 
It should be clearly understood that no advertising of any kind is even remotely 
suggested in behalf of the statehood movement.  It needs none and might suffer 
more than it gains...  Public opinion can be mobilized in behalf of statehood by an 
entirely non-commercial use of such media as newspapers, magazines, radio, 
public meetings, personal campaigning, the distribution of literature—all 
appropriate publicity outlets.11  
  
Farrington also owned the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, one of the island’s two major dailies, 
and in fact used his newspaper to front the statehood movement.  The Citizens’ Statehood 
Committee’s own executive committee, in fact, called for an “Article a day in daily 
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newspapers” to reinforce and normalize public opinion in support of statehood.12  Under 
the leadership of the Farrington family, their newspaper played a considerable role in 
shaping public opinion in favor of statehood.  In her book Shaping History: The Role of 
Newspapers in Hawai‘i, Helen Geracimos Chapin concludes that Farrington’s use of his 
newspaper to support statehood illustrates the “powerful impact of newspaper ownership 
united to a political agenda.”13  Alfred Pratte, former Honolulu Star-Bulletin employee, 
acknowledged that in regards to statehood, the Farrington family was responsible for 
“decades of preparing and organizing public opinion in Hawai‘i and Washington, D.C.”14  
 Skilled at using the media to shape public opinion, Farrington also headed the 
national publicity campaign for statehood and conceived of the movement as a “dual 
attack.”15  Farrington argued that Honolulu should serve as the “headquarters” to 
disseminate information on statehood targeting populations both locally and nationally, 
while an office in Washington D.C. be responsible for lobbying Congress.  The 
Committee hired the public relations firm Holst, Cummings, Co. and consulted with the 
Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, to shape the master document, “Some Essentials of 
a Program to Secure Statehood for Hawaii.”16  The group estimated the total cost of the 
campaign to be $50,000, an amount that was funded privately and reimbursed later by the 
legislature, with support from the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu.  
 Such organizing and strategizing would lay the foundation for a more aggressive 
and better-funded campaign for statehood.  Territorial Senator Eugene Capellas, a 
member of the Citizens’ Statehood Committee Executive Board, introduced Act 115 in 
July of 1947, which abolished the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and created the 
Hawaii Statehood Commission in its place.  Comprised of a nine-member commission 
  
    146
who by law, were required to be known supporters of statehood, the Commission was 
authorized in 1947 to take over the national campaign for statehood.  All records and 
personnel of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission were transferred to the Statehood 
Commission.  The new Commission was also given a budget of $200,000, “to assemble, 
compile, and disseminate information, conduct national or sectional advertising and 
publicity campaigns, appear as the representative of the Territory before Congress or any 
federal department in regard to statehood; and cooperate with any citizens’ organization 
formed to accomplish the objects of the Act.”   
Indeed, the Honolulu office would remain in contact with more than seventeen 
hundred daily newspaper editors, and as Roger Bell notes, in the first decade the number 
of editorials that favored statehood grew from five hundred to about three thousand 
annually.17  The Commission aggressively controlled how statehood was written about 
and portrayed in the media.  It regularly coached witnesses who testified before the 
different Congressional hearings and distributed nationally large amounts of pamphlets, 
photographs, and letters to different newspapers, government offices, magazines, 
businesses, community organizations, libraries, schools and universities, in support of the 
benefits of statehood.  In fact, the Statehood Commission had intimate ties to the 1892 
Hawaiian Bureau of Information, which utilized similar tactics to justify the overthrow in 
1893 and sway public opinion to support annexation.  Lorrin A. Thurston’s son, Lorrin 
Potter Thurston, would come to chair the Statehood Commission.  Lorrin P. Thurston, 
like his father, was initially opposed to statehood fearing that “haoles from the mainland” 
who had more capital than those in Hawai‘i would soon displace the white settler elite.  
As manager of the other major newspaper, the Honolulu Advertiser, Thurston would 
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come to support statehood and, like Farrington, also use his newspaper to campaign for 
statehood.18 
From “Japs” to “Japanese Americans” 
 
 One of the biggest obstacles that faced proponents of statehood, as we had seen in 
previous chapters, was that Hawai‘i contained a large population of Japanese Americans 
who were construed by an orientalist discourse as inscrutable foreign threats.  In the 
decades leading to World War II, and punctuated by the December 7th attack in 1941, 
American national identity was informed by what Moon-Kie Jung terms “anti-Japanese 
Americanism.”19  Indeed, Japanese Americans who were linked to a belligerent empire in 
Asia were racialized differently from other non-white groups in Hawai‘i.  Jung explains: 
“anti-Japanese racism was not based on an assured belief that the Japanese were inferior 
but on a fear that they were not.”20  The Hawai‘i statehood effort thus needed to contend 
with the question of Japanese American loyalty, and prove that the Japanese could 
assimilate to American ideals.   
  After World War II, however, statehood proponents responded to questions of 
Japanese American loyalty by pointing to the military heroism and massive casualties and 
injuries sustained by the 442nd and 100th Battalion.  Nicknamed the “Purple Heart 
Battalion,” the 100th Battalion suffered the highest casualty rate and became the most 
highly decorated unit in the entire history of the U.S. Army.  Together, the 100th Battalion 
and 442nd Regimental Combat team received more than 18,143 decorations but also 
suffered an unusually high number of casualties and injuries at 9,486.21  The unusually 
high casualty and injury rates show how officers of the U.S. Army viewed Japanese 
American soldiers as expendable; even the soldiers themselves believed they were 
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ordered on what were largely considered “suicide missions.”22  Yet, their willingness to 
take on these missions proved to many that Japanese American soldiers were fiercely 
loyal to the United States.  What made their loyalty so surprising was that it took place at 
a time when the U.S. government promulgated overtly racist policies against Japanese 
Americans, particularly their internment and investigations of Japanese American 
espionage.  At the onset of the war, many Japanese American men were designated 4C 
“enemy aliens,” a classification that not only made them ineligible for the draft, but also 
cast further suspicion over their loyalty to the United States.  Doubted in this way, 
Japanese American soldiers were specifically sent to fight in Europe, away from the 
Pacific Theatre, where Japanese forces fought.  Almost immediately after the war the 
United States helped a war-torn Japan rebuild itself.  In this self-interested process, 
General Douglas MacArthur helped write Japan’s constitution where he offered U.S. 
military protection in exchange for an agreement by the Japanese government to never re-
militarize.  With Japan pacified as a non-threat and perceived as a new economic ally of 
the United States, there soon opened key opportunities to transform prevailing 
perceptions of Japanese Americans as perpetual foreign threats.  
 The MGM film, Go For Broke! played one such role in combating the idea that 
Japanese Americans were foreign threats to be permanently excluded from the U.S. 
national polity.  The film first screened at the national Capitol on May 24, 1951.  The 
New York Times heralded the film as an expression and demonstration of Japanese 
American humanity: “without fuss or feathers or an over-expense of preachy words, is 
aptly revealed and demonstrated the loyalty and courage of a racial minority group, along 
with the normal human qualities of decency and humor inherent in these men.”23  A 
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classic in the genre of postwar “racial minority films,” Go For Broke! challenged 
sentiments from around the world that the United States remained a white supremacist 
nation that restrained the civil rights of Japanese Americans.  The film was written and 
directed by Robert Pirosh, who earned an Oscar nomination for the screenplay.  It starred 
Van Johnson as the protagonist, Lieutenant Michael Grayson.  The cast also included 
actual veterans from the 442nd Regiment, notably Lane Nakano, George Miki, Akira 
Fukunaga, Ken Okamoto, Henry Oyasato, and Henry Hamada.  Go For Broke! screened 
nationally and internationally, through much of Europe and Asia.  Most prominently, 
however, the film screened in Japan on December 7th, 1952, on the 11th anniversary of 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.   
 Historian Tom Coffman explains that while Japanese American soldiers faced 
discrimination in the military, they were key to winning the “hearts and minds” of Asia 
and Japan.  Edwin O. Reischauer, the principal architect of postwar U.S. relations with 
Japan (and eventual ambassador to Japan under John F. Kennedy), had argued in 1942 
that the internment of Japanese Americans had “unwittingly contributed” to Japanese 
propaganda.  Such propaganda stated that Japan was fighting a war to stop the United 
States from spreading white supremacist domination throughout Asia.  Reischauer wrote: 
“We should reverse this situation and make of these American citizens a major asset in 
our ideological war in Asia.  Their sincere and enthusiastic support of the United States at 
this time would be the best possible proof that this is not a racial war to preserve white 
supremacy in Asia, but a war to establish a better world order for all, regardless of 
race.”24  As a result of President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs against Japan, 
coupled with the later military occupation of Japan by the United States, Reischauer 
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would highlight the need to celebrate with vigor the wartime heroics of the Japanese 
American veterans.   
 In the film the heroism and valor of Japanese American soldiers, especially their 
unwavering loyalty and military sacrifice to the American nation, are themselves 
deployed to rid the newly-commissioned Second Lieutenant Grayson of his bigoted 
views of Japanese Americans.  From the start of the film, anti-Japanese racism is 
addressed through a series of pedagogical lessons on liberal racial tolerance.  One series 
superimposes the text of President Franklin Roosevelt over footage of the marching Nisei 
(second-generation) soldiers.  It reads:  
The proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team consisting of 
loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my approval.  The principle on 
which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that 
Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never 
was, a matter of race or ancestry. 
 
The idea that “Americanism” is not a question of race but one of “heart” provides, I 
would argue, a sentimental and overly generous view of U.S. race relations.  Such a 
myopic view of U.S. race relations frames the rest of the film.  Tellingly, while the film 
relies on the valor of the Nisei—for example, also superimposed in the same scene 
described above is a table of their battle record: “7 Major Campaigns in Europe; 9,486 
Casualties; 18,143 Individual Decorations; 7 Presidential Unit Citations”—there are 
many instances, where even in the film’s noble narrative, the Nisei are still pushed to the 
background through supporting roles or symbolic imagery.   
The issue of white racial tolerance and a project of subduing white anxiety around 
blurring racial lines becomes the focus of much of the film.  As a consequence, 
Lieutenant Michael Grayson takes center stage.  Upon arrival at Camp Shelby in 
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Mississippi, a Japanese American soldier drives a visibly disturbed Lieutenant Grayson 
through the camp.  The script describes Grayson’s discomfort with what he sees, “The 
distasteful expression on his rugged, handsome features leaves no doubt as to what he 
thinks of American citizens of Japanese descent.  Grayson throws a glance at the jeep 
driver, then shifts his angular, six-foot frame to get as much space between them as 
possible.”25  Accordingly, the cameras shoot the perspective of what Grayson sees from 
the jeep, providing the audience a scene where a white racial order is flipped on its head.  
Grayson is disturbed and offended to see an American military camp overrun by 
Japanese, where Japanese American soldiers doing a roll call respond to their exotic 
names being called, “Kawaguchi!” “Tsukimura!”  Grayson is even more bothered by 
what the script describes as a “Hawaiian war chant” where so-called “Kanakas” from 
Hawai‘i perform what appears to be hula, which is actually a fake hula done to an equally 
contrived “primitive” sounding song.  Such displays of white discomfort with “Oriental” 
foreignness sets the stage for Grayson to be reformed, even liberated. 
 In the next sequence, Grayson meets with the Sergeant Major, and immediately 
asks to be transferred back to the U.S. 36th Infantry, his previous Texas National Guard 
unit.  When asked if his request isn’t due to the Japanese American troops Grayson 
responds: “Because they’re Japs?  No, sir, it isn’t that at all.”26  Grayson consequently 
receives his first of many disciplinary lectures on the use of the term “Japs”:   
…they’re not “Japs,” They’re Japanese-Americans – Nisei – or, as they call 
themselves, boodaheads [sic].  All kinds of boodaheads, Lieutenant.  From 
Hawaii, Alaska, California, New York, Colorado - yes, and some from Texas.  
They’re all American citizens and they’re all volunteers.  Remember that.  And 
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Grayson is uncomfortable because he is outnumbered by Japanese Americans and is 
racially marked as “haole.”  He consequently is no longer the invisible majority left 
unmarked by hegemonic normalcy.  Indeed, the older white officers at Camp Shelby, 
ranked higher in the white heteropatriarchal order, lecture Grayson on his racism, 
demonstrating America’s new inclusive position on Japanese Americans.  While 
possessing the necessary qualities of a military officer—white, tall, blonde, and a 
Texan—Grayson is still a newly commissioned officer.  As such, his racism becomes 
evidence of his lacking full masculine maturity, where his superior officers consider 
racial tolerance of Japanese Americans necessary for his leadership position.  Such 
lessons of anti-racism, however, function to maintain the established hierarchy that 
includes senior white leadership, over junior white leadership, over subordinate non-
white (Japanese American) soldiers.  In this way, the inclusion of Japanese Americans in 
the fraternity of soldiers recalls how the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition 
included “Orientals” in ways that actually displayed Anglo American supremacy.  In 
other words, the inclusion of Japanese Americans would be tolerated, so long as they 
continued to strive for only subordinate supremacy.    
 In order to portray the United States as a nation founded on democratic ideals, not 
white supremacy, the film needed to provide sufficient reasons for why the United States 
interned 110,000 Japanese Americans.  Grayson broaches the topic when he asks the 
Captain if they use live ammunition at the rifle range, stating that all he knew was that the 
Japanese were placed in “relocation centers” and maybe “the army just had some surplus 
barbed wire they wanted to use, was that it?”27  His Captain admonishes Lieutenant 
Grayson by offering another lesson in racial tolerance: 
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The army was facing an emergency at the start of the war – a possible invasion by 
Japanese troops.  So all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were evacuated as 
a precautionary measure.  There was no loyalty check – no screening – nothing.  
If there were any spies among them, I can assure you they’re not in the four-four-
two.  Every man in the outfit has been investigated, reinvestigated and re-
reinvestigated.  (rising)  I suggest you start getting acquainted.28   
 
Upon learning that he would be in charge of an all Japanese American unit, Grayson 
takes his frustrations out on his platoon by maintaining strict regulations and orders.  The 
film, and the intensity of the drama, proceeds in a series of juxtapositions of scenes 
featuring private conversations among the white officers and private conversations of the 
Japanese Americans soldiers.  In one scene, a Japanese American soldier named Sam, 
played by Lane Nakano, an actual 442nd veteran who had been interned with his family at 
the Heart Mountain Internment camp, prepares a care package of canned goods.  Sam 
explains to fellow soldier Tommy (Henry Nakamura), that the package wasn’t being sent 
to his brother who was serving in the 100th battalion, but rather to Arizona where his 
family was interned in conditions worse than Camp Shelby.  Given the poor treatment of 
this family, he is asked why he would volunteer to fight.  Sam explains that the purpose 
of fighting was to end discrimination against Japanese Americans.  Tommy, whose 
family had been killed in Hawai‘i during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, responds in 
pidgin: “We show ‘em! We show ‘em us boodaheads good soldiers, good Americans!”  
Sam responds: “All we need now is the casualty lists.”29  
 After fighting alongside the 442nd in Italy and France, Grayson comes to respect 
his fellow soldiers.  In a pivotal scene, which sets up the climactic rescue of the Texas 
Battalion by the Nisei soldiers, Grayson stands up for his Japanese American regiment in 
the presence of his unreformed racist friend named Culley, who is also from the Texas 
Battalion.  Drinking at a bar, Grayson explains that the 442nd would be the Texas 
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Battalion’s artillery, and the ensuing dialogue between Grayson and Culley provides yet 
another pedagogical moment for reforming prevailing social conflations of Japanese 
Americans as enemy “Japs”:   
Culley:  They’re sending us up without our own artillery?  Just the Japs? 
Grayson:  They’re a good outfit, Culley.  Plenty good. 
Culley:  Practically winning the war single-handed, what I hear. (contemptuously) 
Japs!   
 
Embarrassed as some of the Japanese American soldiers over hear their conversation, 
Grayson asks Culley to step outside.  
Grayson: They’re not Japs, Culley.  
Culley: What? 
Grayson: They’re Japanese-Americans – Nisei – or, if you prefer, boodaheads.  
But not Japs.  They don’t like it and neither do I. 
Culley: What are you, a Jap-lover or something? 
Grayson:  I said, they’re not Japs.  I’m warning you, Culley— 
 
Grayson proceeds to scuffle with Culley, who would eventually change his views, but 
only after the 442nd and the 100th Battalion rescue the Texas Battalion.  Popularly referred 
to as the “Lost Battalion,” the 100th battalion and 442nd regiment suffered 800 casualties 
to save 211 of the Texan soldiers.30  Forty years later, Senator Daniel Inouye, a veteran of 
this battle who had gone on to become one of the most powerful Senators on capitol hill, 
would state, forcefully: “I am absolutely certain that all of us were well aware that we 
were being used for the rescue because we were expendable.”31   
 While Japanese Americans are shown to have the ability to be included into 
American culture, Japanese culture is shown to be of particular value to the United States.  
For example, a Japanese American soldier nicknamed Chick (played by George Miki) 
constantly complains about racism and the conditions of the camp.  Chick explains that 
while most others enlisted from internment camps, prior to the war he was in Iowa 
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getting paid $500 dollars a month for determining the sex of chickens.  He exhorts: 
“Chick-sexing is a science.  It was developed in Japan and it’s one place a boodahead 
gets a break…”32  In another moment, this one on “dirty tactics” during hand-to-hand 
combat, Grayson has his Sergeant, a Japanese American, in a hold for which he says 
there is no escape.  But the Sergeant suddenly flips Grayson with a judo maneuver.  I 
suggest that the idea of combining “oriental” Japanese knowledge with “western” 
American know-how would provide the cultural groundwork for integrating the Japanese 
American soldiers into the army.  Such a project for inclusion is also about integrating 
Asia into American political and economic hegemony at the outset of the Cold War.  As 
T. Fujitani succinctly argues, “Go For Broke was part of a new pattern of representations 
and discourses in which values considered to be traditional in Asian societies were 
celebrated as conductive to Americanism.”33  The cultural fluidity with which Japanese 
Americans could be both Japanese and American would also justify the disproportionate 
number of casualties suffered by the Nisei.  Japan’s soldiers were racialized in popular 
culture as “kamikaze” pilots, posing a luminous foreign threat, whereby the Japanese 
soldiers were obedient to the point of death.  In the context of war, the motto “Go for 
Broke,” used in Hawai‘i in reference to gambling until one is broke, but popularized 
nationally by the film, continues to essentialize Japanese Americans but now in self-
sacrificial obedience to the U.S. nation.  This characterization of Japanese American 
soldiers (as willing to “Go for Broke”) helped to justify the disproportionately large 
casualty rates of Japanese American soldiers.  In a scene where the soldiers are exhausted 
and sent on yet another suicide mission to rescue the Texas Regiment, Tommy and Sam 
speak of the need to change the attitudes of white Americans like Lieutenant Grayson 
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towards Japanese Americans.  Facing possible death, Tommy tries to encourage a 
disheartened Sam, “It’s rough—it’s plenty rough—but we know what’s it all about.  You 
bet.  More bettuh we ‘go for broke,’ eh, Sam?”  Sam eventually responds with a smile 
saying, “That’s about it, Tommy.  More bettuh we ‘go for broke!’”  Soon after, a shell is 
heard and explodes near two other soldiers injuring one and killing the other.   
 
 Fig. 3.1 The cast of the film Go For Broke!  Short stature of Japanese American soldiers 
 highlighted throughout film. 
 
 
 Though white racism is often the brunt of many of the jokes in the film white 
masculinity is simultaneously and continually reinforced.  Japanese Americans are “shot” 
in the film in ways that highlight their short physical statures against the larger white 
American soldiers, like Grayson.  These shots render them unthreatening to white 
heteropatriarchal order.  In one particular montage, the soldiers are shown training for 
combat by running through an obstacle course, but they are unable to leap over trenches 
or climb a wooden wall.  Their inability to perform what “normal” soldiers are routinely 
  
    157
able to do is a symbolic form of emasculation.  Still racially different but nationally the 
same, the racial order of the United States would symbolically become more inclusive as 
a multicultural nation, yet still preserve notions of white supremacy.  
 While Japanese American military sacrifice helped to mend U.S. relations with 
Japan, therefore facilitating the opening of Asian markets to American businesses, in 
Hawai‘i, it also assisted both a movement for statehood and Japanese American 
ascendancy.  Matsuo Takabuki, 442nd veteran, major player in land development, and a 
once controversial Trustee of the Kamehameha School Bishop Estate, recalls that their 
celebrated record on the battlefield “pushed” them “to the forefront of the statehood 
effort.”34  In his memoirs, Takabuki writes that future Congressional Delegate and 
Governor of Hawai‘i, John A. Burns, would tell Japanese American veterans: “Do not be 
ashamed of who you are.  Talk about your war record…  You have proven that you are 
Americans.  You earned this honor under fire.  Flaunt it.”35  Indeed, the Hawaii Statehood 
Commission would highlight the military achievements of the Nisei in its literature.36  
Armed with their GI Bills, many Nisei veterans would again leave the Islands to 
attain professional and law degrees, which upon their return, bolstered the social, 
economic, and political power of the Japanese American community.  John A. Burns 
would help to reorganize the Democratic Party by drawing heavily from the popularity of 
the Japanese American veterans.  Many veterans would thus become hugely successful in 
political office.  Some notable examples include the aforementioned Daniel Inouye, who 
would become a Senator in the U.S. Congress, and George Ariyoshi, who would become 
the first Japanese American governor of the state.  With other elected officials like Daniel 
Aoki, Sakae Takahashi, and Matsuo Takabuki, they worked together with Burns to 
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revitalize the Democratic Party in a concerted effort to unseat the Republican Party and 
its Big Five supporters.   
With the ideological support of returning veterans and the political support of the 
ILWU, the Democrats were able to accomplish what is often referred to as the 
“Democratic Revolution of 1954,” wherein political control of the legislature shifted 
from the Republicans to the new Democratic Party.37   Takabuki explains, however, that 
the liberal Burns Faction, from its inception, was not interested in disrupting the Big 
Five:  
 We saw the potential growth of tourism as an industry, with new and different 
players.  We realized the Big Five were important players in Hawai‘i’s economy, 
and we did not want to destroy them.  However, we did not want them to continue 
to dominate and be the only game in town.  Tourism would open all kinds of 
economic avenues for the future, providing opportunities for the upcoming 
generation of those outside the existing economic oligarchy.38 
 
This new political force sought a passive revolution, displaying no ambitions of 
fundamentally reordering social relations so much as they sought to be accommodated 
within the economic system of the Big Five.  Prior to the “Democratic revolution,” 
Takabuki writes that returning veterans participated in creating a “financial revolution.”39 
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many white businessmen would leave Hawai‘i 
fearing further military attack and martial law.40  This consequently led to an economic 
vacuum in which many Japanese American and Chinese American entrepreneurs were 
able to capitalize on abandoned businesses and wide open markets.  Takabuki writes:  
The Fukunagas of Servco started a small garage in Haleiwa, which grew into a 
large conglomerate of auto and durable goods dealerships, discount stores, and 
financial institutions.  The Fujieki family started a small family market that grew 
into the Star Supermarket chain.  The Teruyas’ small restaurant and market in the 
1950s and 1960s eventually became Times Supermarket.  Chinn Ho started 
Capital Investment.  K.J. Luke and Clarence Ching created Loyalty Enterprises, 
while Aloha Airlines began with Ruddy Tongg.  As the number of local 
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professionals, lawyers, and doctors grew in postwar Hawai‘i, the economic, 
professional, and political landscape also changed rapidly.41 
 
Takabuki explains further that the major banks in Hawai‘i—the Bank of Hawai‘i and 
Bishop Bank (now First Hawaiian Bank)—would not regularly offer business loans to 
anyone outside of the white economic circle.  This led veterans Daniel Inouye and Sakae 
Takahashi to open two banks: Central Pacific Bank (CPB) and later, the City Bank of 
Honolulu.42  With financial and administrative support from major banking institutions in 
Japan, many in the Democratic party would venture in major residential and tourist 
related real estate development projects, as tourism displaced agriculture as the dominant 
industry in the 1950s and 60s.   
Major land development projects, particularly in hotels and shopping centers were 
slowed down, however, because of the aforementioned fear or lack of confidence by 
stateside lenders and insurers in Hawai‘i’s territorial economy.  This motivated many 
Japanese to push for statehood, alongside those on the other end of the political spectrum 
who were a part of or associated with the Big Five.  Such an emerging historical bloc 
would not go unnoticed or unchallenged by others.  During the war and after it, Alice 
Kamokila Campbell emerged as a leading opponent of statehood, publicly opposing the 
statehood movement while fighting for other forms of self-governance for Hawaiians. 
Alice Kamokila Campbell: Unfit for Self-Government and Commemorating 1893 
 
 More than any other public figure in the 1940s, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell 
was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to statehood. 
Kamokila, as she was commonly known, was the daughter of sugar planter James 
Campbell, which afforded her the economic means to speak against statehood in ways 
that most other Hawaiians who had been dependent on the government or the Big Five 
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for work could not.  Kamokila’s mother, Abigail Ku‘aihelani, was a key leader in 
organizing the 1897 Kū‘ē petitions opposing U.S. annexation.43  Indeed, Kamokila was 
informed by a long matrilineal genealogy of Hawaiian resistance.  Elected as the first 
woman Territorial Senator from Maui County, Kamokila publicized her campaign by 
running a radio advertisement that spoke of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani.44  
Kamokila thus challenged the colonial assumptions that Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian 
women, were incapable of self-government.   
Kamokila maintained that with the attainment of statehood, “something 
indefinable would be lost,” and therefore throughout her political career she would strive 
to achieve some form of self-governance, besides statehood, for Native Hawaiians45 
Kamokila would also make statements about the U.S. citizenship that was forced upon 
Hawaiians, stating, “[i]t took us quite a while to get used to being Americans.”  Indeed, 
Kamokila identified herself as both Hawaiian and an American.  I wish to argue, 
however, that her expression of U.S. patriotism should be understood in terms of what 
Tina Delisle has defined as a “citizen-subject of a U.S. empire,” other subjects of U.S. 
colonialism, who in active and in often contradictory ways, tried to rework the terms of 
U.S. citizenship to their advantage.  In fact, Kamokila would seek out other colonized 
peoples whose American citizenship was forced upon them by the United States, namely 
Native Americans and other Pacific Islanders, in order to better understand other forms of 
American governance that might be available to Hawaiians.46  For instance, after being 
elected to the Territorial Senate, Kamokila traveled to Washington D.C. to attain 
information on the potential of turning the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act into a kind 
of Native American reservation to be administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  
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In 1921, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act set aside 200,000 acres of the least 
desirable land for “Native Hawaiians” of fifty-percent or more blood quantum.  The aim 
was to address the massive poverty of many Native Hawaiians and “rehabilitate” them 
back on the land in a kind of subsistence economy, where they would be able to lease an 
acre of land for a dollar a year.  Kamokila was asked by her Hawaiian constituents to 
investigate the Native American reservation system as an “alternative proposal to the 
present set up,” arguing that the government had been negligent in placing Hawaiians on 
the land.  While in Washington D.C. Kamokila was able to hold meetings with influential 
and powerful elected officials such as Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, Hawai‘i 
delegate Joseph Farrington, and several senators, to discuss the possibility of federalizing 
the Hawaiian Homes Commission.  She also spoke with President Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt, presenting them with a royal calabash on behalf of the “Mothers of Hawaii.”47  
Kamokila explained, however, that it was her discussions with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs that made her “more and more drawn away” from the proposal and would seek 
alternative means of “correcting faults” in the commission.48  Later in the year, with help 
from President Roosevelt and against the will of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, 
Kamokila opened a cooperative store for homesteaders that served as a community center 
for the island of Moloka‘i, including a kindergarten and other activities.  In her two terms 
as Territorial senator, Kamokila continued to enter numerous bills designed to improve 
the condition of Moloka‘i homesteaders.49 
 In October of 1944, still seeking to combat the political and economic oppression 
of Native Hawaiians, Kamokila committed what many considered to be political suicide.  
She sought Congressman Sterling Cole of New York to sponsor a bill that would transfer 
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Hawai‘i from the Secretary of the Interior to the Naval department.  After traveling to the 
U.S. Territories of Guam and Samoa, Kamokila argued that Hawaiians would be better 
able to negotiate the U.S. Navy than Big Five capitalism.  She wrote, “I sincerely believe 
the prestige of America would be greatly enhanced if Pacific island natives, incapable as 
the old Hawaiians of coping with ruthless business methods are folded under the care and 
guidance of our great naval leaders.”50  Having traveled to Guam and Samoa, Kamokila 
reasoned that because Hawaiians were unable to control immigration into Hawai‘i, Naval 
control would actually limit the flow of immigration (as it had Guam), and prohibit non-
natives from owning land (as it did in American Samoa).  Criticism of Kamokila was 
swift: the Honolulu Advertiser editorialized that her opinions did not represent the people 
of Hawai‘i and cast her as being “befuddled with an idealistic illusion of a primitive past, 
whose rigors she herself has never known...”51     
 
Fig. 3.2, Kamokila Campbell was a vocal and public opponent of statehood.   
Front page of Honolulu-Star Bulletin 
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 In January of 1946, when the first Congressional hearings on statehood since 
World War II were held at ‘Iolani Palace, Kamokila would bring the issues of Hawaiian 
self-government, Big Five economic greed, and the numerical dominance of Japanese 
Americans, to bear against statehood.  Aware that her testimony would be one of the few 
in opposition to statehood, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission attempted to squeeze 
her into an afternoon with other witnesses.  Kamokila skillfully forced the committee to 
provide a full day of testimony for her alone, stating that she needed more time for her 
graphs and charts to be prepared.52  In fact, her testimony was much anticipated in 
Hawai‘i: earlier in the month, Kamokila had publicly withdrawn from the Democratic 
party as a result of its endorsement of statehood, seeking instead a vantage point to be 
“independent and free to speak the truth.”53  She managed to get schedule her testimony 
on January 17, the 53rd anniversary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom.  By 
skillful maneuver, Kamokila used this historic date to force a history of the national 
dispossession of Native Hawaiians in conversation with the economic gains many 
believed would occur through statehood.  Kamokila also knew that such an explicitly 
stated connection could mark her as “un-American” and invalidate her testimony.   
On the day of her testimony, Kamokila chose to wear a black holoku gown with 
red and yellow lei and spoke for over two hours to thunderous applause in front of a 
packed room of over 600.  Kamokila charged the Big Five with organizing the statehood 
movement as a means to advance their economic interests by attracting, “outside capital 
and independent financial giants.”  Striking at the heart of the business community’s 
desires for statehood, Kamokila declared: 
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I do not feel…that we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the 
natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress, that we, the 
lovers of Hawaii from long association with it, should sacrifice our birthright for 
the greed of alien desires to remain on our shores, that we should satisfy the thirst 
for power and control of some inflated industrialists and politicians who hide 
under the guise of friends of Hawaii, yet still keeping an eagle eye on the financial 
and political pressure button of subjugation over the people in general of these 
islands.54 
 
In her testimony, Kamokila also called attention to the links between Big Five economic 
domination and the fear and silence that many felt in opposing statehood.  She shared an 
example of one such sentiment, sent to her in private, that implored her to speak on 
behalf of those who could not: “‘We can’t, Kamokila.  My husband would lose his job.’”  
Those present at the testimony, however, were able express their sentiments collectively 
in the cheers and applause made after Kamokila’s comments.  For instance, when 
Representative Angell asked Kamokila why statehood wouldn’t be able to address the 
problems she cited in the Territorial structure, Kamokila responded with a thinly veiled 
reference to the 1893 overthrow: “Who is it that has put us in the position we are today 
but the people who are asking you for statehood?  We, the real people of Hawaii, are 
perfectly happy, just as we are.”  The roar from the audience would force Joseph 
Farrington, who chaired the hearings, to tell the crowd to “refrain from demonstrations 
until after the conclusion of the interrogation.”  When asked by the congressmen what 
kind of government she would want instead of statehood, Kamokila responded, “an 
independent form of government” and then explained that if others wanted to live in a 
U.S. state, they could simply move to any of the forty-eight states in the nation. 
 Kamokila also criticized the numerical dominance of the Japanese.  She implied 
that Japanese Americans aided the attack on Pearl Harbor and that their move from the 
plantations to small businesses could cause the Japanese to “get a hold on the islands.”  
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While other scholars have written her off as a wealthy racist, there is evidence to suggest 
alternatively that her statements were part of a strategy to gain political leverage to 
oppose statehood by purposely playing to the racial fears of white Congressmen and 
aligning with the conservative right.55  A few years earlier, Kamokila had opposed anti-
Japanese racism, arguing that those “whose heart and mind are set against statehood for 
reasons based on prejudice, rather than ideals, those are the people of Hawaii who should 
be pitied rather than condemned.”56  Whatever the case, Kamokila’s statements against 
the Japanese American community reinforced the racism that they had sought to counter.  
At the same time, her remarks against Japanese Americans should not be taken as an 
invalidation of her aims to seek justice, for Hawaiians, against the overthrow of their 
nation.  Kamokila had been arguing all along that statehood, especially as it was backed 
by Japanese American ascendancy, was a continuation of Big Five domination, what 
Haunani-Kay Trask describes as a second elaboration of foreign hegemony.  Trask 
writes, “The history of our colonization becomes a twice-told tale, first of discovery and 
settlement by European and American businessmen and missionaries, then of the 
plantation Japanese, Chinese, and eventually Filipino rise to dominance in our islands.”57  
Indeed, Trask explains that the vehicle for Asian ascendancy was statehood, which came 
at the expense of Native Hawaiians.    
Kamokila’s anti-Japanese statements must thus be read against the backdrop of 
widespread circulation of heroic narratives about Japanese American loyalty, which made 
an ongoing history of racism against Japanese Americans visible, that in turn 
strengthened the statehood movement.  What has been less visible to many, if not, 
rendered natural and normal, are the specific forms of colonial oppression over Native 
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Hawaiians.  It is here that Andrea Smith’s conceptual framing in her “Three Pillars of 
White Supremacy”—of labor exploitation, orientalism, and genocide—can help us 
understand how otherwise noble efforts to combat one’s own form of oppression can lead 
unwittingly to participating in the oppressive logic of another.58  Where Japanese settlers 
and their supporters challenged the view that they were perpetual foreign threats, the 
cultural narratives of civil rights that anchors the Hawaii statehood celebration, forged 
deeply by the histories of Japanese American ascendancy and desires to capitalize on 
land developments in the postwar period, renders invisible their role in the settler 
colonization of Hawaiians.  Adversely, Smith’s framework helps us also understand 
Kamokila’s predicament: in combating the notion that Hawaiians are destined to 
disappear and thus be replaced, she resisted this oppression by heightening fear that 
Japanese Americans were foreign threats “ineligible for citizenship.”  In hoping to 
prevent the latest round of settler colonization and U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i through 
the vehicle of statehood, Kamokila appealed to a long and well-established fear, among 
many white Americans, of Japanese American political ascendancy in the United States.  
Even as it was entirely plausible that Kamokila herself frowned on Japanese American 
ascendancy in Hawai‘i, this ascendancy played a role in the continued political 
marginalization of Native Hawaiians.  
 Kamokila’s testimony (without the question and answer portion) was printed in 
the Honolulu Advertiser the next morning and criticism of her in both the Advertiser and 
Star-Bulletin would last for over a month.59  Lorrin P. Thurston, son of Lorrin A. 
Thurston, was among the first of many to criticize Kamokila, writing in his newspaper 
that while her testimony was “undoubtedly the high spot of the entire hearings” her logics 
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were confused.  Thurston would portray her as lacking consistency in her loyalty to 
political party or stances on statehood and that what she lacked logically was “made up 
for by her utter sincerity.”60  Thurston’s criticisms were chauvinistic and sexist.  They 
reduced Kamokila’s views to little more than emotion and sentiment, figuring her as 
someone who lacked the masculine rationale to be logical and discerning.  Most 
responses, however, criticized her for challenging Japanese American loyalty.  One 
editorial asked: “So she thinks the AJAs have received too much publicity?  Well, I think 
they rate it.  They paid for it with blood—how does she pay for her publicity?  Sooner or 
later it should dawn on her that people are getting fed up with her line.”61 Another argued 
that her comments have set race relations back 50 years.62   
 A few days after her testimony, Kamokila made a statement to the press that she 
had been asked to launch an island wide petition to oppose statehood.  This was a similar 
action to what her mother, Abigail Ku‘aihelani Campbell, had helped accomplish when a 
coalition of Hawaiian organizations toured the islands in 1897 with the Kū‘ē petitions to 
oppose U.S. annexation.  In response, The Maui News published an editorial titled, 
“Kamokila in Die Hard Fight Against Hawaii,” and a few days later warned readers to, 
“Beware of What You Sign.”63  This petition, however, would not circulate because of 
the risk of providing the Big Five with a list of names that could be immediately used to 
“blacklist.”  On September of 1947, however, Kamokila continued her opposition to 
statehood opening an “Anti-Statehood Clearing House.”64  This clearinghouse was 
designed to be a counter to the Hawaii Statehood Commission, from which she collected 
testimony in opposition to statehood and used them to lobby congress against statehood.  
Using her contacts in Washington D.C. she would send “anti-statehood information, 
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reports and arguments to congress.”65  One year later, however, Kamokila would strike a 
major blow to the Hawaii Statehood Commission revealing the campaign to be 
predetermined and deliberately used to silence any opposition to statehood. 
 On January 17th, 1948, on the 55th anniversary of the overthrow, Kamokila 
Campbell filed a lawsuit in Campbell vs. Stainback, et. al, that challenged the legality of 
the financing of the Hawaii Statehood Commission.  This lawsuit was timed to coincide 
with Oregon Senator Guy Cordon’s impromptu visit to investigate statehood.66  In the 
suit, Kamokila charged that the $200,000 (provided for by Act 115, that established the 
Statehood Commission) used by the Territorial government to nationally and locally 
campaign for statehood were “to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers 
opposed to statehood.”67  Her suit targeted especially the Commission’s publicity 
campaign on three main points: 
(1)  A national or sectional advertising and publicity campaign is not a valid 
public purpose for which public funds may be expended; (2) lobbying in 
Washington, D.C., is not a valid public purpose for which public funds may be 
expended; (3) the grant of unlimited discretion to an administrative agency in the 
expenditure of public funds constitutes an invalid delegation of power by the 
legislature.68 
 
Seeking to place a Temporary Restraining Order on the governor, members of the 
Statehood Commission, and territorial officials before the court hearing, Kamokila sought 
to stop them from spending any more taxpayer money to gain public opinion for 
statehood.  Circuit Court Judge Wilson C. Moore denied her request choosing instead to 
withhold any action until he decided whether the financing of the Statehood Commission 
was unconstitutional.69  Attorney General Walter D. Ackerman Jr., would file a demurrer 
against Kamokila’s case.  One month later, Kamokila’s lawsuit was thrown out of Circuit 
Court by Judge Moore who declared that “regardless of what we think as individuals, we 
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must bow to the will of the majority.  The last plebiscite showed more than two to one in 
favor of statehood and the territory, as an integral part of the United States, is in its 
democratic realm.  The basis on which we operate this government is on the will of the 
people.”70 But as indicated in chapter two, the 1940 plebiscite was “deliberately 
imprecise,” and even the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission determined that statehood 
was still a debatable issue.   
 Kamokila appealed this ruling and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court returned a 
unanimous decision in her favor.  In March of 1949, Justice E.C. Peters ordered an 
injunction against the Statehood Commission that prohibited the use of public monies for 
said purposes.  Justice Peters wrote:  
The appellees justify the expenditure of public moneys for publicity purposes… 
upon the ground that the purposes thereof subserve the public welfare, are for a 
‘public purpose’ and hence a rightful subject of legislation.  With this we cannot 
agree.  To accord validity to expenditures for an indiscriminate publicity 
campaign upon the ground that it is for a public purpose would do violence to that 
term as juridically defined and dignify as “public” what obviously is purely 
“political.”71   
 
In essence, the High Court rejected the Statehood Commission’s arguments, ruling 
instead that using taxpayer money to sway public opinion did not serve the “public” 
good, but instead constituted actions “purely political” in nature.   
Though it could no longer spend public monies on national and sectional 
advertising, the Statehood Commission stepped up its indirect, if not underhanded, 
practice of using media outlets, supposedly autonomous from the government, to 
continue to sway public opinion.  It did this in spite of the High Courts explicit ruling 
against the government’s alleged “right to petition the public for its favorable opinion” on 
political matters such as statehood in particular: 
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To conduct a national or sectional advertising campaign on behalf of statehood for 
Hawaii, and for such other purposes as might be included in the right to petition, 
is calculated merely to influence the reading public generally.  Favorable public 
opinion upon the subject of statehood undoubtedly may exert a profound 
psychological effect upon those in whom repose the legislative authority to grant 
or refuse statehood… the creation of favorable public opinion is foreign to the 
definition and concepts of the citizen’s right to petition.72 
 
Though the court found that the territory could not “petition the public” to shape public 
opinion in favor of statehood, it did not, more fundamentally, go so far as to declare the 
Commission invalid, and in fact left room for “reasonable” expenditures for the 
Statehood Commission to promote statehood.  In this regard, the court too was prejudiced 
against any status other than statehood (or the status quo).  This prejudicial view is best 
captured in the court’s view that Hawai‘i’s territorial status was temporary and 
transitional, with the inevitable end goal being statehood.  According to the Supreme 
Court, the Territorial government was created specifically to promote “welfare, peace, 
happiness and prosperity” and thus opined that to “accelerate the evolutionary process of 
the political transition from a Territory to a State abstractly accomplishes the same result.  
Reasonable men cannot differ upon the political advantages resulting from statehood over 
and above those inherent in a Territory of the United States.”73  Yet, even back then, 
Kamokila, and others, were pointing to other forms of self-governance, other forms of 
international rights, and other ways of understanding Hawai‘i’s political history.  Indeed, 
Kamokila and others had an international right to other forms of self-governance that 
were being blocked by U.S. governmental and legal maneuverings. 
 In 1953, Kamokila wrote a letter to Congress, arguing that of the $475,000 that 
had been appropriated for a government led statehood campaign since 1947, no money 
had been apportioned to opponents of statehood.  By 1953, Kamokila had begun to 
  
    171
campaign for Commonwealth and admitted that while the majority of people in Hawai‘i 
were in favor of statehood, this was the only option being discussed and the general 
public “never had the opportunity of studying its merits to demerits.”  She argued 
confidently that if those in Hawai‘i were to allowed a choice between Commonwealth 
and Statehood, she was confident that the majority would choose the former, “provided a 
reasonable time were given for them to receive adequate information concerning 
Commonwealth Status which thus far has been suppressed.”74  Her letter to Congress in 
1953 also shows how her strategies to oppose statehood had changed.  Now, she had 
begun to highlight two different threats: one, that statehood for Hawai‘i would set a 
precedent for other territories (namely, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin 
Islands, and the Panama Canal zone) to gain statehood, and two, communism through the 
International Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union (ILWU)—which by the mid-
1930s had supported statehood and was allied with the Democratic party—had “crippled 
industry” and would pose a serious threat to the U.S. continent.  By the 1950s, Kamokila 
would play to McCarthyism and the red scare to defeat statehood. 
 Lorrin P. Thurston received copies of Kamokila Campbell’s letter, after she asked 
that it be published in the Honolulu Advertiser.  Thurston refused to publish it, but sent it 
nonetheless to the Hawaii Statehood Commission, suggesting that it be “circulated where 
it will do the most good.”75  In 1954, Kamokila, Harold Hughes, and former governor 
Ingram Stainback, formed the organization, Commonwealth for Hawaii.76  The 
Democratic Party, having just taken majority control of the legislature and sensing that 
statehood was around the corner, roundly condemned the new organization and upstart 
movement for commonwealth.  Using the same linear logic employed by the Hawai‘i 
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Supreme court in its Campbell decision, Arthur Trask, John A. Burns, and William S. 
Richardson—leaders of the Democratic Party—prepared a “Resolution Denouncing 
Commonwealth for Hawaii.”  They declared:  
the history of the people of the Hawaiian Islands, ancient and modern, is a 
positive chronicle of the progressive advancement of man from tribal leadership, 
absolute kingship, constitutional monarchy, and republic, to the status of an 
organized territory of the United States of America…the devotion of the people of 
Hawaii is rooted in the high objective of receiving full political rights as a state in 
the union of states of America and that any other political status is an abomination 
to the loyal and patriotic citizens of Hawaii.   
 
The resolution described proponents of commonwealth as “sinister” and labeled their 
movement “illegal.”  It was through such tactics of demonization and criminalization that 
proponents of statehood can be said to have subjugated and obstructed any political 
alternative to statehood.   
Telling is the case of the Statehood Commission’s intimidation of a group of 
Papakolea Homesteaders and local historian Kathleen Dickenson Mellen when they 
attempted to write a document opposing statehood.  In 1948, Mellen and the 
Homesteaders had met with Senator Hugh Butler during his congressional visit to 
investigate statehood in Hawai‘i.  At the meeting, the Papakolea Homesteaders agreed to 
set their opposing viewpoints on paper and send the document to Butler, then Chair of the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  Butler would later write to Mellen 
asking for the letter promised him by the Hawaiian homesteaders.  Mellen reported that 
the Statehood Commission had discovered their plans, “roundly denounced” her, and 
threatened to send a member of the Statehood Commission to “talk” with the people of 
Papakolea.  According to Mellen, this group became “afraid to make the written 
statement.  And I agreed with them—knowing only too well what has happened in the 
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past to those who dared oppose statehood openly.”77  There are, in fact, other recorded 
instances of state repression, enacted by the Hawaii Statehood Commission, against 
Hawaiian opposition to statehood.  The research of John S. Whitehead shows that in 1957 
the Hawaii Statehood Commission determined ways to counter taxi drivers and tour 
guides who were telling tourists that statehood was not desirable amongst Hawaiians.78 
 In 1960, a year after statehood, Kamokila submitted to the Senate a vision and 
message she received from the Goddess Pele.  Her statement was inserted into the public 
record by Senate President William H. Hill, and read to the Senate by the clerk.  
Kamokila wrote that she had never previously received a visit from Pele, but had always 
been surrounded by “queer and incredible incidents.”  She explained that in the face of 
such supernatural occurrences, “with the assistance of the old sages and knowledge given 
me by my mother and grandmother, I have been able to work out miraculous results.”  
Indeed, Kamokila’s opposition to statehood often ran parallel to those of her mother’s 
against annexation.  Kamokila explained that she first received a vision of Pele on the 
morning of November 9th, and recalled her mother’s instruction, at times like these, to 
call aloud the names of those she thought were appearing to her.  “When you mention the 
correct name,” explained Kamokila, “the vision will suddenly disappear.”  After calling a 
list of names, she called the name Pele, and the apparition disappeared.  Taking this as a 
sign, Kamokila traveled to Kilauea crater, where she received another message from Pele, 
instructing her to transmit this message to Hawaiians: “My people, my beloved people of 
Hawaii nei, I am here with you in all the attributes of womanhood, to alert, guide and 
protect you, the present and future generation against the many pitfalls that could engulf 
you in hasty decisions and spectacular progress.”  Pele further stated that the “affairs of 
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state are in such a tangled mess,” and warned of a hidden agency “being drawn toward us 
led by a strong desire for possession.”  Pele closed with a challenge to Hawaiians: “Now 
that we are at the crisis of our destiny, are we to fall into oblivion?”79  
While many Native Hawaiians did in fact support Hawai‘i statehood, many others 
did not, and it was their voices that were purposefully silenced and contained.  In fact, the 
suppression of Hawaiian voices opposed to statehood heads a litany of repressive and 
unjust actions undertaken by agents of the state in the campaign to gain statehood.  These 
include, as we have seen so far, the monopolization of taxpayer money by statehood 
proponents, limiting political choices for decolonization to statehood or territorial 
government, and instances of state repression against Hawaiians opposed to statehood.  
With repeated efforts by leaders (like Kamokila) to oppose statehood, particularly on 
dates commemorating the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and grassroots 
opposition against statehood (such as the Homesteaders of Papakolea, taxi drivers and 
tour guides), it becomes impossible to continue to view statehood as a legitimate or at 
least genuine expression of self-determination or decolonization in accordance with 
internationally-agreed upon United Nations standards.  
While condemned by the majority of the residents in Hawai‘i, much of 
Kamokila’s views and actions were supported, even mandated, by international law.  It 
seems highly probable that Kamokila and others were unaware of the U.S. obligations to 
Hawai‘i under the United Nations.  Joseph Farrington, however, knew that the United 
States itself placed Hawai‘i on the U.N. list of non-self-governing territories, as he was 
also probably aware that the requirements for proper decolonization required that the 
“administering” power make a genuine effort to educate the non-self-governing peoples 
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about their political rights and options.  Yet, Farrington and others did not make this 
information available to the general public even with all of the avenues of media 
available to them.  If in fact a democracy relies on an educated populace, by 1959, 
Hawai‘i residents were deliberately only educated to the benefits of statehood.  Such 
deliberate containment of Hawai‘i’s options for political status combined with a highly 
partial opinion campaign to secure support for statehood, speak volumes about the actual 
status of democracy in Hawai‘i. 
 Both Japanese Americans and Native Hawaiians were contending with very 
different histories and political possibilities shaped by both U.S. foreign policy and the 
needs of a rapidly growing tourism industry.  The conflicting aims between Japanese 
Americans seeking to be further included into the U.S. national polity and of those Native 
Hawaiians who sought some form of autonomy from the United States would only 
intensify as a result of new challenges posed by a Hawaiian movement for self-
determination that emerged in the 1970s.  This movement was a response to post-
statehood real estate developments that displaced economically-poor rural communities, 
and many of these land developments, indeed, involved those who were either in or close 
with the Democratic party.80  The economic greed, which Kamokila Campbell argued 
would drive Hawai‘i as a state, led to numerous evictions of Hawaiians and increased 
militarization.81  Instead of seeing statehood in 1959 as a culminating achievement for 
Hawai‘i, evidence of its modern and democratic character, in my final chapter, I wish to 
examine the effects of statehood and its civil rights narrations on Hawai‘i.  To further 
examine the complex power relations between whites, different Asian groups, and 
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Hawaiians in contemporary Hawai‘i, and the legacy of Hawai‘i statehood, I turn now to 
the artwork of one Hawaiian artist who goes by the pseudonym, Kēwaikaliko.   
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KĒWAIKALIKO’S BENOCIDE: POST-STATEHOOD AND THE INTERSECTIONS 
OF RACE, INDIGENEITY, AND SETTLER COLONIALISM 
 
This artwork was created in October 2000.  It was completed in a week and has been getting both 
positive and negative feedback.  Grandma hates it. 





Fig. 4.1 Kēwaikaliko, Benocide, 2000; Pastel and fluorescent marker on paper.
 183 
A Hawaiian artist who goes by the pseudonym Kēwaikaliko critiques the legal 
challenges emerging out of the 2000 Rice v. Cayetano Supreme Court decision in his 
artwork titled Benocide.  Rooted in a history of imperial dispossession, Kēwaikaliko 
created a loaded illustration that illuminates from a Hawaiian epistemological vantage 
point, perspectives that are often made ideologically invisible or closed to settlers.1  
Central to the artwork is a Hawaiian man being lynched by then governor Benjamin 
Cayetano, Hawai‘i’s first governor of Filipino descent (1994-2002).  At the feet of former 
governor Cayetano lies the bearded and bloodied skull of Sanford B. Dole, the first 
colonial governor of the Territory of Hawai‘i and President of the interim governments 
between the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and presumed 1898 U.S. 
annexation.2  The lynching of the Hawaiian man takes place on a tree with leaves made of 
money and upon which Death, smoking crystal methamphetamine or “ice,” is figured as 
its trunk.  A haole settler, and well-known political pundit, who has been seeking to 
dismantle all Hawaiian rights and entitlements, stands wearing a swastika covered aloha 
shirt patriotically waving the state of Hawai‘i—and what is also the Hawaiian 
Kingdom—flag.  Next to him is what I perceive to be a Hawaiian figured as a pua‘a or 
pig in western style clothing.  A pua‘a with trickster-like qualities, perhaps a colluding 
Native, appears to be fondling the rear of the haole settler.  Depicted in black and gray, 
and comprising the ground beneath this mob are Hawaiian women who appear in all 
manner of suffering.  The black and gray envelop the green mountain that overlooks the 
urban sprawl of Waikīkī.  Centered along the horizon is a nuclear mushroom cloud rising 
into the sky, a direct reference to nuclear testing in the Pacific and more specifically to 
the U.S. military’s devastating impact in Hawai‘i. 
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Benocide was exhibited at the Honolulu Academy of Arts in an exhibition entitled 
“Nā Maka Hou: New Visions” from May 13th until June 17th 2001.  Featured amongst one 
hundred works of art by fifty-eight contemporary Hawaiian artists, the exhibition was 
designed to “communicate a new vision of Hawaiians in today’s society.”3  Manulani 
Aluli Meyer, scholar of Hawaiian epistemology and education, explains the pedagogical 
and theoretical implications of Hawaiian art in her essay “Hawaiian Art: A Doorway to 
Knowing,” which accompanied the Nā Maka Hou exhibition: 
Hawaiian art has always inspired me to enter doorways to deeper relationships, 
wider truths and vivid realities…  We read in art the possibilities of our people, 
we dialog with history, we repent with shame, we wonder, we marvel, we wake 
up!  We are educated through the poetry shared by these modern prophets of 
ancient knowing.  We are changed.  We are changed forever.4 
 
Meyer speaks to the use of art as a pedagogical tool, one that dialogues with history and 
possibilities, challenging the viewer and their versions of reality.  Kēwaikaliko offers a 
vision of Hawai‘i that often goes unseen, even among Hawai‘i residents, and is a clarion 
call for Hawai‘i’s residents to re-envision and re-imagine Hawai‘i’s contemporary 
situation.  The caption that accompanies this piece, however, warns against a reading that 
would represent Benocide as speaking on behalf of all Hawaiians.  Whereas his 
grandmother “hates it” and the artwork has been getting “both positive and negative 
feedback,” I do not wish to argue that all Hawaiians view the court cases in the way that 
my reading of Benocide does.  As mentioned throughout this dissertation, my purpose in 
reading Hawaiian historical moments or texts is not to claim expertise in Hawaiian 
epistemologies or cultural knowledge.  Instead, my interest lies in its rich observations of 
the intricate power relations operating within a settler colony under U.S. occupation and 
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this artwork in particular narrates visually the complex interrelations between whites, 
different Asian Americans, and Native Hawaiians in contemporary Hawai‘i.   
Kēwaikaliko’s artwork continues the thread of Hawaiian resistance to settler 
colonialism and American hegemony, which are the legacies of the overthrow, 
annexation, and in this historical moment, statehood.  Indeed, many who opposed 
Hawai‘i statehood in the 1940s and 1950s, like Kamokila Campbell and John Ho‘opale, 
forewarned that “economic greed” was behind a movement for statehood.  The famous 
Mary Kawena Puku‘i, a Hawaiian scholar, dancer, composer and educator who helped 
keep Hawaiian knowledge alive during a lengthy and aggressive Americanization 
movement in the Territorial period, expressed concern in 1959 that statehood might lead 
to the further elimination of what few Hawaiian rights remained.  Puku‘i observed, 
almost prophetically: “The question that stands up is what is to be done for my mother’s 
people? … Hawaiian people.  Will it mean the dissolving of Kamehameha School?”5  In 
June of 2003 such a lawsuit materialized in John Doe v. Kamehameha, which sought to 
eliminate Hawaiian-first admissions policies.  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s in a post-
statehood era, Hawai‘i’s race relations, politics, and economy changed dramatically.  
Liberal multiculturalism replaced the white racial dictatorship that controlled Hawai‘i 
during the Territorial period.  Such liberal multicultural rhetoric, however, worked to 
flatten the historical and political differences between Native Hawaiians and settler 
groups, positioning Hawaiians as just another ethnic group fighting for their “fair share of 
the American pie.”  Representing Hawai‘i as a racially harmonious and exotic locale 
would also facilitate Hawai‘i’s economic transition from agriculture to tourism, creating 
major hotel and real estate developments that brought in millions of tourists a year 
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radically altering island life. 6  Beginning in the 1970s, but primarily by the 1990s, a 
Hawaiian movement for self-determination would raise public awareness of a history of 
the 1893 overthrow.  Growing more vocal and forceful, this movement for self-
determination would reach critical mass.  In response to such movement for self-
determination, there arose a string of legal challenges that attacked the few remaining 
Hawaiian so-called entitlements, seeking to contain a Hawaiian movement for self-
governance by tying them up in court.  History would in fact repeat itself, as the plaintiff 
in the case, Harold “Freddy” Rice, is a direct descendant of William Hyde Rice, one of 
the men who helped in the 1893 overthrow.  
On February 23, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court in Rice v. Cayetano struck down 
the Native-only voting scheme of the nine Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustees.  
OHA is a state agency responsible for managing and administering trust monies 
generated from the “ceded public lands trust” to Hawaiians.7  The Court found OHA to 
be in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s 15th Amendment and ruled 7-2 that “Hawaiians” 
and “Native Hawaiians” were “race based” categories as opposed to political categories 
held by indigenous Hawaiians.  Thus, the Court found that OHA was a state of Hawai‘i 
race-based agency and therefore ruled in favor of the plaintiff deeming the Native-only 
voting qualifications to be in violation of the 15th amendment.8   
As a result of the Court’s declaration in the Rice decision all federal and state 
programs benefiting Hawaiians as an indigenous people became vulnerable and a series 
of legal challenges ensued.9  In October of 2000 the Republican candidate for U.S. 
Senate, John Carroll, and Hawai‘i resident Patrick Barrett filed two separate lawsuits 
claiming racial discrimination, arguing that Hawaiian “entitlements” created by the 
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Constitution of the state of Hawai‘i violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  These two lawsuits were consolidated and when combined they threatened 
to eliminate the Office of Hawaiian Affairs; all federal programs for Hawaiian health, 
education, and housing; Hawaiian gathering rights; and the Department of Hawaiian 
Home Lands.10  Both cases were eventually thrown out of court for lack of standing once 
it was found that neither plaintiff had ever applied for a single Native program.  In March 
of 2002, however, a group of 16 self-proclaimed “multiethnic Hawaii Citizens” sued the 
state in the Arakaki et al. v. Lingle case.11  This case was reduced to a ruling on the 
constitutionality of OHA in U.S. District court and was appealed to the 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  The Federal Court of Appeals issued a ruling on 31 August 2005 reaffirming 
that the plaintiffs could not challenge the constitutionality of federal spending but ruled 
that they were in standing as taxpayers to sue OHA.  Completed in October of 2000 
Kēwaikaliko’s Benocide challenges the earlier lawsuits of Carroll and Barrett, but 
remains a salient critique against the logic of the string of legal assaults and rulings 
seeking to eliminate Hawaiian rights.12  
 By situating the lynching in Benocide high on top of an affluent scenic point on 
the island of O‘ahu known as Tantalus, the three in attendance obtain a sweeping and 
panoptic vision of both Honolulu and the lynched Hawaiian.  Here a totalizing imperial 
gaze or “commanding view,” one that implies a viewer with an elevated vantage point 
and the imperial authority to subject, discipline, and simultaneously objectify the 
colonized subject has direct bearing on both a reading of this artwork and its connections 
to the imperial gaze of the Rice decision.13  As David Spurr notes in The Rhetoric of 
Empire, the ideology of the gaze is an “active instrument in construction, order and 
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arrangement,” and its authority, similar to Foucault’s Panopticon, relies on an “analytic 
arrangement of space from a position of visual advantage.”14  The gaze defines the 
identity of the subject by fixing its identity in relation to the observers, while also 
objectifying it within a “relation of power inherent in the larger system of order.”15  The 
logic underpinning the lawsuit and Supreme Court’s decision to identify the OHA voting 
scheme as “race-based,” perceives race but renders Hawaiian sovereignty rights and a 
history of occupation invisible, consequently flattening the important historical and 
political differences between Hawaiians and settlers.16  Here, the dominant U.S. 
frameworks of race and citizenship make Hawaiian articulations of indigeneity and 
genealogy through the state racially discriminatory, thus upholding an imperial order that 
reaffirms U.S. settler hegemony in Hawai‘i.  As Hawaiian legal scholar Kehaulani 
Kauanui explains: “Blood quanta classifications have consistently been used to enact, 
substantiate, and then disguise the further appropriation of native lands while they 
obscure and erase a discourse of specifically Hawaiian sovereignty and identity as a 
relation of genealogy to place.”17   
Seeing how systems of settler colonial violence and occupation attempt to remain 
invisible by its presumed naturalness and normalcy, Kēwaikaliko conveys visually his 
knowledge and view of contemporary Hawai‘i by drawing attention, quite literally, to the 
hidden aspects of imperial power that underpin the legal assaults.  The artist is able to 
make such a system visible by turning the “observer into the observed,” marking and 
calling attention to a color-blind visual optic and the violence it enacts.18  In other words, 
through selective narrative framing Kēwaikaliko uses the medium of visual art to draw 
connections between various historical references, thus theorizing on the intersections 
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and distinctions between race and indigeneity, while framing a U.S. legal institution 
within a history of U.S. occupation and settler colonial domination.  Through 
highlighting a notion of sight, this final chapter will trace how Benocide appropriates a 
gaze blind to Hawaiian indigenous birthrights and reverses it upon settler colonials and 
collaborative Hawaiians through the artist’s use of historically-legible images and the 
spatial configurations of a lynching.  
 Indeed, Tantalus, the specific location where the lynching takes place, is marked 
by a settler genealogy of colonial erasure and authority.  In an act exemplifying an 
imperial gaze, the Hawaiian name for Tantalus, Pu‘u ‘Ōhiʻa, became effaced when the 
students from Punahou high school, an elite private school created in 1841 to educate 
white missionary children separate from Hawaiians, renamed this place after a figure in 
Greek mythology (this is the same elite private high school that U.S. President Barrack 
Obama attended).19  The marking of Pu‘u ‘Ōhiʻa, which literally means the mound of the 
‘ōhiʻa tree is identified through the use of the twisted ‘ōhiʻa tree on which the Hawaiian 
is hung.  Kēwaikaliko’s choice to locate the lynching here, pinpoints the historical 
linkage between the power that underpins the imperial gaze in the Rice decision and the 
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom.  Spurr notes, “the superior and invulnerable 
position of the observer coincides with the role of affirming the political order that makes 
that position possible.”20  Many of the men who were influential and actively involved in 
the U.S. backed overthrow also graduated from Punahou high school—for instance, 
Sanford B. Dole who is figured at the feet of Cayetano and the infamous Lorrin A. 
Thurston (who we met in chapter one).21  The plaintiff himself fifth-generation Harold 
“Freddy” Rice also graduated from Punahou high school.22  
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While Cayetano is physically hanging the Native, he does not look at the hanging 
Hawaiian, but rather looks to the haole settler for recognition of this act.23  This is a 
subtle but apt illustration of the performative role that Cayetano as a Filipino American 
had to play in order to maintain his political power and inclusion.  Eiko Kosasa and Ida 
Yoshinaga, founders of the group Local Japanese Women for Justice (LJWJ), exposed 
the chain of command in the state where soon after the U.S. Supreme court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff in the Rice case, Hawai‘i’s Congressional Senator Daniel Inouye issued a 
statement to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and Governor Benjamin Cayetano requesting 
the removal of all trustees who were voted into office.24  Inouye instructed in his letter, “I 
believe that the Governor has authority under a separate State of Hawaii statute to appoint 
interim trustees so that the important work of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs need not be 
interrupted.”25  Cayetano, under Senator Inouye’s instructions, called for the nine trustees 
to step down voluntarily or risk OHA’s closure, and then appointed his own trustees to 
office.  Kosasa and Yoshinaga explain that, “[t]he intended result of Inouye’s statement 
was to facilitate the control of OHA by the state and away from the electoral process.”  In 
Benocide, both the pua‘a and Cayetano choose not to look at the lynching but instead 
look to the haole settler as they struggle for subordinate supremacy within the constraints 
of the system.  As I have argued elsewhere in this dissertation, such participants within 
systems of subordinate supremacy actively police a colonial order so that they remain 
included in such relatively “authoritative” positions. 
Kēwaikaliko’s usage of a lynch mob to visually represent settler colonialism in 
Hawai‘i helps us to see the current multicultural order in which individuals and their 
constituencies have an interest in maintaining a U.S. colonial system that comes at the 
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expense of Hawaiians.  Providing historical depth to the scene, Kēwaikaliko places at 
Governor Cayetano’s feet the bloodied skull of Sanford B. Dole, the first colonial 
governor of the Territory of Hawai‘i (1900-1903).  As mentioned above, Dole was 
involved in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and became President of both the 
Provisional Government (1893-1894) and Republic of Hawai‘i (1895-1898), two white 
settler governments formed after the U.S. supported overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom 
in January of 1893.  Cayetano is positioned over Dole’s remains and appears to have 
Dole’s blood on his hands.  Dole’s position beneath the feet of Cayetano can be 
understood as a historical reference of the transferal of political power from the largely 
white Republican Party to the (East) Asian American dominated Democratic Party.  
Resulting from a general, and popular desire for social change in Hawai‘i, coupled with 
important support from labor unions and the cultural valorization of the all-Japanese 
442nd and 100th Battalion regiments after World War II, the Democratic Party in 1954 
captured from the Republicans a majority of the seats in the legislature in what would be 
termed the “Democratic Revolution.”  As I have labored to show in this dissertation, 
Hawaiian and Asian American oppressions are “overlapping without equivalence” and 
thus it is important to understand how these dissimilar forms of oppression are structured 
differently within the complex relations of power governing the settler state. 
The contest between representative figures Dole and Cayetano historically frame 
the art piece.  In what Haunani-Kay Trask describes as an “intra-settler struggle for 
hegemony,”26 the victor holds the noose.  Cayetano stands where Dole once stood, 
exercising political power, which is only made possible by maintaining Hawaiian 
subjugation.  As Haunani-Kay Trask explains: 
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While Asians, particularly the Japanese, come to dominate post-Statehood, 
Democratic Party politics, new racial tensions arise.  The attainment of full 
American citizenship actually heightens prejudice against Natives.  Because the 
ideology of the United States as a mosaic of races is reproduced in Hawai‘i 
through the celebration of the fact that no single “immigrant group” constitutes a 
numerical majority, the post-statehood euphoria stigmatizes Hawaiians as a failed 
indigenous people whose conditions, including out-migration, actually worsen 
after statehood.  Hawaiians are characterized as strangely unsuited, whether 
because of culture or genetics, to the game of assimilation.27 
 
While Cayetano was not a popular governor amongst many Asian settler communities in 
Hawai‘i, he, and the Democratic Party, are often touted as symbols of Asian success at 
assimilation and especially an Asian American civil rights struggle against white 
exclusion and racism.28  The collective desires for equality or empowerment within an 
American political system by marginalized groups—represented here by the remains at 
Cayetano’s feet—constitute crucial components of a complex hegemonic structure that 
must be understood and interrogated.  The collective desire to oppose white racism, 
unfortunately, fails to address adequately an ongoing and overarching structure of settler 
colonialism and occupation.  Such anti-racist projects can also actively perpetuate it 
insofar as it obscures U.S. occupation beneath a domestic U.S. civil rights discourse.  The 
very naming of the art piece Benocide plays on Ben Cayetano’s collaboration with the 
elimination, or genocide, of Hawaiian indigeneity.  For instance, in response to the Rice 
decision Cayetano declared: “I’ve lived in Hawai‘i long enough to feel I’m Hawaiian.”29  
In such contexts cultural critic Moustafa Bayoumi has called for the development of an 
analytic that can attend simultaneously to different forms of oppression: “Does our 
reliance on race as perhaps the dominant mode for analysis compel us to obscure how 
something like the struggle for aboriginal rights may differ from the struggle for racial 
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equality?  Is there something peculiarly American about seeing race but being blind to 
sovereignty rights?”30   
By holding the noose and looking to the haole settler, former Governor Cayetano 
also represents the collusion of the state of Hawai‘i with the legal assaults.  The state of 
Hawai‘i has always been in a peculiar position of having to defend Native “entitlements” 
from suit while being negligent in administering these same “entitlements.”  In Benocide, 
Cayetano lynches the Hawaiian on a tree with leaves made of money.  The 1959 
Admissions Act, which admitted Hawai‘i as a state, transferred an estimated 1.2 million 
acres of lands from the Federal government to the state of Hawai‘i.  In what was to be 
called the Ceded Public Lands trust, “the betterment of the conditions of Native 
Hawaiians” was listed as one of its five responsibilities and twenty percent of the revenue 
gained by these so-called ceded lands were to be transferred from the state of Hawai‘i to 
another state agency, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which was established in 
1978.  In 1991 the Hawai‘i Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on 
Civil Rights stated that both the Territory and State of Hawai‘i had been negligent for 
seventy-three years in fulfilling their fiduciary duties as trustees of the Ceded Public 
Lands Trust.1  In 1990 the Hawai‘i State Legislature passed Act 304 to provide a 
mechanism for determining the amount of ceded land revenues owed to OHA.  This law 
specified that OHA was indeed entitled to 20 percent of revenue from the ceded lands.  
Three years later in 1993 the state paid OHA $19 million and agreed to make annual 
revenue payments.  OHA filed a lawsuit in 1994 to resolve all remaining back-payment 
issues.  On September 12, 2001, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that Act 304 conflicted 
with the 1998 “Forgiveness Act” passed by Congress, which prohibited further payment 
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of airport revenues for claims related to ceded lands, and was therefore invalid.  The high 
court, however, reaffirmed OHA's right to benefit from the ceded lands trust.  Based on 
this ruling, Governor Cayetano ordered State departments to stop payments to OHA.  He 
then offered to settle the issue of repayment in 1999 with a global settlement of $251 
million and 360,000 acres of ceded lands but OHA declined.31   
 Across from Cayetano, the caricature of a well-known haole settler stands wearing 
a swastika covered aloha shirt, waving the state of Hawai‘i flag and clutching a bundle of 
documents under his arm.  Here, he is representative of a group that has been using the 
precedent set by the Rice decision to dismantle all Hawaiian “entitlements.”  This group, 
Aloha for All, is partially supported by the Campaign for a Colorblind America, a 
national group that challenges affirmative action programs across the United States.32  
We believe that individuals of Hawaiian ancestry are just like the rest of us.  
Hawaiians are not a “people” separate from the State’s other citizens.  They are 
not a “tribe,” not a “sovereign nation.”  They are one among many ethnic groups 
in the state, entitled to the same respect we give all those groups and their varied 
cultures—but not more.33 
 
Of the three—Cayetano, the pua‘a, and haole settler—the haole settler is the only one 
who looks at the lynched Hawaiian directly.  His “colorblind” worldview, however, 
makes the materiality of Hawaiian history and indigeneity hidden in plain sight.  By 
reading the representations of the institutions that structure his worldview, symbols 
representative of a U.S. nation-state—the State flag and U.S. legal documents—the 
system of value attached to each shows how these value systems render occupation and 
indigenous issues ideologically invisible.  In placing the swastikas, a symbol of a 
genocidal and fascist nation-state, within the haole settler’s Aloha shirt, Benocide forces 
one to view the effects of a neoconservative “Aloha for All” ideology to enact a cultural 
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genocide on Hawaiians. 
The haole settler holds in his left hand the state of Hawai‘i flag, which prior to the 
1893 overthrow was a national symbol of an internationally recognized independent 
Hawaiian nation.  The flag has since been recoded as the state of Hawai‘i flag that 
remains under the imposed legal and ideological framework of the United States and its 
Constitution.  The possession of the Hawaiian nation’s flag in the settler’s hand 
symbolizes settlers’ colonial control over the State and the flag’s hidden double 
meaning— both the successful occupation and the simultaneous obfuscation of this act—
is exposed.  Under his right arm is a bundle of documents representative of his group’s 
control of the U.S. legal system.  This group has been using the precedent set by the Rice 
decision in order to legally terminate, or lynch, an indigenous political category held by 
Hawaiians.  In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opening remarks to his opinion on the Rice 
case, Kennedy applies the 15th amendment of the U.S. Constitution to Hawaiians and 
finds their relationship to the state of Hawai‘i to be race-based.  
A citizen of Hawaii comes before us claiming that an explicit, race-based voting 
qualification has barred him from voting in a statewide election.  The Fifteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, binding on the National 
Government, the States, and their political subdivisions, controls the case.34 
 
By focusing the gaze upon Rice’s race and citizenship the court is able to, as Whiteness 
studies scholar Judy Rohrer writes, “render indigenous claims inarticulable by racializing 
native peoples, while simultaneously normalizing white subjectivity by insisting on a 
color-blind ideology.”35  This makes race the normative and salient issue in regards to 
Native entitlements.  Indigenous rights are thus subsumed under a category of race, 
providing other potential plaintiffs with the groundwork to seek the further erasure of 
indigenous rights from Hawai‘i through legal challenges.  Within this identifying system, 
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the Native subject’s claims to indigeneity are executed for the supposed cause of equal 
rights and citizenship.  Haunani-Kay Trask challenges such a declaration noting that:  
As indigenous peoples, we are all outside the Constitution, the settler document 
that declares ownership over indigenous lands and peoples.  Since the 
Constitution is an imposed colonial structure, nothing therein prevents the taking 
of Native lands or the incorporation of unwilling Native peoples into the United 
States.36 
 
This history of political dispossession and forced inclusion into the United States is key 
to understanding the problematic logic of the Rice decision and its legal progeny.  In his 
dissenting opinion to the Court, Justice Stevens points out, “It is a painful irony indeed to 
conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore a 
measure of native self-governance because they currently lack any vestigial native 
government—a possibility of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived 
them.”37   
Tying these images together is the haole settler and his group’s campaign “Aloha 
for All” represented as swastikas within an Aloha shirt.  By juxtaposing these symbols 
and letting them play off of each other, these comparisons do two things.  First, they 
show how violence and injustice can be legitimized through the legal system of a nation-
state.  In Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from Burmingham Jail” he writes that, “[w]e 
should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was ‘legal’ and 
everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was ‘illegal.”38  King’s 
referencing of Nazi Germany’s legal genocide revealed the laws upholding segregation as 
also legal but unjust.  In doing this, King encouraged pastors criticizing his non-violent 
activism to look past the state as inherently just and question how the legal system can 
codify violence.  Kēwaikaliko does a similar move here.  By evoking Nazi Germany, he 
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shows the “Aloha for All” project of applying the 15th amendment to Native entitlements 
as legitimizing a violent termination of Hawaiian rights and a category of indigenous.  
Secondly, Kēwaikaliko’s referencing of “genocide,” in the title Benocide for 
instance, compares the systematic genocide committed by Nazi Germany to the cultural 
genocide committed through the termination of an indigenous category.  By comparing 
these acts, the often subtle but material forms of violence committed against Hawaiians 
are revealed.  Hawaiian playwright Alani Apio uses the term “cultural genocide” to 
describe the legal challenges in his 2001 Honolulu Advertiser newspaper commentary, 
“A Thousand Little Cuts to Genocide.” 
…the things many of you say and do amount to 1,000 little cuts against us.  And 
these cuts represent a subversive, long-standing cultural genocide against the 
Hawaiian people.  Cultural genocide against the Hawaiian people. 
 
Nobody executes us.  No one lynches us.  No government enslaves our children or 
rapes our women.  No citizenry chains us up and drags us from the backs of 
pickup trucks.  No homicidal maniac gassing us.  Just 1,000 little cuts to our self-
esteem, self-identity, cultural pride—to our souls.39 
 
The genocide referenced is not physical but cultural and political.  It is the lynching of a 
Hawaiian nation and indigenous category, which makes Hawaiians distinct from settlers.  
According to Apio, “[p]eople with Hawaiian blood may still be here, but my culture—
distinct and unique from everyone else—will have bled to death.”   
Where the plaintiffs in the legal challenges portray themselves as innocent 
victims, the use of the legible image of a lynching takes us to the very emergence of the 
15th amendment in 1870 and challenges a narrative of settler victimhood.  In the late 
nineteenth century African American intellectuals and activists such as Ida B. Wells, 
Pauline Hopkins and others revealed that the mass hysteria surrounding alleged sexual 
offenses by African American men against white women were imaginary, thereby 
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revealing the practice of lynching to be a form of terrorism used to uphold a white racial 
order and arrest any social mobility amongst African Americans.40  As W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage explains: 
Rather than punish criminals, lynchers actually sought to crush black economic 
aspirations, squelch black activism, and perpetuate white hegemony ... Once the 
myths were discredited, they [Black activists] believed, lynching would be 
understood for what it was—a crude and brutal tool of white supremacy.41 
 
By describing the legal assaults as a lynching of Hawaiians the myths of “racial 
discrimination” and settler victimhood are reversed, visually representing the legal 
challenges as a means to terrorize a Hawaiian community that has been mobilizing 
effectively for self-determination.  Historian Jonathan Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio called the 
legal challenges a reactionary backlash to a Hawaiian movement that had created 
“widespread discussion and acknowledgement” of the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom.42  Though U.S. Hawaiian specific entitlements have existed in Hawai‘i since 
1921, it was not until 1996, three years after the largest demonstration in Hawai‘i’s 
history protesting the illegitimate overthrow of the Hawaiian nation, that the Rice case 
was filed.  The 2000 Carroll and Barrett case were both thrown out of court after it was 
revealed that neither had applied to any Native programs.  Chris Iijima, Professor of Law 
at the University of Hawai‘i asserted,  
[…] these findings confirm that the Barrett and Carroll lawsuits were not 
motivated by any particularized concern for Hawai‘i, or its people, or even to 
redress any real harm to any of its citizens.  These lawsuits were simply the 
application of a generalized right-wing ideology about the nature of race relations 
to the circumstances of Hawai‘i.”43   
 
The sovereignty movement threatened and continues to threaten a dominant political 
order and the legal assaults were a means of impeding the Native movement for self-
determination while also quelling the fears of settler residents.  And while the plaintiffs in 
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the lawsuits imagine themselves as continuing the work of civil rights leaders such as 
Martin Luther King Jr., the historically created systems of unequal economic, political 
and cultural power in Hawai‘i are maintained, not challenged, by their actions. 
The metaphor of a lynching point to commonalities between Hawaiians and racial 
minorities within a colonial order.  But there are also representations that point to the 
unique genealogy Hawaiians have with the Hawaiian Islands, which speaks to the 
specific responsibilities they have to Hawai‘i.  Haunani-Kay Trask explains the familial 
relationship that Hawaiians hold with Hawai‘i: 
As the indigenous people of Hawai‘i, Hawaiians are Native to the Hawaiian 
Islands.  We do not descend from the Americas or from Asia but from the great 
Pacific Ocean where our ancestors navigated to, and from every archipelago.  
Genealogically, we say we are descendents of Papahānaumoku (Earth Mother) 
and Wākea (Sky Father) who created our beautiful islands.  From this land came 
the taro, and from the taro, our Hawaiian people.  The lesson of our origins is that 
we are genealogically related to Hawai‘i, our islands, as family.44 
 
Kēwaikaliko’s other artwork titled Papa A Me Wākea feature the progenitors Papa (Earth 
Mother) and Wākea (Sky Father) and show how both the sky and the land are gendered in 
Benocide.  In Benocide, they are both represented as suffering.  Wākea is striated and 
colored yellow and magenta with a nuclear mushroom cloud rising from it.  Below, Papa, 
the green patches of land, is enveloped in black and gray with Native women shown 
suffering and fighting, some within the crimson red blood.  The Native man is raised to 
the sky by the noose and separated from the land via the noose of the colonial state, 
which creates displacement and interruption.  In his left hand he is holding dirt, clinging 
to Papa or Earth Mother, and what few Hawaiian entitlements that remain.  Hence, his 
clenching of land shows his desire to be released from the noose and returned to the land, 
thus reuniting political sovereignty with land and resources.  The clenched fist also 
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cautions us from viewing the lynching as complete.  In this historical moment he is not 
yet dead but still struggling from being executed. 45  In the tree there is an ‘iole, or rat, 
seeking to free the lynched Hawaiian by chewing at the noose. 
The pua‘a or pig’s thoughts and actions are never predictable and remain 
ambiguous in this piece.  The pua‘a can be seen as either fondling the settler’s rear or as 
Vicente M. Diaz suggested, picking his pocket.  He is a pua‘a with kino lau, a shape 
shifter who could be read as a greedy, colluding pig to be loathed or a pig with the 
potential to turn itself into a giant boar and ruthlessly defeat his enemies, like the pig-god 
Kamapu‘a.  Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa writes about Kamapua‘a and the characteristics of a 
pig nature:  
Defiant of all authority, bold and untamed, he recalls the pig nature that lies 
dormant in most people.  He is the primeval reveler, lusting after life, he is the 
creature eagerly sucking at a mother’s breast.  Treacherous and tender, he thirsts 
greedily after the good things in life—adventure, love, and sensual pleasure.  
Kamapua‘a is a hero to Hawaiians because he recognizes no societal restraint, and 
we love him for it.46 
 
In the drawing, the pua‘a is in a position to free the lynched Hawaiian but perhaps 
because he is not actively protecting an indigenous political and cultural category, the 
pua‘a participates in its destruction.  The pua‘a also troubles a colonizer and colonized 
binary without dissolving the cultural, historical, and political differences between Native 
and settler.  Like Cayetano and the haole settler, the pua‘a is drawn with short, round, 
and stubby features.  The lynched Hawaiian man, however, is drawn to scale.  In the face 
of Hawaiian suffering and occupation, the commonly propagated and highly 
romanticized representations shrouding Hawai‘i (over 7 million tourists yearly) have as 
much relevance as a cartoon, but one with very material effects on Hawai‘iʻs ecology and 
people.47  
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Kēwaikaliko’s work forces the viewer to see the often uncomfortable and harsh 
realities of imperial violence in Hawai‘i while asking one to bear witness to the 
contemporary situation of Hawaiians.  This, I would assert, is the principal purpose of 
positioning the viewer as a spectator to the lynching.  In much the same way that 
lynchings throughout the United States were viewed publicly and necessitated general 
public support or at least silent complicity, we view the lynching as it happens, from the 
same perspective of the other spectators, which implicates the viewer in the symbolic 
lynching of Hawaiians.  Positioning the viewer in this way, the artwork poses a difficult 
question: What are you going to do about this?  As Manulani Aluli Meyer asserts: 
We speak to you in shapes, colors, and metaphors.  We view angles distinctly; we 
prioritize contours differently; we have different politics based on our experience 
of rape, pillage and transformation.  We are speaking in the language of imagery 
and you are learning more about the passion and priorities of a people.  The time 
demands it of all of us.  And I believe we are ready to listen.48 
 
Benocide offers a vision of Hawai‘i that often goes unseen by non-Hawaiians and those 
outside of Hawai‘i, whose only understandings of this place is shaped by advertisements 
propagated by the tourism industry.  Yet the reality expressed visually by Kēwaikaliko is 
one experienced daily by many Hawaiians who continue to be subordinated by U.S. 
occupation and thus struggle for their human rights to self-determination and self-
governance. Indeed, such acts of imperial violence have been made invisible by the 
normalized idea that primitives are “unfit for self-government” and thus “better off” 
under the United States.  Hawaiian artwork such as Kēwaikaliko’s Benocide demystifies 
the illusions of American benevolence, revealing the current violent material effects of 
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50 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD 
 
What does profit mean?  One takes more than one gives.  That’s what profit is. 




  The colliding histories of Hawai‘i statehood that I have examined in this 
dissertation may have occurred in the past, but they certainly continue to inform and 
persist into the present.  Just the fact alone that 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of 
Hawai‘i statehood almost guarantees historical and political collisions will occur.  To 
plan for its yearlong commemorative events the state legislature allocated $600,000 to be 
used by the 50th Anniversary of Statehood Commission.2  This new Statehood 
Commission is not unlike the other commissions examined in this dissertation, both in 
terms of its resources and its campaign to win public opinion.  Already, the Statehood 
Commission has been using selective narrative framing to propagate a history of 
statehood that reaffirms and normalizes U.S. imperial power in Hawai‘i.3  Given the 
contentious events on Admissions Day in 2006 (as we saw in the introduction) and a 
vocal and forceful contemporary Hawaiian movement for self-determination, the 
Commission vowed to create “culturally sensitive” commemorations and activities 
leading to Admissions Day in 2009.4  
 As a part of its yearlong plans, the current Statehood Commission has been 
running a series of television and radio vignettes, called 50 Voices of Statehood, designed 
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to educate the public about different perspectives of Hawai‘i statehood.5  One such public 
service announcement features Reverend Abraham Akaka’s 1959 sermon, which was 
delivered at Kawaiaha‘o church on March 13th, 1959, the day after the Statehood bill was 
passed.  In this vignette, U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka describes his older brother’s sermon 
as a celebration of both statehood and the Aloha spirit, and gives the impression that the 
largely Hawaiian church was uniformly supportive of statehood.6  While the sermon did 
celebrate statehood as an achievement, the actual text of Reverend Akaka’s sermon also 
acknowledges the existence of Hawaiian opposition to statehood, an antagonism 
premised on America’s desecration of Native sacred sites and a government “motivated 
by economic greed”:   
There are some of us to whom statehood brings great hopes, and there are those to 
whom statehood brings silent fears…  There are fears that Hawai‘i as a state will 
be motivated by economic greed; that statehood will turn Hawai‘i (as someone 
has said) into a great big spiritual junkyard filled with smashed dreams, worn out 
illusions; that will make the Hawaiian people lonely, confused, insecure, empty, 
anxious, restless, disillusioned—a wistful people.  [Italics my own]7 
 
Reverend Akaka’s description of Hawaiians’ “silent fears” regarding the possible 
negative effects of statehood resonates with the sentiments expressed by John Ho‘opale, 
Alice Kamokila Campbell, and others, who had described Hawaiians who were opposed 
to statehood as operating within a climate of fear.  This climate, as we have seen, was 
produced through large amounts of taxpayer monies (used by the Hawaii Equal Rights 
Commission and Hawaii Statehood Commission), and through deliberate aims to silence 
and invalidate such opposition.  Through the nearly 25-year state-sanctioned opinion 
campaign, those who voiced opposition to statehood were characterized as impediments 
to Hawai‘i’s presumed natural and inevitable growth into a full-fledged American state.  
While unpopular at the time, such opposing views that explored forms of governance 
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other than statehood or the status-quo—the only two options presented to Hawai‘i’s 
voters in the official plebiscite—would have satisfied international law.  
Indeed, the very idea that statehood was a natural and expected development for 
Hawai‘i was ideological, shaped by American national narratives, the opinion campaigns 
of these commissions, and by those who had economic interests in statehood.8  Reverend 
Akaka’s statement in 1959, that many Hawaiians feared that Hawai‘i as a state would be 
motivated by “economic greed,” seem prophetic fifty years later.  Catalyzed by the most 
recent economic depression (beginning in 2008), one that economists have compared to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, Governor Linda Lingle and Attorney General Mark 
Bennett appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to gain clear title to sell or transfer 1.2 
million acres of so-called “ceded lands.”9  These “ceded lands” are in fact Hawaiian 
crown and government lands seized by the United States at the time of the alleged 
annexation in 1898.  As mentioned in chapter four, when Hawai‘i became a state in 1959, 
the federal government transferred these lands to the new state government.  In 1994, 
however, Pia Aluli, Jonathan Osorio, Charles Ka‘ai‘ai, and Keoki Ki‘ili sued the state of 
Hawai‘i in an effort to prevent it from selling 500 acres of these lands on Maui and 1,000 
acres on the island of Hawai‘i.  The case would make it to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, 
which in February of 2008, reversed the lower court ruling and granted the plaintiffs’ 
request for an injunction to stop the state from selling or transferring these lands.10   The 
Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the state of Hawai‘i cannot sell or transfer these lands 
pending resolution of Hawaiians’ claims as recognized in the 1993 Apology 
Resolution—a congressional resolution that apologized for the U.S. involvement in the 
1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian nation.  In acknowledging the moral and legal 
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transgression, the apology also explicitly recognized that Hawaiians had never 
relinquished sovereignty over Hawai‘i.  In an unprecedented move, Governor Lingle 
went over her own State Supreme Court decision and appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  On March 31, 2009, the High Court ruled that the 1993 Apology Resolution, as a 
congressional “resolution,” that is, a vote that required only a simple majority rather than 
a two-thirds majority vote in Congress, did not sufficiently constitute a legal stop to the 
state’s titles to the lands in question.11  The irony of such a decision is that the annexation 
of Hawai‘i was itself based on a resolution, the Newlands Resolution, which was passed 
by Congress in 1898.   
As a measure to clarify title to the so-called Ceded Lands, but in more direct 
response to the 1993 Apology Resolution and string of lawsuits (examined in chapter 
four) that sought to eliminate “Native entitlements,” the aforementioned Senator Akaka 
has introduced into Congress the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, 
popularly known as the Akaka Bill.  In a hotly contested political move, this bill would 
grant “federal recognition,” granting sovereignty on a U.S. national level and thereby 
lead to some measure of autonomy for Hawaiians.  Similar to statehood, such a move 
would grant Hawaiian self-determination through a civil rights legal discourse and not 
recognize the international claims that Hawaiians still hold since the overthrow of their 
nation.  President Barrack Obama, who calls himself a Native son, has expressed support 
for the Akaka Bill.  An article in Hawaii Business makes explicit the financial 
motivations behind Obama’s support for this bill, stating that it would bring greater 
economic stability to the state of Hawai‘i, particularly in regards to the issue of “legally 
clouded ceded lands.”12  
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Fig. 5.1 Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance (HIAA) demonstration at the 50th 
Anniversary of Statehood Commemoration at the Hawai‘i State Capitol, March 18, 2009. 
 
 In a moment when the state’s attempts to gain clear title to “ceded lands” 
coincides with the celebration of its 50th anniversary of statehood, Hawaiian groups have 
intensified their own organizing efforts with a range of actions to expose the “history of 
theft” behind these state-sponsored commemorations and policies.  At the official 
statehood celebration held at the open-air rotunda at the State Capitol, the Hawaiian 
Independence Action Alliance (HIAA), a coalition comprised of more than 10 different 
Hawaiian groups, organized a peaceful demonstration to draw attention to statehood’s 
more obscured history.  Unlike the Statehood Commission (and its $600,000 budget), the 
HIAA action was a strictly grassroots effort with no financial support.  The creativity and 
message of the demonstration, however, allowed the activists to steal the show.  With tall 
red and black banners fastened to bamboo that read “HAWAIIAN INDEPENDENCE,” 
and with each participant wearing a single bright green letter on black t-shirts, the group 
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spelled out the phrases, “FAKE STATE” and “HISTORY OF THEFT” to critically link 
the celebration of Hawai‘i statehood to a history of U.S. occupation and imperialism in 
the Islands.  Group organizer Lynette Cruz stated: “There was no treaty of annexation.  
Show me the treaty.  There’s been an incorrect interpretation of history all these years.”13  
The official celebration of statehood withdrew from the open-air rotunda of the State 
Capitol and retreated into the Chambers of the House of Representatives, consequently 
leaving the capitol open for the demonstrators to openly chant and spread their message.  
While the local newspapers and news channels limited their coverage of the 
demonstration to brief mention, coverage by the Associated Press, provided the group 
national and international attention.  Through newspapers such as the Times of India and 
China Daily, the existence of a Hawaiian movement for self-government seeking 
autonomy from the United States was made known internationally.14  Long-time 
Hawaiian activist Richard Pomai Kinney, who was 19 years old at the time of statehood, 
was quoted as saying: “Statehood is a fraud.  My parents said Hawaii would become only 
a place for the wealthy.  Look at it today.  There’s nothing to celebrate.”15  Indeed, fifty 
years after statehood a disproportionate amount of Hawaiians live in high rates of 
homelessness, incarceration, infant mortality, and drug and alcohol addiction.  They 
continue to face and oppose land developments on Native sacred sites and burials, legal 
assaults threatening the selling of lands stolen by the United States at the time of 
annexation, including evictions from these lands.   Celebrating fifty years of a 
government that has legitimized, and at times initiated, such imperial violence was the 
last thing many wished to do.   
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 This dissertation has examined historical actors, narrators, and cultural 
productions across diverse historical moments to offer a “history of the present,” an 
attempt to historicize the demonstrations of Hawaiians and supporters in the 
contemporary moment.  Through an examination of the articulation of dissimilar histories 
and politics I have mapped historically the different logics of oppression (Three Pillars of 
White Supremacy) that are themselves productive of diverse political identities that limit 
and guide individuals in their visual world with real political, economic, and legal 
consequences.16  In particular, I have examined cultural productions—world’s fairs, 
movies, state seals, political cartoons, labor pamphlets, and visual art, amongst others—
through the propagation of state-led opinion campaigns and the opposition to them, 
paying careful attention to the discursive formations of orientalism and primitivism, 
which helped to organize U.S. capitalism and settler colonial power.  By situating 
Hawai‘i statehood at the intersections of U.S. labor exploitation, settler colonialism, and 
war, I examined how ambivalent nation narration(s) mobilized around Hawai‘i statehood, 
have historically disposed well-intentioned citizens to enact the colonial oppression of a 
domineering class.17  I have thus argued that state historical discourse takes the United 
States’ occupation of Hawaiian lands as fixed, and thereby allows a civil rights discourse, 
one with major limitations in addressing international human rights injustices against 
Hawaiians, to take precedent.  Consequently, I have found that such a firmly entrenched 
civil rights discourse normalizes the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i, limiting and 
constraining our field of vision from understanding the complicated and intricate colonial 
dynamics at play in Hawai‘i.  Informed by the work of Andrea Smith, this dissertation 
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thus calls for an attempt to become multilingual in these dissimilar histories and logics of 
oppressions.18  
 Whereas additional time and resources for revising this dissertation into book 
form will allow me to cover a number of other significant historical and counter historical 
incidents that I had initially proposed in my prospectus, this study points to new vistas of 
future research.19  For example, I will expand the historical scope of my project by 
repositioning the 1959 admission of Hawai‘i as a U.S. state not as a moment of apogee 
but rather, as a moment of profound economic and cultural transition, where the 
institutional workings of the state were streamlined to respond more quickly to 
multinational neoliberal capital.  My hope is that such an expansion will explain the 
simultaneous development of corporate tourism, global U.S. militarism, and the rise of 
the contemporary Hawaiian sovereignty movement in the postwar period.  The thematic 
and methodological expansion of historical scope will also situate my evolving thoughts 
of settler colonialism in conversation with the recent work of scholars such as Scott 
Morgensen, Andrea Smith, Mark Rifkin, and Chris Finley, each of who have begun to 
explore sexualized dimensions of settler colonialism through ideas such as “settler 
homonationalism.”20    
 Whatever the future holds for this project, I am certain that the present and 
dimming future of Hawai‘i statehood will continue to operate at the intersection of a 
settler state and an ever expanding and meddling U.S. empire, whose twin formations 
will continue to be premised on a colonial logic of white supremacy dependent on the 
denial of the sovereignty of peoples figured as “primitive.”  The theatricality of the state 
and its continued misrepresentation of the violence enacted by this empire, allows it to 
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sustain its practices of global hegemony through an image and narration of itself as an 
inclusive and changing liberal multicultural state.  Hawai‘i’s own Barrack Obama is but 
the latest and most powerful elaboration of this.  Within an ever-growing American 
system reliant on economic growth through labor exploitation, settler colonialism, and 
war, since its very inception, American liberation and exploitation are two-sides of the 
same coin.  Until, perhaps, we become multilingual in the logics of each other’s histories, 
and create a politics to address these numerous forms of historical oppressions 
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